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**POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING AND ELECTION
REFORMATIONS IN NIGERIA'S 2015 GENERAL ELECTION:
ISSUES AND IMPACTS**

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UUM
Universiti Utara Malaysia

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA
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**POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING AND ELECTION
REFORMATIONS IN NIGERIA'S 2015 GENERAL ELECTION:
ISSUES AND IMPACTS**



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**A Thesis Submitted to Ghazali Shafie Graduate School of Government, in
Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Universiti Utara Malaysia**



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ABSTRACT

Periodic election is one of the major tenets of democratic rule and it is considered as a huge financial venture involving government spending for sponsoring electoral management body, political parties and contestants. Elections in Nigeria are often volatile with widespread irregularities that made them faulty and unacceptable. Political party financing and electoral process during the Nigeria's Fourth Republic became corrupted due to the influence of money politics. Hence, this study examined the process of political party financing and electoral reformation and its impacts on the outcome of the 2015 General Election. One of the major problems relating to the country's election is how the regulations on political party financing was violated with illegal spending and corrupt practices which subsequently affected the election outcome and its credibility. This research used qualitative method whereby the data were obtained from informants who were selected from organisations and agencies relating to election, as well as anti-graft agencies, academicians and focus group. The data obtained from the field was analysed and discussed using content analysis and thematic interpretations. The findings of this research show that there was a clear violation of regulations on political party financing and massive corrupt practices amounting to trillions of Naira, particularly by the two major contending parties: APC and PDP. This money was sourced from government's treasury and illegally spent in bribing the stakeholders who were involved in the elections but, the election reformation helped immensely in producing an improved election in comparison with the previous ones. This research recommends that regulations on political party financing should be revisited and any future election should be conducted using electronic voting. In addition, financial activities of parties and candidates should be strictly monitored and violation of electoral laws by any party or candidate should be sanctioned severely.

Keywords: Political Party Financing, Election, Election Reform, Electoral Process, Nigeria's Election.

ABSTRAK

Pilihanraya berkala merupakan salah satu rukun utama pemerintahan demokratik dan dianggap sebagai usaha kewangan yang besar kerana melibatkan perbelanjaan kerajaan untuk menaja badan pengurusan pilihanraya, parti politik dan calon yang bertanding. Pilihanraya di Nigeria sering tidak menentu dengan penyelewengan berlaku secara berleluasa yang menjadikannya rosak dan tidak dapat diterima. Sewaktu Republik Keempat Nigeria, pembiayaan parti politik dan proses pemilihan telah disalahgunakan melalui pengaruh politik wang. Oleh itu, kajian ini mengkaji proses pembiayaan parti politik dan impaknya terhadap hasil pemilihan umum 2015. Salah satu masalah utama yang berkaitan dengan pilihan raya di negara tersebut adalah bagaimana perbelanjaan haram dan amalan rasuah melanggar peraturan pembiayaan parti politik yang kemudiannya mempengaruhi keputusan pilihan raya dan integritinya. Penyelidikan ini menggunakan kaedah kualitatif di mana data telah diperolehi dan dikumpulkan dari pemberi maklumat yang dipilih daripada organisasi dan agensi yang berkaitan dengan pilihanraya, serta agensi anti-rasuah, ahli akademik dan kumpulan fokus. Data yang diperolehi dari medan dianalisa dan dibincangkan dengan menggunakan analisis kandungan dan interpretasi tematik. Hasil dapatan kajian menunjukkan dua parti utama yang bertanding: APC dan PDP, telah dengan jelas melanggar peraturan mengenai pembiayaan parti politik dan terlibat di dalam amalan rasuah besar-besaran yang berjumlah sehingga trilion Naira. Sumber wang tersebut telah diperolehi daripada perbendaharaan kerajaan dan dibelanjakan secara haram dalam menyogok pihak berkepentingan yang terlibat di dalam pilihan raya tersebut tetapi reformasi pilihan raya sangat membantu dalam menghasilkan eoeksi yang lebih baik berbanding dengan yang sebelumnya. Kajian ini mencadangkan agar peraturan mengenai pembiayaan parti politik perlu disemak semula dan pilihan raya pada masa akan datang perlu dijalankan dengan menggunakan pengundian elektronik. Di samping itu, aktiviti kewangan parti dan calon harus dipatuhi dengan ketat, dan pelanggaran undang-undang pilihan raya oleh mana-mana pihak atau calon perlu dihukum dengan lebih keras.

Kata Kunci: Pembiayaan Parti Politik, Pilihan Raya, Pembaharuan Pilihan Raya, Proses Pilihan Raya, Pilihan Raya Nigeria.

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DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to Almighty Allah (SWT) for His unending mercy and blessings in guiding me throughout the journey of my life with success. All blessings and praises be on His Messenger Muhammad (PBUH). I dedicate this work to my parents for their guidance and support in my life. I dedicate this work to Dr. Hamza Sule Wurobokki for his fatherly support in my life.



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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA	Action Alliance
AC	Action Congress
ACB	African Continental Bank
ACD	Action Congress for Democracy
ACN	Action Congress of Nigeria
ACPN	Allied Congress Party of Nigeria
ACSS	Africa Centre for Strategic Studies
AD	Alliance for Democracy
ADC	African Democratic Congress
AG	Action Group
APLP	All People Labour Party
ANFREL	Asian Network for Free Election
ANPP	All Nigerian Peoples Party
APA	African Peoples Alliance
APC	All Progressives Congress
APGA	All Progressive Grand Alliance
APP	All Peoples Party
APS	African Political System
ARP	African Renaissance Party
ASEAN	Association for South East Asian Nations
AU	African Union
AVM	Air Vice Marshal
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BNP	Better National Party
BNPP	Better National Peoples Party
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
CAC	Corporate Affairs Commission
CBN	Central Bank of Nigeria
CCB	Code of Conduct Bureau
CDRT	Centre for Democratic Research and Training
CIDA	Canada International Development Agency

CISLAC	Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre
CJN	Chief Justice of Nigeria
CLEEN	Centre for Law Enforcement Education
CNC	Conscience for National Consensus
CNN	Central Network News
COG	Commonwealth Observer Group
CPC	Congress for Progressive Change
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CPPA	Centre for Public Policy Analysis
CPP	Centre Peoples Party
DFID	Department for International Development
DPN	Democratic Party of Nigeria
DPP	Democratic Peoples Party
DSS	Department of Security Services
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group
EO	Election Officer
EU	European Union
EUEOM	European Union Election Observer Mission
FCTA	Federal Capital Territory Abuja
FDP	Fresh Democratic Party
FEDECO	Federal Electoral Commission
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FP	Fresh Party
GCB	Global Corruption Barometre
GDM	Grassroots Democratic Movement
GFI	Global Financial Integrity
GIGA	German Institute for Global Agency
GIR	Global Integrity Report
GNPP	Great National Peoples Party
HDP	Hope Democratic Party
HP	Hope Party
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICPC	Independent Corrupt and other Related Practices Commission

IDEA	International Database for Political Financing
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFES	International Foundation for Election System
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INEC	Independent National Electoral Commission
IPAC	Inter Party Advisory Council
IPOB	Indigenous People of Biafra
IRI	International Republican Institute
KP	Kowa Party
LDPN	Liberal Democratic Party of Nigeria
LP	Labour Party
MPPP	Mega Progressive Peoples Party
MASSOB	Movement for Agitation of Sovereign State of Biafra
NAC	National Action Party
NASS	National Assembly
NBS	National Bureau of Statistics
NCNC	National Council for Nigeria and Cameroons
NCP	National Centre Party
NCS	Nigerian Custom Services
NCSSR	National Commission on Social Security Reform
NDC	National Democratic Consensus
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NDP	National Democratic Party
NEPU	Northern Element Progressive Union
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
NMDP	National Majority Democratic Party
NMM	National Mass Movement
NNA	Nigerian National Alliance
NNDP	Nigerian National Democratic Party
NPC	Northern Peoples Congress
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NPN	National Party of Nigeria
NPP	Nigeria Peoples Party

NRC	National Republican Convention
NTP	National Transformation Party
NYM	National Youth Movement
PDC	People for Democratic Change
PDP	Peoples Democratic Party
PPA	Peoples Progressive Alliance
PPN	Peoples Party of Nigeria
PRC	Provisional Ruling Council
PRP	Peoples Redemption Party
PVCs	Permanent Voters Card
OECD	Organisation of Economic Countries and Development
OPC	Oduduwa Peoples Congress
SDMP	Social Democratic Mega Party
SDP	Social Democratic Party
TI	Transparency International
TMG	Transition Monitoring Group
UBA	United Bank for Africa
UDP	United Democratic Party
UKAID	United Kingdom Agency for International Development
UK	United Kingdom
UMBC	United Middle Belt Congress
UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNCP	United National Congress Party
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIP	United Nigeria Integrated Party
UPGA	United Progressive Grand Alliance
UPN	Unity Party of Nigeria
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes
UPP	United Peoples Party
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCIRF	United Nations Commission on International Religious Freedom
USD	United States Dollars
US	United States

VOA

Voice of America

WRAPA

Women Right Advancement and Protection Alternative



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CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

1.1 Introduction

This chapter is a general introduction of the research work including the major purpose of the research particularly the reason for the choice of the research topic, the main problem identified that led to the conduct of the research, the scope and limitation encountered in the research, the significance of the research and its contribution to the existing knowledge, the methodology used in data collection and analysis and the complete plan of action for the conduct of the research work.

1.2 Background of the Research Work

The 2015 General Election in Nigeria has set the foundation for a new wave of democratisation and democratic consolidation in Nigeria and Africa at large. This is because of its impact in ushering of opposition political party at the national level for the first time in the history of the country and for the political changes that took place before, during and after the election. The election was heralded by controversies, hope, fear, threats, expectations, determination, and desire for change. It was the first time in the history of the country that the opposition political party successfully defeated the incumbent president which seemed almost impossible before. The election is considered at national, Africa and international level as an improvement from the previous ones since the resurgence of democratic rule in the Fourth Republic (Nwachukwu, 2015). However, such unanimous credibility and general scorecard given to the 2015 General Election was largely due to the historical victory of the

opposition in the country and the recorded improvement in the conduct of the election without taken into cognisance other ingredients that will test the integrity of the election especially political party financing and corrupt practices that took place during the process of the election.

Elections in Nigeria are normally accompanied with violence, rigging, malpractice, corruption, vote buying, intimidation of opposition, harassment of voters, politically motivated assassination, ballot snatching, stuffing of ballot boxes in addition to massive employment of religion, ethnicity and regional politics by the politicians to win at all costs. This led to the elections identified as not free and fair leading to crisis of illegitimacy and popularity. This has been the norm since the emergence of the Fourth Republic and even in the previous Republics (Isma'ila & Othman, 2015).

The 2015 General Election in Nigeria was conducted in an atmosphere of intense fear, insecurity, political alliance and re-alliance while the campaign was dominated by great issues of national concern such as insecurity, corruption, unemployment and poverty as observed by many scholars. These scholars also stressed that the Boko Haram insurgency, corruption, poverty, unemployment and poor economic policies compelled for the campaign process to be on matters of national interest and that has made a significant impact on the outcome of the election (Centre for Public Policy Alternative 2015, Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2015, Ewi 2015, Orji 2015, Ayanda & Odunayo 2015, Chukwudi 2015, International Republican Institute 2015, Omilusi 2015, Ahar 2015 and Oji 2015).

Nigeria is a country with multi-ethnic and multi-religious as well as multi-cultural

entities which make the politics a war affair and in particular during elections where the voting pattern is always influenced by the above variables. From the culmination of major and minor ethnic groups during pre-colonial period, the British colonisers amalgamated the diverse multicultural entities into a single unit called Nigeria in 1914. It was a union of an imbalance entity with three major ethnic group namely Hausa/Fulani (North), Igbo (South) and Yoruba (West) dominating the minorities in the politics of the country since political independence (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015:7).

The election pattern in Nigeria used to take the trend of the North voting for a northern Muslim candidate, South voting for an Igbo Christian candidate and the West voting for a Yoruba either Muslim or Christian candidate being a mixed region. In the process, elections turned violent and are bedeviled with malpractices. This is due to political culture and voting behavior of the electorates since independence as well as the influence of money politics. This was the major concern for a democratic setback in Nigeria as the military found it necessary to intervene on many occasions to confiscate power to restore order, unity and security in the country (Ibrahim & Abubakar, 2015).

Nigeria is currently divided into six geo-political zones as North East, North West, North Central, South West, South East and South-South. The country is also divided into 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja (FCTA). The country is the most populous African nation and the seventh most populated in the world with an estimated population of 200 million from the projection of the 2006 Population Census (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015:7). The North is believed to be the majority

according to 2006 population census, in terms of population dominated by Hausa/Fulani Muslims while the South is dominated by Igbo Christians and mixed Yoruba Christians and Muslims. This explains why the North is always a decisive force in the electoral politics of the country.

With the transition back to democracy in 1999, there emerged a two-party system with three dominant political parties which are, Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), All People Party (APP) and Alliance for Democracy (AD). The APP and AD won the majority electoral seats in their respective regions except the PDP which dominated the North and the East. Since 1999, the General Election holds periodically after every four years and the Fourth Republic seems the longest democratic transition in the history of the country. The General Election had occurred five times as against the Aborted Third Republic only once and it was annulled, the Second Republic experienced General Election only twice as in the case of the First Republic. All the General Elections hold in the Fourth Republic were alleged to have been marred with coercion, rigging, vote buying, corruption, ballot stealing and snatching, stuffing of ballot boxes and other electoral irregularities making the elections controversial, incredible and considered as undemocratic in practice (Ayanda & Odunayo, 2015). The 2015 General Election seemed an improvement in this perspective as it is considered credible, historic and the dawn of a new era in the democratic consolidation in Nigeria (Ayanda & Odunayo, 2015).

In addition, the 2015 General Election was believed to have been different from the previous ones in the sense that the major national opposition political parties formed an alliance which culminated in a positive result for their victory. The Action

Congress of Nigeria (ACN), All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), faction of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) and Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) decided in 2013 to form a coalition which gave them a strength that no opposition political party has ever gathered in the history of Nigeria. This had been strengthened further with the new PDP joining the APC later. With powerful supporters, financial strength, national spread and the continuing dwindling of the relevance of the ruling PDP which had ruled for 16 years, the opposition seemed likely even before the election a ready winner.

Furthermore, one important factor in the 2015 General Election that made the election unique was the conduct of the election. The electoral body, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) introduced electronic voting using smart card readers which were believed to have succeeded tremendously in checkmating rigging and electoral malpractices. The INEC in the 2015 General Election looked more set, improved, credible and equal to the task amidst various security and logistics challenges (Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room, 2015: 10).

Thus, in general, while the studies identified above insisted and accepted the overall declaration of the 2015 General Election as credible taking into consideration some measures or specifically factors such as the emergence of opposition as the winner, the use of card reader, one vital aspect is neglected which is the integrity of the election with reference to the campaign spending of the major contenders in relation to the established regulations on political party financing in the Constitution and Electoral Act 2010. This work identified this angle as an area of interest and questioned the extent of the credibility by examining the financing of political parties and the ethical

issues of adherence to the rules and/or violation of the rules and how the phenomenon affected the outcome of the election. In other words, this work examined the political party financing of the 2015 General Election and the level to which it can be accepted or declared as credible when the ethical issues of party financing in the process was critically examined.

The issue of political party financing is of great concern to many including analysts, policy makers, electoral bodies and international agencies. It is a premise of promoting fair play and ensuring transparency as well as eschewing corrupt practices during contest for political offices universally. There are studies existing on the subject matter by some scholars. One of these scholars is Biezen (2003). He observed that citizens all over the world today show growing concern on influence of financial activities on political parties and how this led to corrupt practices and criminal sponsorship of parties and candidates. In recent years, there are alleged corrupt practices and lots of scandals associated with financing political parties which questioned the validity of elections and democratic process. In order to curb this, the European Union, for example, suggested a benchmark for financing party activities (Biezen, 2003: 9).

According to Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2012) studies, member countries set some regulations to ensure transparency in political financing and electoral process which include; regulating private funding, increasing public funding and setting spending limit. However, realising that, these regulations are not enough, the members resorted to improve the process of transparency by including; disclosing candidate/party financing. This is very important because regulating financing of political activities will prevent illicit financing and corruption

which might lead to squandering of public resources and misplacement of priority in the policy making (OECD, 2012: 6).

The major sources of finance for political parties and candidates involved contribution bans, private sources of income, limits on contribution, public financing and abuse of state resources. There are efforts at ensuring compliance and sanctions but, the problem is oversight activities and lack of strict adherence to regulations which give windows to corrupt activities in political funding (Londono & Zobatto, 2014).

Political party financing is crucial in any democratic settings as the contestants need to source for a means of sponsoring their political activities. It is expected that; political financing should be transparent and in line with regulations provided by the electoral body of any country. Failure to adhere to the rules of engagement will lead to violation of the electoral process which may lead to corruption and other illegal practices. In Nigeria, there is a financial mark set up by Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for campaign and other activities leading towards election. For instance, a ceiling of N1 billion (\$3, 168, 981.52) is set for financing Presidential campaign in 2015 as provided by electoral reforms of 2010, N200 million (\$633,796.30) for Gubernatorial candidates, N40 million (\$126, 759.26) for Senatorial candidates, N20 million (\$63, 379.63) for contestants of Federal House of Representatives and N10 million (\$31, 689.82) for members State House of Assemblies. The regulations stated that, any candidate intending to contest for any political office should adhere to the provisions (Ukase, 2015).

Politicians and their parties in Nigeria used the means of political financing to siphon money into their private pockets. The process is also used by the electorates to acquire

financial and material benefits in terms of patronage to certain political figures. Despite the existence of financial regulation of campaign spending, the political parties and politicians spent above ceiling and use the campaign process to loot public funds and also corrupt the whole political process through bribing of the electoral officials, vote buying, bribing of security personnel, bribing of stakeholders in the electoral process, forceful subversion of electoral procedure and the use of public office after election to enrich themselves since they emerged through a corrupted process (Walecki 2003, Olarinmoye 2008, Ayoade 2008, Adetula 2008, Adeyi 2008, Aiyede 2008, Best 2008, Smah 2008, Ojo 2008, Yagboyaju 2011, Micheal 2013 and Transparency International 2015).

The linkage between money and politics is a powerful one with implications for democracy, especially in new democracies. Political party financing has been identified as a source of political corruption in several countries (Innocent & Nkechi, 2014). Campaign financing has become a subject of concern in Nigeria because of violation of regulations which usually gives undue advantage to some candidates and contestants. This emanated because of most contestants sometimes controlling the governmental powers having an unlimited access to public funds to use for their own personal advantage or purpose (Nkechi & Innocent, 2014).

In Nigeria, sponsoring a candidate or a political party in an election is a good investment with a return as the sponsor will regain what he spent with extra profit. This is possible as a result of the socioeconomic environment in the country with rising level of poverty, hunger and illiteracy which made the electorates vulnerable for easy manipulation of the electoral process through vote buying and rigging of elections

results. In this regard, with huge amount of money spent in securing an elective position, it is easy to see the correlation between politics and high level of corruption in the country (Innocent & Nkechi 2014, Omilusi 2015, Olorunmola 2015, Micheal 2013 and Olarinmoye 2008).

This work examined political party financing and election reformations in the 2015 General Election in Nigeria and how it impacted in the integrity of the election and its outcome in general with some perceived corruption and corrupt practices in terms of the sources of finance for the political parties and contestants, spending above the maximum set limit and bribing of stakeholders in the process and the future implication of these acts.

1.3 Problem Statement

There are electoral regulations on campaign spending at all levels in Nigeria and the contestants are expected by law to abide by them. However, there are evidences that candidates and their political parties at all levels spent more than the financial benchmark. A Report by USAID/UKAID in 2015 revealed that Presidential, Gubernatorial and Senatorial as well as House of Representatives candidates spent far beyond the financial ceiling set up for their campaign. For example, the then, ruling party Presidential candidate (PDP) spent N8, 749, 685 296 (USD27, 727, 590.97) while the opposition party APC spent N2, 915,846,737 (USD9, 240, 264. 41) just for media campaign alone. The money was sourced from other sources and public resources which affected the general public and is a form of corruption that is perpetrated using the platform of campaign activities while denying masses essential services with the diverted fund (United State Agency for International

Development/United Kingdom Agency for International Development, 2015).

Some reforms and factors introduced by the electoral body were believed to have contributed in the success of the 2015 General Election. Many factors are considered to have contributed in the success of 2015 General Election and these issues are of variant dimension which were discussed by scholars such as issue-based campaign and not sentiment (CPPA, 2015), challenge of Boko Haram insecurity (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2015, Ewi 2015 and Orji 2015), minimal level of rigging (Ayanda & Odunayo 2015), freedom of speech (Chukwudi 2015), media accessibility (IRI 2015), role of political parties (Omilusi 2015), adequate funding of the electoral body, INEC (Ahar 2015), fielding of corrupt candidates which gave some parties an edge over others (Oji & Anthony 2015).

Other scholars attributed the success of the election to too much expectations from the opposition candidate of higher performance by the electorates and the post-election challenge (Animashaun 2015), credibility of INEC in the electoral administration (Orji, 2015), the use of smart card readers (Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room 2015), role of social media (Bartlett et al 2015), change in political behaviour and voting pattern (Ibrahim et al 2015) and religious freedom in election (USCIRF 2015).

However, the above studies paid little or no attention to the political party financing and the impact on the transparency and integrity of the election which would have critically questioned the overall acceptability of the outcome of the election since democracy is associated with transparent governance and accountability. There are

attempts to examine the aspect of political party financing of the 2015 General Election by some scholars as presented below but the studies were inadequate, and they have failed to link their studies with the ethical issue of credibility of the election.

The attempts at studying political financing and election in Nigeria by some scholars (Walecki 2003, Olarinmoye 2008, Ayoade 2008, Adetula 2008, Adeyi 2008, Aiyede 2008, Best 2008, Smah 2008, Ojo 2008, Yagboyaju 2011, Micheal 2013, Transparency International 2015, Ukase 2015, Lawal 2015, Aghara Chukwuemeka & Onyeizugbe 2015, Olorunmola 2016, Omilusi 2016 and Omilusi & Adu 2016) analysed little or none of the impacts of political party financing on the integrity and credibility of the election. All the studies above by these scholars did not capture adequately the issue of political financing in the 2015 General Election specifically and its impact on the integrity of the election in general. The majority of the works on 2015 General Election and political financing did not give adequate attention to the issues of violation of regulations on political party financing and sources of campaign funding and its role in determining the outcome of the election.

Most of the existing works rely on secondary sources and available reports in drawing their conclusion. This made them to postulate that, the 2015 General Election is credible. This study differed from the above mentioned and the other existing ones as it used the primary source of investigation in examining financing of political parties and elections campaigns and how the process led to violation of regulations on campaign spending and other corrupt practices in the process. In essence, this study questions the credibility of the 2015 General Election in terms of adhering to the financial regulations and corrupt practices in the campaign processes. This is the

research gap that this work intends to fill as all the studies so far consulted by the researcher could not fill in this gap appropriately.

In addition, the credibility of the 2015 General Election is judged from the premise of fulfilling certain criteria of democratisation such as freedom of expression and fair play ground for campaign activities for both the ruling party and the opposition but, few works looked at the election from the impact of political party financing as criteria for judging the credibility and transparency of the election. This work exploited this aspect of the electoral judgement and credibility.

There are many impacts of political party financing such as cases of corruption in campaign finances of 2015 General Election though; not scholarly written, but, were captured and covered by many national dailies and all other forms of media. For example, a sum of \$2.1 billion (N777, 133,624,337, 580.00 billion) earmarked for the procurement of weapons to fight the Boko Haram insurgency was diverted for campaign financing of PDP in the 2015 Presidential election. Besides, the PDP Presidential candidate fund raising raised about N21 billion (\$6, 614, 173 million) for campaign financing which is above the financial ceiling of N1 billion (\$ 314, 960) set up by the electoral body INEC (Nkechi & Innocent 2014). There were also allegations against the opposition APC of spending above the financial ceilings.

A Report by USAID/UKAID in 2015 revealed that, the then, ruling party candidate (PDP) spent N8, 749, 685 296 (\$27, 727, 590.97) while the opposition party APC spent N2, 915,846,737 (\$9, 240, 264. 41) in the media and publicity sector alone. The money was sourced from other sources and public resources which affected the general public

and is a form of corruption that is perpetrated using the platform of campaign activities while denying masses essential services with the diverted fund. It is not the existence of financial regulations for political financing that is paramount, but the enforcement of legal regime is the issue that needs proper implementation and monitoring which is lacking in the process.

Political financing in Nigeria is an issue of concern because of the political culture in the country which characterised the periods of elections as money-making venture opportunity for the politicians, their patrons, the electorates and the general public. This is because money plays an important role in determining who wins during elections as votes are bought and sold; electoral officials are bribed and connived with to rig the results, security personnel are bribed while voters are enchanted with money.

There might be other hidden expenses not disclosed by Reports set up by the Presidential Committee on corruption investigation and media and this work investigated these finances and how the process affected the electoral conduct as well as the outcome of 2015 General Election. A good example of this is non-remittent revenues by the national owned oil company (NNPC) and the revenues were believed to have been injected in the financing of the 2015 Presidential Election. Recent discoveries are exposing millions of dollars found hidden in the houses of top echelons of PDP members including \$150 million from the former First Lady the wife of President Jonathan, \$156 million from former Minister of Petroleum Diezani Alieson Maduekwe and \$3.6 million from former Group Managing Director of the national oil company NNPC. And there are many whistle blowing incidences emerging presently (Sahara Reporters online and Premium Times online March 2017).

It is evident that corruption occurred in the electoral process in 2015 General Election as in the case of the recently revealed bribery of the electoral body (INEC) officials in various parts of the country to manipulate the election's results in favour of PDP. It was perpetrated through the office of the former Minister of Petroleum Mrs. Diezani Allison Maduekwe where about N23 billion (\$63, 822, 813.191 million) was allegedly distributed to the selected INEC officials in 36 States of the Federation and this involved about 223 INEC officials (EFCC, 2017 & INEC, 2017). This made the electoral process corrupt and the long-term implication of such practices is that corruption is institutionalised by the elected officials which led to the deprivation of the majority impoverished Nigerians at the expenses of the very few ruling class. This outcome is the impact of political party financing where excessive money was used.

In addition, there are other political parties and contestants (Adebayo Ayeni APA, Ganiyu Galadima ACPN, Sam Eke CPP, Rufus Salau AD, Mani Ahmad ADC, Allagoa Chinedu PPN, Martin Onovo NCP, Tunde Anifowose Kilani AA, Chekwes Okorie UPP, Comfort Sonaiya KP, Godson Okoye UDP and Ambrose Albert Owuru HP) (INEC, 2015) who participated in the 2015 General Election as Presidential candidates and there was no adequate information about their sources of finance for campaign activities and indeed, majority of Nigerians till date are not even aware that they participated in the electoral process. They were ignored by most researchers as many works could not even cite their presence during the election or how they contributed in the electoral process in terms of opposition. But, this work is only concern with their sources of finance, the spending and the impact on the election's integrity such as the corrupt practices involved in it.

1.4 Research Questions

The research questions are categorised into the following:

- (I) What are the rules and regulations on political party financing in Nigeria?
- (II) What are the sources of political party financing in Nigeria during the 2015 General Election?
- (III) How do the electoral reforms that were introduced in the 2015 General Election influenced the success of the election?
- (IV) How does political party financing affect the integrity of the 2015 General Election?

1.5 Objectives of the Research

The major aim of this research is to investigate the financing of political parties and contestants in the 2015 General Election and how the process has affected the integrity of the election in general. There are other specific objectives as follows:

- i. To examine the rules and regulations on political party financing in Nigeria;
- ii. To investigate the sources of political party financing in Nigeria during the 2015 General Election;
- iii. To examine how the electoral reforms introduced in the 2015 General Election influenced the success of the election and
- iv. To analyse how political party financing affect the integrity of the 2015 General Election.

1.6 Scope and Limitation of the Research

The study is limited within the scope of the 2015 General Election in terms of only regulations on political financing, campaign spending as well as the impact of the financing in the electoral process and its influence on the outcome of the election. This is because political financing in Nigeria in the Fourth Republic is an issue of concern by both scholars and the general public and the impacts on the integrity of the election specifically in the 2015 General Election has not receive much attention despite the interest. Since it is not feasible to cover all aspects of elections such as administration, political parties, electorates' behavior and many other related issues, it is pertinent to look at the sources and means of financing the elections as an attempt in closing the gap of knowledge. The subject matter of political party financing is wider particularly in Nigerian context where the impact of political party financing has many effects such as corruption and subversion of due process in governance. As a result of this, the study focused on the effects of political financing on the integrity and transparency of the election as it is very difficult to look at election in all its ramifications in Nigeria. Therefore, the scope and limitation of the work is the impact of political financing on electoral process and its credibility in the Fourth Republic with General Election in 2015 as the area chosen for the research.

Nigeria's 2015 General Election was chosen as the area of study because the election was entirely an improvement from the previous elections in the Fourth Republic. The past four elections were not seen as credible and were marred with rigging, violence, electoral malpractices, vote buying, intimidation of opposition, harassment of voters and most importantly the usual trend of the incumbent always winning. It was the first time in the history of Nigeria that an opposition political party, the All Progressives

Congress (APC) had wrestled power from the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP); the Party that ruled the longest period in the history of the country for straight 16 years. The election was conducted in an environment of uncertainty with Boko Haram insurgency threatening the North-eastern part of the country and the whole country at large. The election became the umbilical cord for the continued existence of the country as one or a time bomb for its disintegration.

In addition, the scope of the research is chosen because of the impact of the election in changing the dimension of politics, democracy, voters' behaviour in Nigeria and Africa at large. Already, the ousting of the ruling PDP by the opposition APC had influenced other similar results in Africa in Ghana, Gambia and Somalia and many more countries are expected to join the train. The 2015 General Election is also chosen as the scope of the research in the sense that, it was the first time the election was conducted electronically and also the sources of financing electioneering campaign became a point of concern for the electorates as well as the issue-based campaign instead of the traditional ethno-religious and regional voting that used to take place in the past elections.

The research encountered three major limitations which are; personal challenges, procedural challenges and limitations in data collection and sourcing of information. The researcher undertook the research without sponsorship from any organisation or scholarship from any institutions. He relied on personal income and family support which made it very difficult in undertaking the research in terms of publications and other financial requirements of research at this level. There was no sponsorship by the researcher's institution for the conduct of the research.

Another limitation of the research is time constraint particularly in data gathering. The maximum time spent in data collection is four months and the time required for such type of data collection should be more than that but, due to the time constraint and the need for the researcher to meet the periodic requirement of the research work within the stipulated Semesters, he utilised the limited time and ensure that the maximum data needed is collected but with extreme difficulties and extra hard work.

One of the greatest limitations met by the researcher in data collection is accessibility to the informants which proved very difficult. As the nature of the topic involved politicians and information regarding finance, to have access to politicians who could willingly release information was very difficult. The researcher resorted to familiarity by identifying those closer to them by association or family to introduce him to them before they were approached for the interview.

The limitation in data collection is due to the nature of the topic of research. Most of the informants and agencies that are related with the subject of study were reluctant to cooperate in giving the required information freely because of the fear of set up or spy from anti-corruption commission. Thus, the data was collected under serious secrecy and confidential nature with some of the informants unwilling to allow for either recorded interview or snapping of pictures as evidences of field work. Others preferred to respond either through a verbal interaction unrecorded instead of documented means or email and Whatsapp for those who have tight schedules because meeting with them became difficult. However, many allowed for recording of the conversation freely and many were willing to offer vital information despite the resistance from others.

The release of information by the agencies and commission related to the subject matter of study was very difficult. They viewed the researcher with suspicion as being an agent from some secret organisation spying on them. In this regard too, the researcher had to identify those intermediaries from their families or friends and associates to allay their fears of exposure. Even in this case, many of them could not allow for a recorded interview or offer written reply for seeking their consent for interview to avoid any exposure that will lead to public knowledge of the information they have provided. But, the researcher made them to know that it was a research work and the information that they provided would be used for the work, but their personal identity would not be disclosed.

The other limitation encountered in the process of data gathering was failure of the international media including BBC Hausa and VOA Hausa to respond for conduct of Focus Group Discussion (FDG). They were contacted through their correspondences in Nigeria and they have accepted. They have weekly programmes on burning national issues especially on politics. They invited specialist from different parts of the country depending on the topic of discussion. They agreed to use the topic and invite members of the public for discussion and generation of information. But, all efforts to secure the discussion later failed as they declined to honour the request. Instead, the researcher sought for other alternative towards Focus Group Discussion from Unity Fountain in Abuja with members of civil societies and human rights activists.

1.7 Significance of the Research

The overall significance of the research is contribution to knowledge through filling

an existing gap in the area of study in which adequate attention is not given to which is examining the impact of political party financing and election reformations on the success of the 2015 General Election using particularly an interview approach instead of secondary sources and reports. The research is significant in four major aspects; filling the literature gap in the existing area of study and methodological contribution which is the use of primary source of data using interview and focus group discussion as well as theoretical contribution using two theories of Rational Choice and Clientalism which were not used before in combination by the previous works consulted and the practical contribution.

The literature contribution is the formation of a model to explain the factors that made the 2015 General Election successful according to the field work and informants' views and not the previous assumptions and findings by scholars that studied the subject before. Also, the literature contribution was made in adopting a model by Walecki, Carlson & Jeffrey (2006) on impact of money politics and process of political financing where the identified themes were included from the researcher's viewpoint. Also, the literature designed a model of organisational chart of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) as its original contribution. In addition, the literature contribution provided additional information such as constitutional and Electoral Act 2010 regulations on political party financing which was not provided by the previous works so far examined in the field and also the investigation of political party financing led to the discovery of many vital information on corrupt practices involving the share of USD 2.1 billion and the beneficiaries as well as the bribery to INEC staff to rig the elections which were not all discovered by the previous consulted works so far in the chosen subject of study.

The theoretical contribution was the used of two inter-related theories: Rational Choice Theory of Election and Clientalism together to explain and support the literature, information from the field and discussion of findings. While the previous studies (Kura 2014, Nkechi & Innocent, Ukase 2015, Nwagwu 2015 and Ayanda & Odunayo 2015) used Clientalism in their works, but none of them used Rational Choice Theory to explain political party financing. This study integrated the two and as such; it presented a theoretical contribution in the field.

The methodological contribution is the used of primary source of data where interview was conducted with some selected informants as against the previous studies of such nature (Omilusi 2016, Ewi 2015, Chukwudi 2015, Ahar 2015, Orji 2015 Kura 2014, Nkechi & Innocent, Ukase 2015, Nwagwu 2015 and Ayanda & Odunayo 2015) which relied on secondary sources for their work. In this regard, this work led to a different outcome from the previous ones. The theoretical significance of the work is very valuable also as it will attempt to situate the case study of the 2015 General Election within a set of assumed and predicted behaviours and circumstances in an exploratory and explanatory manner which will add value in the understanding and interpretation of the 2015 General Election in Nigeria.

The work has practical contribution in many perspectives. The research is the most needed and demanding area of study that a social scientist in Nigeria can add value in contributing towards national development. The fact that, there were numerous works on this subject matter yet, political party financing and election, remain the most outstanding issues of national concern that defy various panaceas presented so far. The

research will be valuable to our society in the sense that, it will attempt to iron out workable remedies in improving future regulations and transparency in the conduct of General Election in the country. The research will be significant to many groups in their search for improving elections in general in Nigeria.

The research will also be very useful to many stakeholders involved in elections in Nigeria such as policy makers, electoral body, people, civil society organisations and electorates. Policy makers have been trying to come out with the best means of improving elections in Nigeria and fostering of transparency in the process of political party financing. But, the focus of their policy is not in congruent with the reality on ground as all the policies initiated so far such as establishing an independent electoral body; the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), involvement of Civil Societies and allowing for international monitoring and setting limits of financial spending for political parties failed to work. The research provided an alternative framework that is practicable.

The electoral body in Nigeria; Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) will benefit from the work since it is the responsibility of the body to scrutinise party activities, campaign processes of all registered political parties, and regulating their financial spending. The research is of great value to academicians, public commentators, independent researchers, analysts and students of knowledge in the sense that it is attempting to shape their frame of mind on neglected areas in this specific work.

The anti-graft agencies such as ICPC and EFCC will also find this research beneficial in their approach towards deterring and dealing with corrupt practices in Nigeria since

presently it seems they give a lopsided emphasis on government officials most especially political office holders. People too can benefit from the outcome of the research or the general public. People are complacent in aiding corrupt practices and election irregularities. They tend to link these practices with politicians while ignoring their role in terms of selling their votes, assisting in rigging, political thuggery, perpetration of violence and other malpractices that the politicians hired them to perform.

1.8 Research Methodology

In this section, the method used in data collection, analysis and other issues related to methodology such as criteria for selection of informants were all discussed.

The overall philosophy of the research is the inductive approach where ideas and information that are generated are expanded and explained in detail using clearly illustrative interpretations. The researcher believed in the use of epistemology where by relying on what is known to be true is given preference rather than assumptions. The researcher has the philosophy in believing in gathering of data from the varieties of sources to enable for a rich data that will strengthen the contribution of the work. Furthermore, the research philosophy believed in the use of scientific method in data analysis specifically presentation of information and data using illustrations such as models, tables, charts and in interpretive words as well.

1.8.1 Research Design

The research methodology for this work is qualitative research. Qualitative research is

the use of both primary and secondary data in obtaining information for research through the adoption of specific techniques suitable for the type of research in question and the nature of the environment for conducting the research (Sharan, 2002, Sekaran & Bougie, 2013 and Creswell, 2014). Qualitative research uses words as data collected and analysed using all forms of data analysis. The term qualitative research refers both to techniques of data collection and analysis and a wider framework for conducting research or paradigm (Braun & Clarke, 2013:3). Paradigm here refers to the beliefs, assumptions, values and practices shared by a research community (Kuhn 1962 cited in Braun & Clarke, 2013: 4).

Qualitative research is not about data and techniques only. It is about the application of qualitative strategies within a qualitative paradigm which is quite different from a quantitative paradigm. It involves words both written and spoken language, understanding and interpretation of a more local meanings, generation of a narrow but rich data, seeking of patterns as well as accommodation and exploration of difference and divergence data, theory generating and inductive, flexible method value -oriented in approach sometimes (Braun & Clarke, 2013: 4).

Qualitative research is design in different methods depending on the type of the research. Phenomenological research is a design of inquiry based on philosophy and psychology in which the researcher describes the lived experiences and situations of individuals about a phenomenon as described by the participants themselves. Grounded theory is a design of inquiry in which a researcher derives a general abstract theory of a process, action or interaction as grounded in the views of the participants (Creswell, 2014: 14).

Ethnography is a design of inquiry in which the researcher studied the shared patterns of behaviours, language, and actions of a chosen cultural group or an organisation or even an institution in natural settings over a prolonged period of a time. Case studies are a design of inquiry found in the evaluation of an in-depth analysis of a case, often a programme, an event, activity, process or one or more individuals (Creswell, 2014: 14).

The narrative approach links together a sequence of events, usually from just one or two individuals to form a harmonised story. An in-depth interview is conducted, reading of documents and looking for themes. It explores how an individual story illustrates the larger life influences that created it (Sauro, 2015). This research is a case study going from the above description because it is a study of a case of an event that took place which has been occurring but with different situation. It is discussed below in detail.

1.8.2 Method of Data Collection

From the above discussions, the research design for this work is the use of case study approach. The research is a case study type of qualitative approach because it is an evaluation and an in-depth analysis of a particular case which is the 2015 General Election in Nigeria. It is a case study of a bounded system (Sharan, 2002) and it can be particularistic; descriptive or heuristic (Sharan 2002, Sekaran 2003 and Bogden & Biklen 2007). Particularistic means the case study focuses on a particular situation, event, programme or phenomenon (Sharan, 2002). Descriptive means that the end product of the case study is a rich description of the phenomenon under study while

the last type Heuristic means that case studies illuminate the reader's understanding of the phenomenon under study (Sharan, 2002). Thus, summarising from the above explanations, this research is a case study and a particularistic case study specifically because it is an investigation of an event and a programme that took place within a specific period of a time.

The study used interview in generating data from the stakeholders involved in the case. This is to enable for flexibility in the data gathering where questions are asked that are open for further suggestions and more questions from the informants. The study also referred to other sources and looked for all rounded means of getting information such as news, documented evidences, cases that emerged after the election, events that are taking place in the post-election period and relevant individuals and organisations with verbal or written documents to gather data.

The researcher conducted an interview. The interview was the technique of semi-structured where flexible questions were asked for the informants and in the process, many more questions that were not within the context of the questions asked initially emerged. The informants were also given the freedom and flexibility to flow in information related to the questions asked without restriction which they added value to the answers that were provided. Some sections of the population who are direct stakeholders in the electoral process in 2015 were selected for the interview. The selection included politicians, who contested for various political positions during the 2015 General Election, stakeholders of political parties, principal officers of Independent National Electoral Commission, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission's senior personnel, Civil Society Organisations' representatives,

academicians and members of general public.

In addition to the above, the researcher conducted a Focus Group Discussion using some selected targets. The FGDs targetted international media; BBC Hausa and VOA Hausa services which conduct a weekly programme on elections and media action in Nigeria by assembling stakeholders who have the responsibility of the management of elections in the country and engage them in discussion. Another FGD targetted a group of people that are accessible from the above-mentioned stakeholders for separate FGDs. However, after several efforts to contact the media houses for the FDG, the media houses did not cooperate and that made the researcher to resort to other alternatives. People were selected instead, from Unity Fountain Abuja involving representatives of civil societies and general public and were used to conduct the FDG.

The research also used documented materials in the data collection process. The source of data for documented analysis was the use of official governmental reports such as that of National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), the Nigerian 1999 Constitution, Electoral Act 2010, USAID/UKAID Report, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Independent Corrupt and other Related offences Commission (ICPC), Transparency International, Global Corruption Index reported quarterly and other related sources.

The research also used secondary sources of data collection and the sources consist of textbooks, journals, articles, magazines, newspapers, online sources, maps and

other theses written on the subject matter. These sources were used for review of related literature and formation of theoretical framework in explaining the research context. This enabled for the establishment of the research gap and contribution to knowledge.

1.8.2.1 Sources of Data

The data were sourced from two major means. The primary and secondary sources. The sources are discussed below in sequence.

1.8.2.2 Primary Sources

The primary sources consist of mainly three means. The in-depth interview with some selected informants from the relevant area of study, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with some selected members of civil societies and documented primary materials from the government and international agencies.

1.8.2.3 In-depth Interview

The informants/participants were selected from various categories of the country and the institutions that are related to the subject and area of study. The researcher succeeded in selecting his informants according to categories from A to F where category A represents politicians, category B party stakeholders, category C Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), category D Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), category E academicians and category F Focus Group Discussion (FDG) with civil societies and members of the general public. The informants were selected based on the accessibility and quality of their information as

follows:

Table 1.1

Number of Informants Selected and Their Category for Interview

Informants Category	Interpretation	Frequency
A	Politicians	6
B	Party Stakeholders	4
C	INEC Staff	3
D	EFCC	5
E	Academicians	3
Total	5	23

Source: Field Survey 2017

The above table indicates the number of informants selected from different categories based on the availability and the quality of the informants to provide accurate and reliable information for the research. The informants are selected who are senior officials that can provide information; six from politicians group, four from party stakeholders, three from INEC Staff, five from EFCC, three from academicians. The criteria used for their selection would be discussed in the next section (see appendix I also for additional details).

1.8.2.4 Focus Group Discussion

In this category, the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) was conducted with one group selected from a centre in Abuja called Unity Fountain. The FGD consists of members of civil societies. There is a coalition of civil society organisations in Nigeria established in the 2011 General Election called the Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room (NCSSR) specifically for election monitoring and other electoral support. The

members of the FGD were selected from this coalition. The criteria for identifying and selecting them was discussed in the next section. The discussion was conducted using semi-structured questions and in a round table manner, they were asked questions and allowed to respond individually based on their own personal views.

Table 1.2

Number of Informants Selected for Interview in the Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

Informants	Category	Frequency
F1	Northeast	1
F2	Northwest	1
F3	Northcentral	1
F4	Southeast	1
F5	Southsouth	1
F6	Southwest	1
F7	Abuja	1
F8	Abuja	1
Total	8	8

Source: Field Survey 2017

1.8.2.5 Criteria for the Selection of Informants

The informants were selected based on some criteria set up by the researcher to enable him obtain a reliable and accurate information that is directly linked and relevant to the topic of research. In the category A (Politicians), the researcher selected six of them including one serving Senator, one serving Member Federal House of Representatives, Governorship candidate, Senatorial contestant, serving Member State House of Assembly and serving Chairman Local Government Council. The reason for

selecting six in this category is because of the distribution of the elective offices into seven electoral offices including President, Senator, Federal House of Representatives, Governors, State House of Assembly, Local Government Chairmen and Councillorship. And at the time of the conduct of the research the local council election involving chairmen and councillors did not take place in many parts of the country. The researcher used the available elective offices from each rank at least one except for Presidential candidates which he could not accessed.

The informants in category A were drawn from the major political parties (APC and PDP) which contested for the 2015 General Election at various elective offices. The researcher selected them based on accessibility. As most of the politicians are very difficult to access for interview, the researcher used his connection to get access to some of the informants from his State of origin Gombe State and then, they linked the researcher with their colleagues in the National Assembly for the interview. This is because they almost have the same political environment and experience and any information from few of them could be used to generalise within their category.

In the second category (B), the researcher selected four informants from four major political parties that participated actively in the 2015 General Election. Four were selected in this category because they belong to four major parties that contested for various political offices at national and state levels. The other parties were limited in their national spread for contest of various elective offices during the General Election. There were more than fifty political parties registered in the 2015 General Election with about fifteen of them that contested for the Presidency and other elective offices at various levels in the country. The National Publicity Secretary of the then ruling

Peoples' Democratic Party (PDP) was selected who has firsthand information on the national activities of the party including financing and campaign, the National Treasurer of the then opposition All Progressives Congress (APC) and now, the ruling party, having classified information on the party's sources of income, expenditure and campaign spending. The National Secretary of Social Democratic Party (SDP) who is also versatile being the Chairman of Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) in Nigeria an umbrella that is a coalition of all the political parties. Finally, the Acting National Secretary Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPP) was selected because his party entered into an alliance with the APC during the elections and he has the full information of his party's sources of income and its expenditure.

The third category of the informants is category C which consists of staff from Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Three of them were selected and interviewed. This is because the issue of political party financing is an issue that is undertaking by three Departments in INEC which include Operation Department, Political Party Monitoring Department and Account and Audit Department which make the three as the most important source of data in this topic of study. The first is the former Director Operations in the Commission in Abuja who served for ten years before retirement and he participated actively in all the previous elections conducted by INEC in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011. The second informant is the current serving Director of the Commission Political Party Monitoring in Abuja. The Department was introduced in 2010 to ensure that political parties are monitored as the Commission is empowered constitutionally to do so. The third informant in this category is the Director Finance and Auditing Department of the Commission in Abuja. The three above selected are the best informants in the Commission who can provide information

on political parties' activities and financing as well as the entire electoral process.

The fourth category of the informants is personnel from Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) which is an anti-graft agency established in 2001 to investigate public office holders and politicians who are found with looting or embezzlement of public funds and to charge them to courts of law if they are found guilty. In this category, five officials were selected. Five were selected here because the Commission has six geo-political zonal offices and national headquarter in Abuja. One was selected from the head office while the remaining four were selected from the geo-political zones where the issue of political party financing resulted in corrupt practices that were allegedly attributed to the illegal and corrupt activities of politicians and INEC officials in the selected zones. The Zonal Coordinator in the Northeast was selected where the cases of electoral corruption exist in all the states from the 2015 General Election, Publicity Officer from the Southwest Zone where cases of electoral corruption were already prosecuted in the court of law emanating from the 2015 General Election, Senior Investigation Officer from the Southsouth also where cases were established of corruption during the 2015 General Election, Deputy Zonal Coordinator from the Southeast where similar above cases were established and the Director of Operations in the Headquarters in Abuja.

In category E which consists of three academicians, they were selected based on their academic excellence and specialisation in the area of study. Three were selected because they distinguished themselves with their academic contributions and specialisation in the field of study and their practical experience also being involved as consultants for the electoral body; the INEC. The first informant is a Professor of

Political Science from Bayero University Kano Nigeria who specialised in Political Economy with emphasis on elections, corruption, civil society, political parties and he has written several books and articles on the subject of his specialisation. He is also having a practical experience of elections in Nigeria as he worked as a consultant for INEC in 2011 and a returning officer in 2015. The second informant is a Professor of Political Science from Usman Dan Fodio University Sokoto who is a specialist in Political Economy with an interest in corruption, political parties and elections. He has written severally on the area of his interest. The third is a Professor of Political Sociology from Ahmadu Bello University Zaria who served as Principal Personal Assistant Secretary to the INEC Chairman Professor Attahiru Mohammed Jega. The three of them were selected based on their specialisation, wealth of knowledge and practical experience on the subject matter of study.

1.8.2.6 Criteria for the Selection of the Focus Group Discussion (FGD)

The last category is F which is Focus Group Discussion. The informants selected were eight in number and the researcher used a meeting point for selecting them called Unity Fountain in Abuja where different groups of intellectuals, activists, civil societies and other pressure groups meet on daily basis for demonstration on burning national issues and meetings. Eight groups were identified and the interview date was fixed where one informant was chosen from each of the eight groups who represent all parts of the country as Abuja is the centre of the country. The number eight was arrived by choosing on the day of the discussion a member from each of the civil societies' representatives from the six geo-political zones and FCT Abuja. Eight different civil societies were found with representatives across the six geo-political zones and Abuja

adequately represented to give the information a national outlook and to have different versions from the six zones and Abuja on the information needed.

Finally, the researcher relied on the selection number provided by Sharan (2002) where she identified the maximum as 30, Creswell (2014) settled on 28 and Lune & Berg (2017) agreed on minimum of 4 and maximum of 30 for a qualitative research interview.

1.8.3 Method of Data Analysis

The data analysis involved the use of content analysis which is the thematic and analytic analysis of the data generated and it is pertinent here to explain in clear terms what a content analysis is. Content analysis is a careful, detailed, systematic examination and interpretation of a particular body of material in an effort to identify patterns; themes; assumptions and meanings (Lune & Berg, 2017). The materials referred to in the above conceptualisation can refer to any information produced by people for special purposes. Content analysis is a form of human communications; this may include permutations of written documents, symbols, photographs and graphics (Lune & Berg, 2017).

The analysis is designed to code the content as data in a form that can be used to address research questions. This refers to every material collected from field observations, focus groups and existing documented interviews (Harrison 2001; Bogden & Biklen 2007 and Lune & Berg, 2017). They include the records of the work which are coded into consumable information for secondary data. Content analysis also provides a means by which to study processes that occur over long periods of time

that may reflect trends in the society (Lune & Berg, 2017).

There are numbers of procedures used by qualitative researchers to analyse their data and they include interpretive approaches; social approaches and collaborative social approaches. Interpretive is the treatment of social action and human activity as text, social approach is the treatment of case study activities to gather data and interpret it and collaborative social research is the operation of research mode in a work with a specific subject in a given setting to accomplish some sort of change or action (Lune & Berg, 2017). In this regard, the researcher's way of analysis involved the formation of themes and sub-themes where the data obtained from the informants were classified into subjects and presented accordingly with their interpretation. The literature available was discussed, data from the field used to support or oppose or synthesised the information and the theories were applied within the context of each subject to prove its applicability and relevance.

The data obtained from the interview and Focus Group Discussion were presented in the appropriate places of discussion in the preceding chapters where applicable after coding and decoding of data using tables, charts, and other means of generation of meaning and interpretation from the words of informants in making analysis. The analyses were strengthened with the literatures and the theory or theories used in the research in the explanation and justification of the research findings. The analyses were used to arrive at research findings and discussions as well as conclusion and recommendations for future actions.

The data obtained from the field was analysed in thematic forms. The chapters in the work were designed to respond or answer the research questions raised in the work.

Thus, the data obtained from the interview, focus group discussion and primary documented sources in addition to the secondary data were inserted in the various chapters accordingly. They were summarised in themes and sub-themes with each of the themes answering a particular question or presenting a particular answer or finding of the research. This has been done in the next subsequent chapters.

The themes were discussed together with the views of the informants analysing their areas of agreement or disagreement. The researcher summarised the findings or views in a tabular form while in other cases using charts especially pie charts and the design of models to interpret the findings and the conclusion from the findings as well. The themes were supplemented with the existing literature on the matter and the theoretical expositions were used where necessary to back up the information provided.

The informants were grouped into specific categories alphabetically (see table 1.1 above) and for easy clarification in the analysis, the informants were given numbers for their categories. As such, in category A (politicians), informant 1 is a serving Senator APC, informant 2 serving member Federal House of Representatives PDP, informant 3 is a Governorship candidate APC, informant 4 is a Senatorial contestant PDP, informant 5 is serving member State House of Assembly APC and informant 6 is a serving Chairman Local Government Council PDP. In category B (party stakeholders), the informants are numbered as follows: informant 1 is the National Publicity Secretary PDP, informant 2 is a National Treasurer APC, informant 3 is a National Secretary Social Democratic Party and also Director Inter-Party Advisory Council (IPAC) in Nigeria and informant 4 is a National Acting Secretary Democratic Party of Nigeria.

In the third category which is C (INEC officials), informant 1 is Director Political Party Monitoring Department INEC, informant 2 is a former Director Operations and Logistics Department INEC and informant 3 is a Director Finance and Audit Department INEC. In category D (EFCC officials), informant 1 is Zonal Coordinator Northeast, informant 2 is an EFCC Publicity Officer Southwest, informant 3 is a Senior Investigation Officer from Southsouth, informant 4 is a Deputy Zonal Coordinator from Southeast and informant 5 is a Director of Operations Abuja Headquarters office.

In the next category E (academicians), informant 1 is a Professor of Political Science in Bayero University Kano who is a specialist in election, corruption, political parties and a consultant with the INEC for many years. Informant 2 is a Professor of Political Science in Usmanu Dan Fodio University Sokoto with specialisation and many publications in corruption, elections and political parties and an informant 3 is a Professor of Sociology from Ahmadu Belo University Zaria who is a specialist in Political Sociology and a personal assistant to INEC Chairman Professor Attahiru Muhammed Jega.

The last category F (Focus Group Discussion with Civil Societies and other members of general public) are numbered as: informant 1 from Northeast, informant 2 Northwest, informant 3 Northcentral, informant 4 Southeast, informant 5 Southwest and informant 6 Southsouth and the two informants in 7 and 8 are from FCT Abuja. Thus, for easy understanding, they are tabulated in the following way.

Table 1.3

Showing the categorisation and numbering of Informants According to their Groups for Analysis

Category	Informant's Designation	Coded number
A (Politicians)	Serving Senator	1
	Serving Member Federal House of Rep.	2
	Governorship candidate	3
	Senatorial contestant	4
	Serving Member State House of Assembly	5
	Serving Chairman Local Government Council	6
B(Party Stakeholders)	National Publicity Secretary PDP	1
	National Treasurer APC	2
	National Secretary SDP and Director IPAC	3
	National Acting Secretary DPP	4
C (INEC Officials)	Director Political Party Monitoring Dept.	1
	Former Director Operations and Logistics	2
	Director Finance and Audit Department	3
D (EFCC Officials)	Zonal Coordinator Northeast	1
	Publicity Officer Southwest	2
	Senior Investigation Officer Southsouth	3
	Deputy Zonal Coordinator Southeast	4
	Director Operations Abuja Headquarters	5

E (Academicians)	Professor of Political Science BUK	1
	Professor of Political Science UDUS	2
	Professor of Sociology ABU	3

Source: Field Survey 2017

Table 1.4

Showing the categorisation and numbering of Informants in the FGD

FGD	Category	Coded Number
1.	Northeast	1
2.	Northwest	2
3.	Northcentral	3
4.	Southeast	4
5.	Southsouth	5
6.	Southwest	6
7.	FCT Abuja	7
8.	FCT Abuja	8
Total	8	8

Source: Field Survey 2017.

1.9 Organisation of Chapters

In chapter one, the general background of the study is presented and this include a brief background of the subject matter of study, problem statement, research questions, objectives of the research, scope and limitation of the research, significance of the research, methodology and organisation of chapters.

Chapter two discussed literature review and theoretical framework as well as research

gap. The literature is divided into three sub- themes; (I) The 2015 General Election; Issues and Features, (II) Nature, Dimension and Conduct of the 2015 General Election in Nigeria and (III) Political Financing, Political Culture and Election in Nigeria and theory of Clientalism and Rational Choice Theory of Election.

Chapter three is the discussion of regulations in political party financing in the Nigeria's Fourth Republic and this includes constitutional regulations, Electoral Act 2010 provisions on political party financing and financing of the electoral body, financial regulations of electoral offices and issues and patterns of election financing in the 2015 General Election. This chapter also examined how the regulations were violated using the information obtained from the field and existing data to support the arguments.

Chapter four is the examination of the various sources of political party financing by parties and candidates during the 2015 General Election and this includes discussion on political parties, Nigerian political parties and specifically political parties in the Fourth Republic (1999-Date) in addition to the examination of the various sources using data from the informants and other sources that are related in the discussions and analysis.

Chapter five is the examination of the General Elections in the Fourth Republic from 1999 and this has sub-themes as; transition to democratic rule in 1999, nature of General Elections in the Fourth Republic, previous General Elections 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 and finally the overview of 2015 General Election; the reformatations, outcomes and implications. In addition, thematic analysis was used in the chapter to determine the success and its extent on the election in relation to the data

generated from the field as against the previous existing works.

In chapter six, impact of political party financing and election reformations on the success of the election was discussed in detail and this include the discussion of electoral corruption, causes of electoral corruption in Nigeria, manifestations of electoral corruption in Nigeria and its impact on the integrity and outcome of the General Election using the information from the field, the theories and existing data in the field to support the discussion and analysis.

Chapter seven is the summary, conclusion, recommendations, references, appendixes, maps and other supporting documents where applicable.

1.10 Definition of Key Terms and Concepts

In this section, some key words used constantly in the research were defined and explained within the context of this particular work as follows.

1.10.1 Political Party Financing

This is the process of sourcing of funds for undertaking the responsibility of campaign activities of parties and the candidates that bear their platforms in a contest for electoral offices. In Nigeria, the 1999 Constitution in Section 225 and Section 226 provide that, political parties can be monitored by the electoral body; INEC in terms of their sources of funds for campaign and other political activities.

The Electoral Act 2010 in Section 90(1-7) provides that, political party financing is any legal means of funds that parties or candidates can source for their campaign

expenditure provided the sources are not from any foreign means. This means it can be personal source, private, parties' revenue and individual donations.

Political party financing is mostly associated with some illegal activities such as excessive spending beyond maximum limit, corrupt practices and cliental relationship where votes are negotiated in return for favours between the politicians and electorates. It is often linked with concern for policy makers in terms of transparency as examined by Biezen (2003) and USAID (2003).

1.10.2 Election

It simply refers to the process of periodic change of leadership of an organisation or a state using an agreed legal binding document. In democracy, election or rather periodic election is the process of voting leaders in a procedure arranged by the law of the land depending on the nature of the state and the system of government it operates. Many scholars (Kapur 2009, Almond & Verba 1963, Dahl 2000) post it that, election is associated with democratic government and a periodic election means peaceful transfer of power and change of government by the electorates.

The above disclosed that in the context of this work, General Election in Nigeria is a four-year activity constitutionally where leaders are elected or re-elected for a four-year mandate. It is carried out by an independent body called the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for the various elective offices including Presidency, Senate, Federal House of Representatives, State Governors, State House of Assemblies, Local Government Chairmen and Councilors.

1.10.3 Electoral Corruption

Corruption has been perceived differently depending on one's understanding and the environment as well as the law of the land. Generally, corruption is seen as the unethical and dubious acts or violation of due process or conferring undue advantage unnecessarily on some group or denying a group or a person his entitlement deliberately. Scholars (Ackerman 2000, Nield 2000, Hoffman 2000, Asobie 2012, Saliu 2012 and Fatai 2012) see corruption as the illegal act of public stealing, abuse of power, violation of regulations, conferring undue advantage, using power for personal gain, nepotism, selfishness and diverting public fund for private gain.

Corruption can take the form of bribery, extortion, subversion, stealing and use of public office for private gain. There are also different types of corruption such as cultural corruption, economic corruption, political corruption, environmental corruption and electoral corruption. For the purpose of this study, electoral corruption is the major concern since it is one of the impacts of political party financing during the election in 2015.

Electoral corruption refers to the illegal and dubious activities that are taken place during the process of campaign, political party financing, excessive illicit spending above the stipulated law and electoral conduct which consist of vote buying, bribing the electoral officials and security agents as well as party agents, political intimidation and harassment, ballot stealing, ballot stuffing, ballot snatching and alteration of results.

1.10.4 Impact

The term impact stresses the role of a given factor or idea or any activity correlational on other thing and it can be either positive or negative and it can stem from the former to the latter mostly or sometimes vice versa. In the case of this research, it refers to the role played or the outcome of the political party financing activities on other issues such as in the case of excessive spending, violation of spending rules, corrupt practices and other illegal means that are used by politicians and parties to secure victory at all cost.

1.10.5 Credibility

The term integrity means credibility, sustainability, ethical and moral conduct behaviour towards certain positively accepted societal norms or rules and regulations. For the purpose of this research, credibility is the value and fairness of judgement of the acceptability and integrity of the 2015 General Election with specific reference to the factors that influence its outcome especially political party financing.

1.11 Summary

This chapter is the main background of the research work which introduced the topic of study and articulated the problem of the research which led to the identification of research questions. The aim and objective of the work was discussed in addition to the discussion of the scope and limitation of the work followed by its significance to knowledge. The chapter also discussed in detail the methodology used in data collection and analysis. The chapter set the foundation for the main text of the work in the subsequent chapters that followed.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Literature Review

In this section, an attempt was made to review critically the available literature on the issues and dimensions of the 2015 General Election and political party financing. The analysis provided by scholars in the area will assist in exposing the literature that is not attained to in the field of study. This will give a room for contribution by the researcher. This section is categorised into sub-themes: (i) The 2015 General Election: Issues and Features; (ii) Nature, Dimensions and the conduct of the 2015 General Election; (iii) Perspectives on Political Party Financing in Nigeria which also includes process and measures of political party financing in Nigeria, causes of money politics and impact of money politics on Nigerian elections and Issues in Regulations and Provisions on Political Party Financing in Nigeria (iv) Political Culture and Elections in Nigeria which consists of the concept of political culture and Nigerian political culture (vii) Literature Gap and Contribution; (viii) Theoretical Framework and their applicability within the context of the research.

2.1.1 The 2015 General Election: Issues and Features

The 2015 General Election in Nigeria differs from the previous elections in the history of Nigeria since political independence in 1960. There were ten General Elections that took place since 1960 with two of them in the First Republic, two in the Second

Republic, one in the Aborted Third Republic and five in the current Fourth Republic. What made the 2015 General Election unique are combinations of many factors that were not hitherto, obtainable in the previous ones. These factors include: the emergence of strong opposition political party never witnessed in the history of Nigeria, the first time an opposition political party won the Presidential Election against the incumbent and other majority seats at the National Assembly and State levels, the use of electronic voting system in the process of the election, campaign activities based on issues instead of the usual traditional ethno-religious and regional alliance, the emergence of awareness on the issue of political financing and campaign promises and many other issues. All these were not applicable in the previous elections. Based on the above assertions, the literature here examined these factors and their impact on the outcome of the election.

In the build up to the 2015 General Election, one key issue is the party positioning. This had happened because of the internal power tussle in the then, ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP). President Obasanjo; a southerner served for 8 years and handed over power to the elected Umaru Musa Yar'adua; a northerner in 2007 in the same PDP platform. Yar'adua died in 2010 which led the President Jonathan to contest in 2011 under the platform of the ruling PDP and won as against the protest of the northerners who saw President Jonathan's tenure as their stolen mandate since the ruling PDP agreed to be zoning power between the north and south for 8 years starting with Obasanjo in the South. When President Jonathan declared his intention to re-contest in the 2015, the northern leaders started strategising. In essence, it was a Northern gang up against the incumbent President Jonathan coupled with security challenges in the country most especially Northern Nigeria, poverty, corruption and

unemployment (Paden, 2015: 7).

Apart from the mass defection of party members, there was the merger of the four major opposition political parties in the country from across both the north and the south including Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and a faction of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA) to form the most strongest opposition party APC in the country which challenged the PDP seriously. The coming of newPDP (a split group called newPDP emerged in 2014 after an unsatisfied convention from the main PDP party) lately into APC further aggravated the problem of PDP while sustaining the tempo for APC in the process. This view supports the above assertion by Paden (2015) of Northern gang up against President Jonathan to re-capture power.

Prior to the 2015 General Election, the credibility of the election was already doubted as a result of poor preparation by the electoral body; the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Many expressed uncertainties about the preparedness of the INEC and the safety of their lives during the election owing to the increasing level of insecurity in the country. A Report observed that, there were lots of pre-election survey by different independent research bodies on the outcome of the election in Nigeria, Africa and internationally. The survey conducted which presented a more appropriate situation was done by Afrobarometre; an Africa non-partisan led research network that conduct public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic condition and other related issues. The organisation conducted a survey in 2015 in Nigerian 33 States and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja only the three States of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa were not

covered due to insecurity (CLEEN Report, 2015).

The outcome of the survey as presented by the CLEEN Report (2015) disclosed that; Nigerians are generally dissatisfied with the economic conditions and 74% of the surveyed believed that the government's performance in key issues was very poor. The 80% of the surveyed expressed their will to vote in the Presidential Election but revealed their fear of intimidation and insecurity in the electoral process. Almost two/third of the interviewed believed that INEC has the capability of conducting free, fair and credible election but, the overall trust in the institution is limited to only 32% of the interviewers. The two major parties; APC and PDP are head to head in the survey with each of the parties having 42% chance of winning according to voters.

The CLEEN Report 2015 further observed that the Nigeria's 2015 General Election took place at the challenging time with the insurgency destabilising many states in the northern region, fallen oil revenue leading to declining income for the country which hampers economic growth and a serious corruption allegations against the public office holders. The quality of the election is also set under scrutiny. With the 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections marred with violence and incredibility, it seemed the 2015 is better organised except the fears of violence and insecurity according to the Report.

The above pre-elections issues and surveys turned out later to be with some semblance of efficiency and they also support the assertion of Paden (2015) above as the outcome of the General Election revealed that, economic conditions in the country,

insecurity and corruption influenced many voters to elect the opposition APC. Furthermore, as feared by many interviewers in the Report, there was violence and even killings in many parts of the country during the election. But, notwithstanding, the election also as expressed by the interviewers emerged as the most free, fair and credible compared to the previous ones in the history of the country. These arguments have been further supported by another scholar, Adibe (2015) as discussed below.

The 2015 General Election was given a better view by analyst as it was the first time that the opposition is given the chance of wresting power from the incumbent ruling party. The election is the fifth since the inception of the Fourth Republic. The election will be a two horse race between the ruling PDP and the main opposition APC the party that was formed in February 2013 from the conglomeration of four major opposition political parties in the country and the new PDP. The 2015 General Election is most important than the previous elections because it was the first time that a strong national opposition party emerged to challenge the ruling party. Furthermore, the mismanagement of the economy by the ruling party and the Boko Haram threat which created insecurity in the country all post a great challenge for the 2015 General Election to be handled with success otherwise more violence will erupt in the country worse than that of the 2011 General Election (Adibe, 2015).

Another issue that affects the outcome of the 2015 General Election is the North-South division and Muslim-Christian dichotomy with regional inequality being a dominant factor. The Northern dominated Muslim region is the biggest and the most populous while the Southern Christian dominated have the control of the power at the centre with President Jonathan emerging in 2011 election as the winner. But, the

minority South is economically and educationally better than the impoverished majority North. The 2015 General Election will witness the role of money and the power of incumbency which is the major strength of the PDP. This is accompanied with all the institutional support that goes with it. The ruling PDP has control over Federal resources, security personnel, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) which can be used to harass the opposition political parties and contestants (Adibe,2015).

The electoral umpire according to Adibe's (2015) pre-election analysis improved positively and many electorates developed confidence in the ability of the INEC to conduct a credible election in the 2015. The strength of the two most contending parties too is a point to reckon with in determining the outcome of the 2015 General Election. The PDP still has the power of incumbency. It still has a great support in the South-South, South East and some parts of South West. It can also wield some influence in the north to a lesser extent. The APC on the other hand has the strength of the majority populous North and South West.

In another report by International Republican Institute in 2015 General Election in Nigeria, the report observed that, the APC won the Presidency and majority of the legislative and Governorship seats in the country for the first time in the history of the country. The 2015 General Election marked the first democratic transfer of power from one party to another. While the election faced many challenges such as logistics, delays, low turnouts, incidence of violence, as well as procedural irregularities in some states, still, the 2015 General Election was largely seen as transparent and a credible expression of the will of the Nigerian people (IRI Report,

2015).

The pre-election Report of the International Republican Institute (IRI) for 2015 General Election noticed the emergence of the most strongest opposition in Nigeria which has the potential of challenging the ruling party, there was a marked improvement in party primaries particularly the opposition APC only that the emergence of women as contestants was very minimal, there were also a recorded cases of vote buying, violation of ballot secrecy, disadvantaging some aspirants and intimidation during the party primaries, there was an improvement in the training of the party agent, voter education improved (IRI Report, 2015).

The 2015 General Election is affected by pre-election violence and hate speech which compelled the two major Presidential contestants; Muhammadu Buhari of APC and Goodluck Ebele Jonathan of PDP to sign an accord in Abuja for non-violence campaign and elections. There was the greatest challenge of insecurity in the northeast with Boko Haram insurgency displacing many communities and creating IDPs in various parts of the country. It was perceived that the insurgency will pose a serious security challenge in the conduct of the 2015 General Election. And indeed, the insurgency had caused a tremendous security challenge for the 2015 General Election as predicted by IRI Report. However, the election still emerged successful amidst the threats of insecurity.

The IRI Report also noticed that, prior to the 2015 General Election, the preparations by the INEC was commendable. But, the election dates were postponed for security challenge reasons from February 14 for Presidential and National Assembly elections

to March 28 and for State Governorship and House of Assembly from 28 February to 14 April. This had casted doubts in the minds of many voters whether election will hold at all or not and also on the credibility of the INEC in handling the election proper. The citizens continued to monitor the election closely.

The major event which is a source of concern for the 2015 General Election was the growing Boko Haram insurgency. The second issue is Niger Delta which is tagged” as the spoilt jewel of the nation” being the oil producing region with a stagnated environment as a result of the activities of the oil companies. The contesting President in the ruling PDP; President Jonathan, is from Niger Delta. Indeed, PDP which has ruled the country since 1999 will face a real challenge to beat its APC adversary. However, the ruling PDP has the advantage of massive resources to be deployed in the process of election and the troubled opposition zone of northeast that faced a threat of Boko Haram (Auge, 2015).

The outcome of the March 2015 General Election will not be influenced by the achievements of the current President due to perceived poor performance nationwide in the economy and security but, rather, by the capacity of the PDP to control the electoral process, to use its power and money to attract votes. But, this can be countered by APC as a card to play in terms of state Governors it controls in major populous states, the Speaker House of Representatives and other top-ranking politicians in the country in all regions who defected to APC (Auge, 2015).

The Nigerian 2015 General Election was identified as the most difficult due to specifically Boko Haram challenge in the country. Indeed, the threat led to

the controversial postponement of the election from February to March. The potential for violence was higher due to a given close Presidential race and frustration of the electorates arising from poor performance of President Jonathan. President Jonathan faced a serious challenge from an opposition that seemed to be the most powerful in the history of the country (Blanchard, 2015). Other major challenges of the 2015 General Election identified in the work of Blanchard (2015) are; the Niger Delta conflict, Boko Haram transnational crimes and corruption.

The Nigeria 2015 General Election is a critical test for its political leaders, its security forces and its people. The country was ruled for much of the post political independence years by the Military before the transition to civilian rule in 1999. The election held in the Fourth Republic after the re-emergence of civilian rule were seen as flawed, with each election becoming worse than the previous one continuously. However, the 2011 Election was seen as an improvement and better than the previous ones. This made international observers and local civil society bodies to put more pressure on the government to improve the process of the election in the future to be more credible and fair. One major issue that will remain a challenge in the proper conduct of the 2015 General Election is the threat of Boko Haram (Blanchard, 2015).

While the above analysis presented the real pre-election situation in the country, the election took place in the Boko Haram bedeviled areas successfully albeit, with some attacks in Gombe, Bauchi, Adamawa, Yobe and Borno, the conclusion or prediction of the Blanchard (2015) above was not accurate. Insurgency did not hinder the successful conduct of the election. Infact, the insurgents went into sleep

during the election days except few attacks that did not disrupted the election as even the attacked areas still hold the elections (Blanchard, 2015). Despite the serious security threat of Boko Haram insurgents, the Election was identified as the most free, fair and credible in all the elections conducted in the Fourth Republic.

In another study conducted by ANAP FOUNDATION; NOI Polls (2015), (a Polling Analytic Databank Strategy) ahead of the coming 2015 General Election, the opinion poll revealed a tightly contested race between the incumbent President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan of the ruling PDP and Muhammadu Buhari of opposition APC. All the interviewers selected were those who registered and have collected their voters' card ready for the election. From the results, the respondents were asked on who they are going to vote between Muhammadu Buhari of APC and Goodluck Jonathan of PDP. They responded in this way: 32 % Muhammadu Buhari of APC and 30 % Jonathan of PDP. This showed a slight margin of win in favour of opposition APC.

The above polls seemed to be perfectly correct as the outcome of the 2015 Presidential Election showed almost the same margin of percentage towards the same two sampled candidates. The final outcome of the 2015 Presidential Election is 54.55% for APC and 45.45% for PDP. This has however, indicates a more margin than the polls' result. But, the polls also pointed that, some sampled respondents were undecided and their votes might swing to either side. It was probably casted in favour of APC which widened the margin more than the predicted polls before the election.

In the preparation for the 2015 General Election, there was an effort to ensure

maximum guarantee for security of lives and properties as well as to curb the politics of do or die by the contesting parties. In short, there was an effort to eliminate zero sum game in the 2015 General Election (Olurode, 2014). INEC in its own part experience election insecurity of its personnel and the general procedure of the election. In this regard, the INEC Chairman, Professor Attahiru Muhammed Jega observed that election security is the handiwork of all stakeholders and not only the INEC or the security personnel. The stakeholders include; INEC, government, political parties, electorates, security personnel, candidates, observers, Civil Society etc. and their role should involve mobilisation of citizens for registration and participation in voting, oversight of the electoral process, support for the process, making demands for improvement, spreading certain democratic values, information dissemination, gate keeping functions, rule setting and norm setting, conflict management and driving electoral reforms (Jega, 2014).

The above was an effort by the electoral body to present a blueprint for a secured and an improved election in the 2015. It can be inferred that the effort yielded a desired result as the election security management and the general electoral procedure was improved compared to the previous ones.

The 2015 General Election is an election with multiple challenges which will take place in an atmosphere of greater crisis and unprecedented uncertainty. With the lingering Boko Haram crisis not properly addressed by the PDP government, deep divisions within the country's elite, if the elections are not properly managed, it will lead to the break-up of the country. There were many predictions of the break-up resulting from the 2015 Presidential Election considering the way each region was

hell bent on winning by make or mar (House of Commons Report, 2015). But, as suggested by the above Report, the election was properly managed although, not without great challenges, but it was successful and the country remains united afterward.

Another report before the conduct of the 2015 General Election is that by the Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI 2015) which observed that the 2015 Presidential Election faced two serious security threat; the Boko Haram and the Middle Belt crises. The country also faced a serious economic challenge with a dramatic fall in the price of oil in the world market few days before the election. The President Jonathan government became weaker because of its failure to address the insurgency and corruption allegations labeled against the top government officials serving under him. The Report however, concluded that, the election would be tightly contested and it will be the litmus test for the current level of political culture and development in the country (BTI, 2015). While all the observations raised by the Report seemed real, one vital issue was omitted and the omitted issue is the Niger Delta security question. The militants who belong to the native of President Jonathan threatened break-up if Jonathan failed to win the election at all cost.

2.1.2 Nature, Dimension and Conduct of the 2015 General Election

The March 28 and April 14 2015 General Election marked another turn in the history of Nigerian politics as it was the first time that the opposition unseat the incumbent President in a successful election. Of the sixty seven million and four hundred and twenty two thousand and five (67, 422, 005 million) registered voters, only thirty one million and seven hundred and forty six and four hundred and ninety (31,

740, 490 million) were accredited for 2015 Presidential Election. Twenty nine million and four hundred and thirty two and eighty three (29, 432, 083 million) of the votes were casted with 97% of the votes valid. The 2015 General Election and the outcome were entirely different from the previous elections in Nigeria in different ways (Centre for Public Policy Analysis, 2015).

In the 2015 Presidential Election, 14 (fourteen) political parties contested for the post of Presidency, less votes were cast in 2015 than in 2011 by 25%, the incumbent lost to the opposition by 45% to 54%, the opposition won more States 21 out of 36 (CPPA, 2015). The above analysis showed that, the 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria set a culture of departure from the previous norm of the incumbent always winning in every re-election without a serious challenge. It was also the first time that campaign activities were dominated by issue based politics and the voters voted across all regions unlike the previous situation where every contestant was elected by voters from his geographical region and religion. The election also pointed to many changes that will continue to impact on the future elections in the country.

The 2015 General Election was recognised as the most challenging one in Nigeria because of the daunting issue of Boko Haram. Indeed, it was not only the outcome of the election in which the opposition APC wrestled power from the ruling PDP that matters, but, the future security obstacle is the main agenda for concern after the election. This was because the electioneering campaign was dominated by promises of tackling security challenges from the opposition APC which was perceived as capable of doing so. Thus, it was understandable that even before the election, the

opposition APC already had an upper hand in the outcome because many Nigerians perceived the Boko Haram threat as a deliberate negligence of the ruling PDP then. Hence, it can be seen as an election of insecurity and violence where the two threats dominated the pre and during election period activities (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015).

The above publication is not looking at the 2015 General Election but, rather, the outcome. In other words, it is examining the challenge that the new government will face which is the security threat since it made a bold statement and a promise of tackling insecurity squarely in its campaign promises. Of course, the government will have to deal with the popular demand of the electorates that led to its emergence which are mainly insecurity, corruption and poor management of the economy.

The 2015 General Election in Nigeria is viewed from the perspective of the usual norm of election rigging which has been taking place in the previous Republics in Nigeria. But, the argument is that the First Republic election was organised by British Colonial Administrators while Second Republic and Aborted Third Republic Elections were prepared by the military and were considered as flawed. However, the 2015 General Election differed in the sense that it was administered by the civilian leaders themselves. The elections in 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 were organised and implemented by civilian democratic regimes (Isma'ila & Othman, 2015).

Electoral malpractices occurred in all the four mentioned elections above administered by the civilian democratic regime. While before, the champions of democracy used to blame the military for incredible elections, they tend to believe that proper

democratisation process will usher in credible elections. However, the 2003 and 2007 elections conducted seemed to be the worst ones in the history of Nigeria. There were electoral malpractices in the Fourth Republic elections of 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015 because of the outbreak of post-election violence by the electorates who felt they were manipulated by the incumbents (Isma'ila & Othman, 2015).

Furthermore, there was an imposition of candidates and lack of internal party democracies in 2011 and 2015 Election which perhaps, led to the defeat of the ruling party by the opposition in the 2015. The culture of corruption poses a serious challenge in conducting credible elections in Nigeria and that leads to electoral malpractice. Nigeria's political culture is entangled in political corruption which manifests itself in the use of and negative influence of money in politics, election rigging and thuggery (Isma'ila & Othman, 2015).

The above analysis indicates that, the 2015 General Election are bedeviled with corruption, election malpractice and thuggery. This is not to mention the issue of insecurity or the Boko Haram threat totally ignored by the authors. But, this matter had been discussed by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies above. Political thuggery and election rigging caused political violence which were the characteristics of elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011 while in 2015, the threat of insurgency presented another dimension of violence not witnessed before in the history of the country. Fortunately, the 2015 General Election emerged successful, free and credible compared to the previous ones despite the daunting security challenges and the level of election rigging as well as malpractices which were less than that of 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections surprisingly. This has been recorded by many reports and works of

international observers.

In another study by Ayanda & Odunayo (2015) which supported the submission of Isma'ila & Othman (2015), it was observed that Nigeria had a terrible electoral history as all the elections were marred by various irregularities and controversies particularly in the process of the conduct of the elections. INEC was accused of its inability to conduct transparent and credible elections in the Fourth Republic. They perceived the 2015 General Election as entirely different from the previous ones in the sense that, despite the intense level of competition between the two major political parties; APC and PDP, there was a spirit of gentleman ship in the actions of the two contestants before and after the election. None of the candidate was desperate to win the election. There were minimal level of rigging reported, manipulation of the votes, intimidation of the electorate and violence (Ayanda & Odunayo, 2015).

The 2015 campaign was based on issues and not sentiments. The 2015 General Election was a proof of the supremacy of national interest above that of personal interest. The Jonathan government was riddled with serious allegations of corruption and woeful performance in the economy. As a result, the PDP lost the election (Ayanda & Odunayo, 2015).

While some of the issues raised by Ayanda & Odunayo (2015) might be true, some of their analysis cannot be true of the 2015 General Election. Their opinion of the candidates not desperate to win the election was far from the truth. There were threat, intimidation, hate speech, violence. The APC candidate was attacked in 2013 with a

bomb explosion in Kaduna city. He was tagged as a candidate without school certificate, his supporters were captured arbitrarily, there was an issued threat by ruling party supporters of either winning the election or there must be war and other threats. On their notion of campaign on issues and not sentiments, yes it was to some extent but, still there was sentiment in terms of North versus South, Muslim-Christian dichotomy and other related issues. Only that, the level of personal sentiments was minimised in the 2015 election as compared to that of the previous elections in the Fourth Republic.

The 2015 General Election is a step forward in democratic consolidation in terms of freedom of speech. The way in which people expressed their views in printed media and social media without harassment, intimidation or imprisonment during the process of election in the 2015 is commendable (Chukwudi, 2015). This view is of course; true in the context of the 2015 General Election in Nigeria. There were rampant views on daily basis from opposing contesting parties. Some of the opinions seemed to be insults targeted at the Presidential contestants including the incumbent. The incumbent neither attempt at strangulating the opposition views nor harass them or intimidate them. Their opinions were respected and it was a remarkable achievement in the history of Nigeria and consolidation of democracy in the country.

Contrary to the above view by Chukwudi (2015), Nwofe (2015) examined the negativity of the media campaign and hate speech in the 2015 General Election. He highlighted that media played a powerful role in the democratic process. Negativity in the campaign covering entails a characterisation of inflaming news to reflect a one-sided conflict which is an indication of a potential danger in the polity. The author

presented some samples of negative media advert targeted at both the APC and PDP Presidential contestants in 2015 campaign activities such as labeling President Jonathan as “clueless”, “liar”, “incompetent” and “corrupt” while the APC candidate Muhammadu Buhari is labeled “Brain dead”, “old brain” and a “dictator”. Such media negativity exhibited hate speech and politics of bitterness which in turn might lead to violence (Nwofe, 2015).

The above view is what the researcher critically explained of the position of Chukwudi (2015) that the election was done in an orderly manner without hate speech or desperation for capturing power. Indeed, the 2015 General Election was full of hate speech and desperation to win at all cost. However, Chukwudi (2015) was right in his view of the improvement in freedom of speech in the 2015 General Election as discussed above.

The 2015 General Election was overall scored as better and improved as well as credible. The Report noted that: on the issue of electoral laws and regulations, the electoral laws and guidelines are adequate for electoral process; electoral guidelines mandated for a credible electoral process; the electoral commission was independent; electoral laws and guidelines were published publicly; voter registration was verified; dispute resolution and appeal processes were provided; dispute resolution and appeal processes were publicised and reported violations of campaign regulations were independently investigated and resolved (IRI Report, 2015).

The nature of the environment of election, media provided equitable access

to all candidates; the campaign period was non-violent; election day was free of violence; campaign messages were less inflammatory; no intimidation of voters. In addition, on the matter of integrity of the election, the Report also disclosed that, the election was credible and free of rigging and other malpractices. The Report obtained the above assertions through survey of the registered voters who collected their voting cards and were involved in the voting process in the 2015 General Election (IRI Report, 2015).

In another view, 2015 General Election was seen as a great role of political parties in the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria particularly in the Fourth Republic. Two major political parties were identified as playing the key role which immensely supports democratic principles in Nigeria. For instance, the zoning principles of the then; ruling party (PDP) in which there was an official agreement in the party's constitution that the Presidency would be zoned between the north and the south for a four year two term continuously. On the other hand, he also recognised the effort of the major opposition political parties that formed a coalition which led to the emergence of a strong opposition that not only challenged the ruling party but, also seized power from it (Omilusi, 2016).

While the above analysis can be viewed as a good description of the role of political parties in the 2015 General Election, one indisputable fact is the manner in which the ruling PDP violated the zoning formula in the 2015 Presidential Election. The North insisted that, it still has an unfinished tenure of the deceased Yar'adua which they must be allowed to complete before the continuation of the South. The South, on the other hand, capitalised on the advantage of the power in their

hand and refused to honour the agreement. As a result, PDP lost support in the North and, this phenomenon is one of the major factors that led to the defeat of the ruling PDP in the 2015 Presidential Election.

In another work, party politics is seen as helpful in the consolidation of democracy in Nigeria in the 2015 General Election. The political parties that contested the Presidential Election played an internal politics that made the competition at higher level more vibrant. A good example is the primaries conducted by APC in selecting the Presidential candidate. All the 36 States and the FCT Abuja representatives were allowed to participate freely in the primary election and their votes count. It was through that platform that, Muhammadu Buhari emerged with the highest votes to represent the opposition in the final election in which he eventually won. However, that is not the case with the ruling PDP. The incumbent President was declared unanimously as the sole contestant in the party without allowing other party members that indicated their interest to contest. This also affected the party's performance in the general election (Omilusi, 2016).

The 2015 General Election is the most expensive in the history of Nigeria and the bridge between the sustenance or dismantles of democracy all depending on the opposition APC which fortunately delivered. Indeed, the 2015 General Election in Nigeria was tagged as the most expensive in Africa with a whooping sum of N125 billion (\$340, 863, 696.382 million) spent by INEC in the electoral process (Ahar, 2015).

The above discussion expressed the extent of expenditure of the 2015 General Election

in Nigeria from one side; the electoral body, INEC. The author should have explored the expenditure of the political parties and contestants to make the work all round. But, it was missing and this need to be examined because, one cannot clearly understand the level of the expensiveness of the election unless if other expenses outside the electoral body are also taken into consideration.

The 2015 General Election is also viewed from the perspective of the implications of the politically exposed persons' participation in the election. The interpretation of the above statement is; the way corrupt politicians who served at various capacities including State Governors, Senators, Ministers, Members House of Representatives participated in the 2015 General Election either as contestants for various political positions or supporters of the major contestants (Oji, Okechukwu & Anthony 2015). These corrupt politicians according to Oji et al. (2015) should have been convicted for corrupt charges but, they were able to frustrate the criminal justice system and maintain their freedom. Not only that they maintained their freedom, but, they are still seeking for political positions which undermined the integrity of the leadership even after the election.

This view is true in the sense that, the Jonathan's government had been criticised as the most corrupt and even the President himself is seen as corrupt. For example, the former Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Governor, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi revealed that about \$20 billion was not remitted from 2010 to 2013 by the national oil company; Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), the President fired him and blocked all attempt at investigating the allegation. This scandal have been reported by many dailies such as Daily Trust Newspaper, Leadership Newspaper,

SaharaReporters online, NewsRescue online and Premium Times online. Yet, the President is the contestant for Presidency again in addition to other corrupt public officers who vied for Governorship and Senatorship with a clear corruption charges. This incidence perhaps, contributed to the defeat of the ruling party because of the perception of the electorates that the ruling party shielded and celebrated corruption.

In another approach, the 2015 General Election is perceived as the most credible and legitimate election which conferred legitimate status for the elected. The outcome of the election did not only led to the alteration of power from the ruling party to the opposition but, also, widely acknowledged as reflecting the wishes of the electorates. The assertion here is concern that, while the election provided a legal post-election legitimacy to the electorates, the emerging President will find lots of obstacles in delivering his campaign promises owing to some reasons identified by the author. He emphasised – that the Muhammadu Buhari led government must be proactive in managing the expectations of the electorates before they degenerate into frustrations (Animashaun, 2015). This view is questionable if other opinions above are taken into consideration of hate speech in campaign, influence of money politics and attempt to win at all cost by some of the politicians.

In its effort for national rebirth, the Buhari government will face many challenges famous among which is the shrinking economy and dwindling national revenue. The second major challenge is how the President can assemble a team of experts, nationalistic, patriotic, altruistic and honest public servants that will serve dedicatedly (Animashaun, 2015).

The above analysis is an apt explanation of the 2015 Presidential Election and the aftermath challenge. Already, the President is seen as failing to deliver his campaign promises two years after the election amidst a high expectation. And this has to do with the nature of fallen oil revenue which shrank the economy further as Nigeria solely depends on exportation of oil for source of revenue. The Naira has crashed from N195 per Dollar to N520, inflation rate increased from 11.2 % to 18.6 %. This challenge is a great one and unless a miracle is done, the government is heading for a doom as many electorates are already frustrated and disappointed.

Furthermore, a much credit was given to the electoral body (INEC) for the success of the 2015 General Election. Nigeria's electoral success can be attributed in part to several reforms adopted by the electoral body (INEC). And this had guaranteed legitimacy on the country's electoral process in future. INEC introduced computer electronic machine card readers for voter accreditation and encouraged all political parties to deploy their agents at all polling units nationwide for the first time. Although, the use of card reader posed a challenge during the Presidential Election in many places, it was still successful in most of the polling units (Orji, 2015).

In addition to the above explanation, the INEC too introduced the display of voters' list prior to the election, display of result sheets in each polling unit, encouraged voters to stay in the polling units and guard their votes to make sure they have count and also to follow up the collation to the last destination until the final result is declared. These measures introduced by INEC were never introduced before and they have succeeded in making the election transparent and credible as it had minimised rigging and many irregularities that used to occur in the previous

elections. This is one of the reasons why the 2015 General Election is seen as entirely different from the previous ones.

The INEC itself released a statement after the declaration of the winner in the 2015 Presidential Election congratulating the country, the outgoing President for his courage and patriotism and also congratulated the incoming President. The INEC noted that, the 2015 Presidential Election set a precedence of democratic values in the country which has come to stay. It was the first time in history that the incumbent willingly surrendered power. This means in the future elections, the incumbents can be defeated and they must concede power willingly as did President Jonathan. Thus, the 2015 Presidential Election can be seen as a watershed in turning the democratic and political history of Nigeria from the politics of zero sum game or winner takes all to a politics of non-zero sum game where winners and losers take their respective result still as victory.

The Nigeria Civil Society Situation Room, a non-governmental organisation, reported that the Nigeria 2015 General Election represented a milestone in Nigeria's democratic history. Apart from the opposition taking over power from the incumbent, the election is generally seen as credible and free and fair to a larger extent. Most elections in Nigeria are often controversial or even disputed sometimes. The Situation Room reported that it was able to mobilise support for INEC to have the confidence of the people towards a credible election. The Situation Room also contributed in mobilising the general public to collect their voters' card and it educated them on the operation of the smart card readers.

The Civil Society Situation Room concluded that the introduction of smart card readers prevented rigging of election. Indeed, the Report perceived smart card readers as a game changer for the 2015 General Election in Nigeria. This is because the politicians were unfamiliar and afraid of the card readers, as they had not learnt how to manipulate it. The extent of their ability to rig the elections has been limited. Thus, the 2015 General Election has proved to be very positive for Nigeria's democracy. This is because it delivered credible elections, reinvigorated the electorates' confidence in the electoral process and has offered a better means of improvement in the future. But, the Report finalised, the great expectation from the part of the general public on the new government will pose a serious challenge in its performance. The Report also resolved to continue to engage positively in the betterment of election, democracy and good governance in Nigeria in future.

Here, the above Report by the Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room speculated that, the 2015 General Election was successful because of the introduction of the electronic smart card readers which made rigging or manipulation of the electoral process impossible. In other words, but for the introduction of the smart card readers, there will likely be the possibilities of some politicians attempting to rig the elections and the outcome cannot be quantified in terms of violence and national disintegration. The 2015 Presidential Election aptly saved the nation from uncertainty of disintegration and national crisis because of the taming of rigging and manipulation process.

Social media also played a very vital role in the actualisation of the success of 2015 General Election. According to Bartlett et al. (2015), Nigeria has witnessed a

remarkable growth in internet and social media users. From 200, 000 users in 2000, by 2015 around 30 % (around 51 million) of the population are online. The use of social media in election started in the 2011 election. In the event towards the March, 28 2015 Presidential Election, the researchers had collected 13.6 million tweets posted by 1.38 million unique users associated with the Presidential Election which, were made in English Language only. The researchers' findings discovered that, twitter use was ten times higher during the election period than normal time. The tweets mainly shared news, campaign activities, election preparation, results and issues. There were few cases of ethno-religious and regional tweets in the samples collected (Bartlett et al 2015).

There are other instances of social media such as Facebook, Whatsapp and other social media platforms with political groups emerging and support groups for many contestants. But, the above was the only scientific study carried out. It was generally an acknowledged fact that, social media played an important role in the build up to the 2015 General Election as all events were reported even before the reports by electronic and printed media like issues of the postponement of the election from February 14 to March 28, the results of the election ward by ward etc.

It is a general view that the 2015 General Election took place based on campaign issues instead of exploitation of belonging to the same religion or ethnic group. The economic situation in the country worsened, insecurity became a national threat, corruption manifested to a larger extent beyond imagination and other indicators of social and economic stagnation. The electorates became frustrated and could not wait to oust the perceived corrupt government for a better governance and

national development.

The 2015 General Election was identified as an unexpected success as a result of security issues and challenge faced by the electoral body. INEC faced the challenge of finance, distribution of PVCs and election materials and security of the electoral process. The election was keenly contested with campaign smears and inflammatory messages. There were challenges in the electoral process but, the INEC succeeded in handling the election to the final stage and declared the winner. The success of APC in the 2015 General Election was attributed to three major factors. The first is the poor performance of the Jonathan Administration. Second, is the internal crisis of the ruling PDP which led to many prominent party members defecting to APC making it more strong in the challenge. Finally, improvement in the administration of the electoral process also contributed in the success of the Elections (Orji, 2015).

In another dimension, it is argued that Boko Haram was the major determinant of the 2015 Presidential Election as President Jonathan lost the election due to his declining popularity daily as a result of the effects of insurgency. Many perceived the President as incapable and incompetent in handling the security situation. While, others believed that, the President has the capacity for tackling the Boko Haram crisis but refused to act deliberately instead, using the crisis as a means of siphoning money for himself and his cronies. For instance about N1 trillion (25 % of the total budget) was earmarked for fighting Boko Haram each for 2013, 2014 and 2015. But, there was no any significant improvement. The insecurity escalated prior to the election (Ewi, 2015).

2.1.3 Perspective on Political Party Financing in Nigeria

Political financing in Nigeria has many dimensions and variations. It involves the sum total of all governmental expenditure in discharging its responsibilities. However, for the sake of this research, the main concern is on political party financing, campaign expenditures of contestants, money politics, role of godfathers and other issues particularly corrupt practices that take place in the process.

2.1.3.1 Process and Measures of Political Party Financing in Nigeria

The process of financing politics and elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011 in Nigeria is an act of perpetuating corruption where the ruling party (PDP) deployed public resources and security personnel in winning almost 100% in many states. This made the elections look short of credibility and acceptance. This can be true considering the outcome of the elections result which were protested violently in some sections of the country and series of post elections litigation by the aggrieved contestants who thought they were manipulated in the process (Lawal, 2015).

Similarly, one of the factors responsible for costly politics in Nigeria is marketing or advertising through media both printed and electronics. Candidates spent tremendous sum of money in campaign processes in an attempt to sell themselves to the electorates. This means; the financial ceiling stipulated by the Electoral Act as Amended in 2010 would not be complied since the contestants use their resources as much as they can deploy in media adverts which is only an aspect in political party financing since there must be other financial responsibilities aside (Aghara et al 2015).

The implications of the above scenario is the fact that winning an election is best on

how much you spent during campaign and the policymakers could not oppose bad policies and unpopular projects which leads to poor governance. Olorunmola (2016) further observed that, there are many factors that influence higher cost of election in Nigeria such as; media spending during campaigns, lack of enforcement capacity, corruption and impunity, political culture, zero sum game, crowd renting and lack of volunteerism.

Political finance in Nigeria is influenced by interparty relations, politicians, party membership and the electorates. Money is influential in democracy because most of the political activity is impossible without it. Political finance is mostly campaign and party funding (Walecki, 2003:7). Walecki (2003) further identified the categorisation of political financing by Vilfredo Pareto as idealistic or ideological, social and striving for material benefits. He further observed that problems of political finance are at the centre of the debate on political corruption. The restrictions imposed on political parties and individual candidates by regulations of funding usually create a gap for irregularities in political finance. The major type of political finance-related corruption in Nigeria includes vote buying, funding from infamous sources, selling of appointments, abuse of state resources, personal enrichment, bribery, violating political financial regulations, contract kickbacks, bribe from private sectors and denying accessibility to opposition political parties (Walecki, 2003: 8).

Thus, for Nigeria to regulate money flow in its politics and elections, it must adopt the following measures among others; full disclosure, doctrine of agency, appropriate sanctions, elimination of patronage politics and control over costs of elections, control of donations and effective implementation and enforcement. Non-

governmental organisation should also play a vital role as a watchdog in the financing process and election (Walecki, 2003: 8).

The political and electoral process in Nigeria is subverted and manipulated in favour of the privilege few (Yagboyaju, 2011). In the same but, different approach, Kura (2011) observed in a study using one specific political party, the ruling party at the time of study, Peoples Democratic Party, he discovered that, the process of selection, fielding, financing, campaign and participation in election were all faulty and ordinary window dressing in their outlook as they were bedeviled with corruption and subversion of the process (Kura, 2011).

Political parties' sources of finance and campaign in the 2015 General Election are full of corrupt practices and violation of the legal process that existed. In Nigeria, the issue of party/campaign financing is fraught with lots of controversies and scandals. It should be noted that, finance is of utmost importance in any political activity and therefore, even the electoral umpire in its regulation provided that, there is a maximum financial ceiling that a candidate or a political party can spent (Ukase, 2015).

Corrupt political financing process abounds in Nigeria in the 2015 General Election. It is argued that, there are some regulations that are provided in which every candidate and political party must adhere to. These include prohibition against corrupt and illegal practices, financial deposits for candidates for public offices, disclosure rules, spending limits, contribution limits, bans on certain types of contributions e.g. anonymous, political broadcasting rules, rules concerning the

internal funding of party activities, rules concerning the declaration of assets and measures to control public spending of political campaign (Ukase, 2015).

2.1.3.2 Causes of Money Politics in Nigeria

It should be noted that, political parties have the ultimate aim of achieving electoral win and political gain in democratic process; they will deploy all their material, financial and intellectual resources in order to emerge victorious. In this perspective, the parties on assuming power will not hesitate to utilise public resources for their private purposes. This results in corruption there by, the electoral process being corrupted (Omilusi, 2016).

The above assumption by Omilusi (2016) is what is obtainable in Nigerian context where the candidates and their parties used all the resources that they can provide in securing electoral victory for them to abuse the public offices entrusted in them. They amassed wealth unnecessarily for future contest giving them an edge over the opposing contestants.

It is also observed that, political parties are mainly established in Nigeria to recruit, interest articulation and interest aggregation for the sake of political socialisation. But, the political parties failed to perform the above role that they are expected to play instead, the owners or key leaders who are tagged national leaders of the party that provided the finances of the parties used the advantage to occupy top political position both in parties and government. The manifesto, objectives, interest and role of the party were the personal ambition of the national leaders and become their personal property. Thus, in this case, the process of financing election,

electoral process and acquiring power was criminalised and corrupted (Omilusi & Adu, 2016).

The cost of election in Nigeria is better understood when viewed from historical perspective. Nigeria is a Federal structure with three tiers of government; Federal Government, 36 States and 774 Local Government Areas. Each tier has three arms of government which are; Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. The Federal Government controls the resources at the centre and allocate monthly grant to the States and Local Governments. Thus, the Federal Government wields enormous power at the centre. Politics at the centre becomes more competitive because of the huge lucrative salaries and allowances enjoyed at that level. Nigeria has a greater ethnic division with about 374 ethnic groups. Political parties must fulfill the criteria of having a national outlook and representation before they are registered to discourage ethnic politics (Olorunmola, 2016).

There are few works on campaign finances in Nigeria by both local and international observers. The available ones are Reports by organisations like European Union Election Observer Mission (EUEOM); Commonwealth Observer Group (COG); National Democratic Institute (NDI); International Federation for Electoral System (IFES); United States Agency for International Development (USAID); United Kingdom Agency for International Development (UKAID) and International Database for Political Financing (IDEA). The major drivers of the cost of election are among others the expression of interest where political parties rely on candidates during election period to make money by selling the nomination form to them expensively; support and activities of the godfathers who spent for their godsons

with a view to make profitable investment in the future and bribes through buying and selling of votes during party primaries (Olorunmola, 2016).

The financing of political parties in Nigeria is also studied from the historical perspective. Party politics in Nigeria was identified before based on issues and ideologies in the First Republic. In the Second Republic, the parties and the contestants used patronage to source for their finances. In the aborted Third Republic, the Military Regime introduced a different pattern of financing where individuals are allowed to privately finance their political campaign and private party funding. The implication resulted in parties financial activities not clearly tracked or regulated leading to violation of the campaign and election process which tantamount to corruption politically (Adeyi, 2008: 63).

In another view, it has been observed that, the use of money in politics particularly in capturing political position has become influential of recently. The use of money in campaign votes is now an open secret in Nigeria. In this regard, women were deprived of seeking for political position because they do not have the financial muscles of men to contest. A data was relied in a survey by Women Rights Advancement and Protection Alternatives (WRAPA) in 2003 election, 90% of the aspirants reported the lack of finances as a major constraint, which gave their opponents an advantage over them as even the delegates to the primaries have to be paid before they elect a candidate (Best 2008: 28).

The responsibility of monitoring election campaigns and finances eluded the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) for many decades. There are no

available records on the amount of money spent by political parties and candidates. Reliable data on the costs of election in Nigeria is difficult to obtain. Research in this area is still fresh and there are lots to be done.

2.1.3.3 Issues in Regulations and Provisions on Political Party Financing in Nigeria

Globally, there are no shortages of regulations governing campaign money. It must interest us to note that most of these regulations were introduced as responses to the dimensions and magnitude of scandals witnessed in the countries concerned. The frequency with which new laws regulating the injection of money into politics are introduced are a clear indications of the challenges of making workable and implementable laws by various countries (Ukase, 2015).

It should also be noted, however, that the range of issues relating to aspects of campaign and party financing are so variegated that some of the provisions relating to the same are contained in broader laws about elections such as the constitution or electoral laws. Sometimes, they are also included in anti-corruption legislations or media laws. Laws about voluntary associations and organisation may also contain provisions containing aspects of political financing. Given that there are plethora of laws on political financing, there are usually many laws in various countries that deal with this subject. The existence of multiplicity of separate laws often complicates the task of regulatory body or bodies responsible for enforcing these laws (IDEA, 2014:6). Essentially, the main provisions of political/campaign financing are centered on the following areas:

- i. Prohibition against corrupt and illegal practices (such as vote buying);

- ii. Financial deposits for candidates for public office;
- iii. Disclosure rules;
- iv. Spending limits;
- v. Contribution limits;
- vi. Bans on certain types of contributions (such as foreign contributions, anonymous contributions, or contributions from business corporations);
- vii. Political broadcasting rules;
- viii. Rules concerning the funding of internal party contest;
- ix. Rules concerning the declaration of assets by candidates for public office and;
- x. Measures to control the use of public resources for campaign purposes.

Political and campaign finances are sometimes separated in some countries as in Nigeria where the two are separated. There are regulations on sources of campaign finances, maximum limit spending and other financial issues related to elections in Nigeria. In Nigeria, there are various constitutional and other legal instruments guiding the operation of political parties, especially as it relates to campaign financing. These include the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria as amended, the 2002 and 2006 Electoral Acts, and 2010 Electoral Act as amended. Others include the statutory rules of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other informal rules. These laws provide copious provisions of the extent and limitation of political parties with respect to campaign/political financing. The constitution, for instance, is the first grand-norm governing the activities of political parties in the country. Some studies have already made available detailed provisions of the rules and regulations governing the internal and external operations

of political parties derived from the 1999 Constitution. What is of utmost interest is the limitations placed on political parties especially with respect to their funding activities by the 1999 Constitution (Ukase, 2014).

For instance, Section 225 Sub-Section 2 of the 1999 Constitution is unambiguous on the finances of political parties. It states that:

“Every political party shall submit to the Independent National Electoral Commission a detailed annual statement and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets together with a similar statement of its expenditure in such form as the commission may require” (Nigerian 1999 Constitution).

Sub sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the same provision are even more forthcoming on the roles of INEC in checking the financial dealings and status of political parties. For instance, Sub- section 3 states that no political party shall:

- (a) Hold or possess any funds or other assets outside Nigeria; or
- (b) Be entitled to retain any funds or assets remitted or sent to it from outside Nigeria.

Sub-Section 4 states that:

“Any funds or other assets remitted or sent to a political party;

“From outside Nigeria shall be paid over or transferred to the Commission within twenty-one days of its receipt with such information as the commission may require” (Nigerian 1999 Constitution).

Sub-Section 5 further states that:

“The Commission shall have power to give directions to political parties regarding the books or records of financial transactions which they shall keep and, to examine all such books and records” (Nigerian 1999 Constitution).

Importantly, section 226 sub-section 1 permits INEC to mandatorily prepare and submit annually to the National Assembly a report of the accounts and balance sheet of every political party. In preparing its report, sub-section 2 of the same provision empowers INEC to:

“Carry out investigations as will enable it form an opinion as to whether proper books of account and proper records have been kept by any political party, and if the Commission is of the opinion that proper books and accounts have not been kept by a political party, the Commission shall so report” (Nigerian 1999 Constitution).

It is also important to examine the provisions of section 228 of the 1999 Constitution, especially as it deals with public funding of political parties and punishment for those that contravene sections 221, 225 (3) and 227 of this constitution. To be specific section 228 states inter-alia:

The National Assembly may by law provide-

- (a) For the punishment of any person involved in the management or control of any political party found after due inquiry to have contravened any of the provisions of sections 221, 225 (3) and 227;
- (b) For the disqualification of any person from holding public office on the ground that he knowingly aids or abets a political party in contravening Section 225 (3) of this Constitution;
- (c) For an annual grant to the Independent National Electoral Commission for disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them in the discharge of their functions; and
- (d) For the conferment on the Commission of other powers as may appear to the National Assembly to be necessary or desirable for the purpose of enabling the commission more effectively ensure that political parties

observe the provisions of this part of the chapter.

The Electoral Act 2006 in Nigeria provided that, there should be spending limits on candidates and political parties as follows.

A mere glancing through the below table will disclose that, going by the above analyses so far, the political office holders and their party platform do not adhere to the provisions of the Electoral Act 2006. Even the electoral body itself; the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) realised the inadequacy of the provision and as a result, the maximum amount was reviewed again. The 2010 Electoral Act rescheduled the amount that contestants can spend after a thorough review as presented below.

Table 2.1

Showing Spending Limits of Candidates According To 2006 Electoral Act and 2010 Electoral Act

Position	Spending Limit 2006
Presidential Candidate	N500Million (USD1, 591, 935.45)
Governorship Candidate	N100Million (USD318,387.09)
Senatorial Candidate	N20Million (USD63, 677.42)
Member Federal House of Representatives	N10Million (USD31,838.71)
State House of Assembly Members	N5Million (USD15, 919.35)
L G Chairmanship Candidate	N5Million (USD15, 919.35)

L G Councillorship Elections	N500,000 (USD1, 591.94)
Position	Spending Limit 2010
Presidential Candidate	N1Billion (USD3, 183, 870.91)
Governorship Candidate	N200Million (USD636, 774.18)
Senatorial Candidate	N40Million (USD127, 354.84)
Member Federal House of Representatives	N20Million (USD63, 677.42)
State House of Assembly Members	N10Million (USD31, 838.71)
L G Chairmanship Candidate	N10Million (USD31, 838.71)
L G Councillorship Elections	N1 million (USD 3183.871)

Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Electoral Act 2006 (the computation into USD was made by the researcher in November 2017).

Looking at the above table carefully, one can see that just in less than five years, the financial ceiling for campaign spending was reviewed where it was doubled as a result of two major factors. One factor was the inadequacy of the fixed amount in sponsoring candidates for their respective positions. Second, the desire to ensure that a reasonable amount is given in order to curb corruption and illicit financial spending needs to be reinforced. However, a mere examination of the 2011 and 2015 elections might prove that far more than the above fixed amount was spent by different contestants and their political parties.

However, there are evidences that, corrupt campaign and political financing exists in the process of elections in Nigeria. These include among many; the political contributions that are inconsistent or that which contravene the existing laws and regulations of political financing in the country, using money by a political office holder from corrupt sources for campaign, the illegal use of state resources for personal political venture, acceptance of money or gift in return for an illicit favour or promise of a reward after the election to an office and contributions from unauthorised sources by the law (Ukase, 2015).

In addition, it can also be inferred from the above provisions, regulations and laws that, there is no provision for a strong enforcement of legal regime in monitoring and sanctioning of political financing in Nigeria. The regulations are inefficient about the defaulters and the sanction to be applied. This has left a loophole for continuous corrupt practices and illegal political financing in the electoral process of the country.

2.1.4 Political Culture

There is no polity without a belief system inherent in the people. The rising and the falling of a polity is a product of a kind of political beliefs, dispositions, and orientations that run in the psyche of the people and their leaders. On the basis of that, the greatness of any nation is a product of the political culture that is prevalent on it (Adeniyi, 2006: 46). Based on the above, it is relevant to look at classical explanation of the term political culture, Nigerian political culture and its relationship with political party financing.

According to Almond, Powell, Strom & Dalton (2005), political culture does not explain everything about politics. Even people with similar values and skills will behave differently when they face different opportunities or problems. Nor is political culture unchangeable. New experiences can alter the attitudes of people. A nation's political culture includes its citizens' orientations towards three levels: the political system, the political and policymaking process and policy outputs and outcomes. The system level involves the citizens' and leaders' views of the values and organisations that comprised the political system. Do citizens identify with the nation and accept the general system of government? The process level includes expectations of how politics

should function, and individuals' relationship to the political process. The policy levels deal with citizens' and leaders' policy expectation from the government. What are the government's policy goals and how are they to be achieved?

Lucian Pye argues that:

"The notion of political assumes that the attitudes, sentiments and cognitions that inform and govern political behaviour in any society are not just random congeries but represent coherent pattern which fit together and are mutually reinforcing. In spite of the existence of great potentialities for diversity in political orientations, there is a limited and distinct political culture in any community which gives meaning, predictability and form to the political process" (1962: 34).

In another study, Pye and Verba (1965) emphasize that, political culture is a recent term which seeks to make explicit and systematic much of the understanding associated with long standing concepts such as political ideology, national ethos and spirit, national political psychology and fundamental values of a people. In other words, the above analysis indicates that, political culture is the deductive interpretation of the hitherto inductive all-encompassing political theory which merged all national issues at once. Here, it specifies values and attitudes in the examination of politics of a given society or a country.

Almond and Verba (1963) defined the term political culture as the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of a nation. Thus, according to the above definition, political culture concerns the psychological dimension of political systems, including all politically relevant beliefs, values and attitudes. Focusing on different reference populations, one can examine elite cultures and mass cultures as well as local, regional and national cultures,

including the sub-cultures of specific groups. Yet, in every case the concept refers to some collective unit of which people are aware and have some feeling of belonging.

Magstadt (2006) argues that culture has many meanings. But, political culture is interested primarily in the aspects of culture that are related to politics; what scholars often called “political culture”. Political culture encompasses the prevailing moral values, beliefs and myths people live by and are willing to die for. It also includes the collective memory of a society- the things we learn about in grade school, what we come to know about our leaders, about crises we have survived as a nation, and about wars we have fought. Virtually anything and everything that shapes our shared perception of reality is part of our political culture.

In another approach, Heywood (2002) stresses that, debate about the nature of political culture has often focused on the idea of civic culture, usually associated with the writings of Almond and Verba (1963). Almond and Verba (1963) set out to identify the political culture that most effectively upholds democratic politics. They identified three general types of political culture: participant political culture, subject political culture and parochial political culture. A participant political culture is one in which citizens pay close attention to politics and regard popular participation as both desirable and effective. A subject political culture is characterised by more passivity among citizens, and the recognition that they only have a very limited capacity to influence government. Parochial political culture is marked by the absence of the sense of citizenship, with people identifying with their locality rather than the nation and having neither the desire nor the ability to participate in politics.

Welzel & Inglehart (2011) identified some dominant themes in political culture including elements such as national pride and collective identities, regime preferences and regime support, confidence in institutions, party identifications, ideological orientations, political interest and political sophistication and orientations towards life. The second component is social values consisting of religious versus secular values, collectivistic versus individualistic values, authoritarian versus libertarian values, nationalistic versus cosmopolitan values and survival versus self-expression values. There are also divisions in political culture including religious and ethnic divisions (multiculturalism), social class and socioeconomic divisions, cross-national differences and culture zones divisions. There is also cultural change and its determinants such as downward trends like voter turnout decline, party- voter realignment and declining confidence in institutions and upward trends like rising self-expression values, rising feelings of efficacy and rising elite challenging actions. Cultural change for democracy has its consequences as follows; orientation towards democracy, social movements and civil society, processes of democratisation and the quality of governance.

Political culture has other ingredients such as sub-culture, political change, dimension and factors that mould it, determinants and measurement as observed by Mahajan (2012). In stable societies, the political culture is homogenous, but where differences between one group and others are marked, there is said to exist sub-culture. Political sub-culture is not a distinct set of attitudes, beliefs and values but a set of attitudes, some of which are in common with other sub-cultures. The political culture of a nation is never static and continues to change with the passage of time. Cultural change is not a process or a goal unique to new states only. Several societies possessing well

established national identities are beset with the problem of cultural transformation (Mahajan, 2012).

Political culture is shaped by the general historical experiences of a country as also by the private personal experiences of the individuals. Political culture is gradually built on the cumulative orientations of the people towards their political processes. Each generation inherits attitudes and beliefs towards politics partly from the earlier generation and partly it is formulated as a reaction to the on-going politics. Political culture is the product of the learning process and the actual experiences of the people.

Apart from the classification of political culture presented by Almond and Pye, there are other types such as mixed political culture, civic political culture and secular political culture. Individual with parochial and subject political culture may be found in predominantly participant political cultures. This is called mixed political culture. Civic political culture exists in a society in which decision-making powers are vested on elite and the people do not participate directly. Secular political culture exists where the people are secular, rational and analytical. Ideological political culture exists where one ideology is encouraged and the people are not allowed to accept ideology of their liking. Homogenous political culture exists where the people hold similar views about political objectives and the means for their attainment. Fragmented political culture exists in a country where the people do not hold similar views about political objectives and the means for their attainment (Mahajan, 2012).

There are determinants of a political culture of a given nation such as political continuity, colonial domination, geography, ethnic differences, religious differences

and socioeconomic structure. In addition, political culture can be measured using indicators such as public opinion and attitudes survey (Mahajan, 2012). Thus, it is the combination of the above elements so far examined that determine the nature and trend of a political culture of any given nation in the world at any time.

Political culture is the commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules. It is that part of the general culture which includes only the set of political beliefs held by an individual and those beliefs only constitutes part of the entirety of the belief. Political culture is a pattern of shared values, moral norms, beliefs, expectations and attitudes that relate to politics and its social context. It is the collective or shared disposition of the people to political values and common attitudes towards political events. It is the primordial orientation of the citizens of a given political community towards politics and how this affects their acceptance of any political regime as legitimate. It involves a belief on how government, politics and economic life of a given community are to be carried out. Political culture involves the understanding and the commitment of a people to a shared way of organizing a political society (Adeniyi, 2006: 46-47).

2.1.4.1 Nigerian Political Culture

Nigerian political culture can be clearly understood as the product of history. The enduring effects of pre-colonial events still play an important role in the political culture of Nigeria today. For instance, the Hausa people began forming city-states in Northern Nigeria from 1000-1200 AD and came under the influence of Islam no later than the 15th century. The Fulani later rose officially in power through the Sokoto Jihad which led to the current blending of Hausa/Fulani. In the forest, the Yoruba and Bini

peoples of southwest began forming kingdoms between the 12th and 15th century at Oyo, Ife and Benin. The Igbos did not establish any kingdom but a fragment of societies in Igbo land in the southeast and Niger-Delta in the south- south. It was the colonial interlude that led to the emergence of these three major nations with many sub-nations under them to form an entity called Nigeria today (Mundts and Aborishade, 2005).

The political culture of Nigeria is extremely heterogeneous and complex. Analysis of it must consider a Western value system overlaid on those of its various pre-colonial traditions. It must assess the impact of a variety of religious beliefs and of the continuing effects of Christian and Muslim proselytising efforts. Since the colonial experience had brought new divisions based on social class and on the different experiences of urban and rural dwellers. The whole range of modern political ideologies is found among the belief systems of the politically active population. Ethnic identity became the major factor in Nigerian political culture with elections and politics entirely divided along Hausa/Fulani in the North, Yoruba in the West and Igbo in the East after political independence. Religion is the second dominant factor in the Nigerian political culture (Mundt Aborishade, 2005).

Political participation and democratic culture in Nigeria as a concept is one that is ridden with grievances and fears of isolation hence the struggle for central power by different ethnic groups. This struggle negatively affects electoral activities in malpractices like thuggery, rigging and other political electoral violence, which is replete in party politics in Nigeria. Democratic culture of any country determines their

political participation. A culture of democracy must reflect the norms and values that place a premium on the freedom of individuals (Daniel, 2014).

There are three main propositions on voting behavior in Nigeria which included Sociological Approach; part identification model and rational choice. The sociological model emphasises on voting behaviour because of impact of social structure suggesting that social group membership influence voting behavior. This is visible in Nigerian context where belonging to a religious group or ethnic group or certain geographical area determines voters' behavior in an election. Belonging to a social group automatically qualifies a candidate to receive votes of such members of that group. Presidential elections in Nigeria are understood along that line (Mudasiru, 2015).

The party identification approach is a situation where partisanship is highly stable over time. Here, voters are less likely to make distinctions between their vote choice and partisan dispositions. This situation is also applicable within Nigerian context where some sections of the population became attached to a given political party irrespective of the candidate because of their partisan position towards that particular party (Mudansiru, 2015).

The rational choice approach lays much emphasis on voters' choice of their candidates in an election based on issues and policy design of the political parties. The choice here is rational. This situation, however, is not obtainable in Nigerian system except to a smaller extent and even this one; is found among elites who chose their party or candidates due to the economic or political benefits they will gain from voting such

candidates. But, a common voter in Nigerian democracy has no rationality in choice as they tend to vote according to sentiments. It simply means that personal material benefit is given priority ahead of policy choice, good governance and a sound leadership that will usher in positive development in the long run. This leads to misgovernance and corruption (Mudasiru, 2015).

The role played by ethnicity and religion in democratisation process in Nigeria is harmful to the system. The tremendous effects of ethnic and religious crises faced by Nigeria in the current phase of democratisation are the outcome of the elite's manipulation of ethnic and religious identity. This has been associated with the problems of historical configuration of the country, the nature of political class and the manner in which they struggled. This has led to an exclusive nature of the politics of ethnic and religious identity among different groups in the country. This has affected the political behavior of the electorates to align themselves with ethnic and regional political parties. The above scenario affects voting pattern during any election whether Presidential or Gubernatorial (Lenshie, 2014).

General elections are generally portrayed with dominance of ethno-religious sentiments as determinants of voting behaviour and political participation across the country. From the presidential through gubernatorial, national and state assemblies' elections, aspirants were largely chosen on the basis of ethno-regional identities. In the presidential election, the president and vice president elect received almost 90 per cent of their votes based on ethno-regional identity. Similarly, the incumbent president received en masse votes from his ethno-regional zones. This has been the culture in Nigerian political theatrical arena where votes are allotted according to ethnic

allegiance and religious sentiments by each particular section or group in the country where their candidate emerge irrespective of whether he will win through their votes or he will lose (Olayode, 2015). Studies by Nnoli (2004) *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*, Joseph (2006) *Democracy and Pre-bendel Politics in Nigeria*, Maier (2000) *This House has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis* and Jega (2008) *Identity Politics in Nigeria* and many others but few to mention revealed the above assertion.

2.1.4.2 Political Culture and Political Financing in Nigeria

Elections in Nigeria are marred with a political behaviour of rigging, the manipulation of religion, ethnicity, regionalism and nepotism. Voters are voting during elections based on their affinity with leaders that belong to the same religious groups, ethnic cleavages, region and other sentiments. Elections were marred with the culture of rigging, malpractices, intimidation of both voters and opposition, use of violence and political thuggery most especially by the ruling party using the power of incumbency. This at times invited military to overthrow the civilian regimes. This process leads to many Republics in the country emerging and disappearing constantly (Olayode 2015, Metumara 2010 & Rufa'I 2011).

The history of election in Nigeria which took place ten times; twice during the First Republic, twice during the Second Republic, once in an Aborted Third Republic and five times in the present Fourth Republic revealed the nature of Nigerian political culture. The elections are mostly characterised with impunity, religious bias, ethnicity, regionalism, tribalism and rigging. Voting pattern is mostly based on the above qualities instead of issue-based campaign and elections. The political behaviour of voters is that of having their votes casted on those whom they belong to the

same ethnic, religious and regional affiliation even if the other candidate is better and has an outstanding record of better performance.

In the study of political culture and voting behaviour of Nigerian voters, it has been examined that ethnic militias turned into a constituted authority and an unofficial threat to the electoral process and democratic development in the country. It is observed that, as a result of the entrenchment of the politics of ethnicity and regionalism, the three main ethnic groups and regions Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba dominating North, West and East formed a culture of establishing ethnic militias who became violent and intimidating during elections prompting for candidates of their ethnic belonging. Such militias include OPC in the West, Yan Daba in the North, and Bakassi boys in the East. Their main role is to fight for their ethnic candidates during election. Thus, voting pattern is forcefully imposed regionally by these thugs (Agbu, 2004).

Apart from ethnicity and religion, other issues that determine political behaviour and voting pattern of electorates in Nigeria include rigging of elections, Prebendalism, manipulation and political violence. Nigerian democracy is prescribed as prebendel where the leaders who control power used every means possible to maintain power at all cost while those outside the corridors of power are using every available means possible to capture power all for personal interest. This include massive rigging of elections, intimidation and harassment of voters and opposition, manipulation of electoral process, vote buying, use of political thugs, political assassination, corrupt practices etc. this has been the norm for many decades to the extent that voters either vote towards that process or abscond away from the

election process there by rendering democracy absurd with electorates not determining who will lead (Joseph, 2004).

The political behaviour and voting pattern in the 2015 Presidential Election witnessed a paradigm shift from the hitherto; existing ethno-religious and regional politics to that of issue-based election to some extent. There was decrease in the number of voters turn out in the 2015 Presidential Election compared to that of 2011, this had happened because of some factors like security situation in the country and the introduction of the card readers, the level of political participation and awareness had increased however (Ibrahim & Abubakar, 2015).

Ibrahim et al. (2015) concluded that, factors that influenced voters' behaviour in voting during the previous elections were mainly ethnic affiliation, religion and region. But, in the 2015 Presidential Election, the major factors that influenced voters' behaviour consist of fear, insecurity, expectations, economic situation and political socialisation.

One issue worthy of discussion in political behaviour and voting pattern of Nigerian electorates is the politics of Godfatherism. Godfatherism is the major factor in determining who will get the platform of contest among political parties and to a larger extent, the emergence of the winner in the general election. Some powerful cabals constituted themselves into a gangster that influence who should be elected. They sponsor these godsons and manipulate the electoral process to ensure that they emerge by hook or crook means (Olarinmoye, 2008).

In some other time, politics of money influence voters' behaviour. The politics of give and take is very much influential in the emergence of winners in any election in Nigeria. Politicians indulge in the habit of giving out money during campaign and elections in order to secure the votes of the electorates and this culture has been normalised to the extent that, no matter how good a candidate is, if he could not give out money he may likely lost out in the elections (Olarinmoye, 2008).

It is imperative to note from the above that, there is an inherent political culture of corruption in Nigeria where votes are bought and sold during the process of election. This has been aided with the intolerable scorch of poverty, unemployment, corruption, illiteracy and other social malaise that sometimes compelled the electorates to perceive the period of elections as a means of making easy money.

2.1.5 Literature Gap

While there are many studies that examined the various issues in the recently concluded 2015 General Election such as the issue of violence, insecurity, Boko Haram, corruption, poverty, role of opposition political parties, campaign finances (Ukase 2015, Lawal 2015, Aghara et al 2015, Olorunmola 2016, Omilusi 2016 and Omilusi & Adu 2016), all the works that attempted to look at the sources of campaign finances for all the political parties and contestants did not give adequate attention to the area and most especially in terms of how the process was turned into a haven of corruption where politicians used the public treasury for campaign finances. While the electoral body; Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) set a financial ceiling of N1 billion (\$3, 183, 870.91), it was realised that all the political parties spent above that set maximum level and that

has impact on the outcome of the election and its integrity as against the widely acclaimed credibility attributed to the election. This is the research gap that this work seeks to fill and its contribution to knowledge.

Majority of the works on 2015 General Election focus on the following: issue based campaign and not sentiment (CPPA, 2015), challenge of Boko Haram insecurity (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2015, Ewi 2015 and Orji 2015), minimal level of rigging (Ayanda & Odunayo 2015), freedom of speech (Chukwudi 2015), media accessibility (IRI 2015), role of political parties (Omilusi 2015), adequate funding of the electoral body, INEC (Ahar 2015), fielding of corrupt candidates which gave some parties an edge over others (Oji et al 2015), too much expectations from the opposition candidate of higher performance by the electorates and the post-election challenge (Animashaun 2015), credibility of INEC in the electoral administration (Orji 2015), the use of smart card readers (Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room 2015), role of social media (Bartlett, Jones, Daniel, Fisher & Jespersen 2015), change in political behaviour and voting pattern (Ibrahim et. al 2015) and religious freedom in the election (United State Commission for International Religious Freedom, 2015).

Interestingly, from the above works, the issue of political financing and its impacts has not received adequate scholarly attention. Furthermore, the research differed from the other studies in the sense that it is a case study that used interview method in data collection or primary sources as contrary to the above existing works which used secondary sources for the conduct of their research on the area of study.

Furthermore, the research differed in its approach owing to its theoretical situation of the study as it attempted to link the research work with theoretical discourses adopted in the work by merging the data obtained from interview with the theories in the explanation and interpretation of the topic studied. Previous studies used Clientalism and other different theories in their studies while this study combined Clientalism and Rational Choice theories together in explaining the literature and the research findings. Thus, in this regard, the research differs theoretically with the existing ones in the area of study.

One distinguishing feature that differentiated this work from other similar ones is it has given a deeper analysis and thorough investigation into the subject matter which consists of issues and revelations that were first hand classified information which were not surfacing during the previous investigations. This feature particularly includes the sum of money that was diverted during campaign from public statutory uses to political financing and the discovery of the involvement of electoral body's staff (INEC) in the bribery scandals during the elections with evidences from the anti-graft agency. This work is providing such information for the first time unless if other such work is on process by other researchers somewhere else.

2.2 Theoretical Framework

The research adopted two theories in explaining the main context of the work and general overview of the discussions, analyses and arguments discussed in the work. It is expected that, the theories will also assist in data analysis and interpretation as well as research findings. The two theories adopted are: Rational Choice Theory and

Clientalism.

2.2.1 Rational Choice Theory

The Rational Choice Theory of voters derived its root from the explanation of the economic analysis of voting behaviour in the writings of Anthony Downs (1957) which he titled “An Economic Theory of Democracy” the theory is commonly known as Rational Choice Theory of Election. Another proponent of this theory is Kenneth Arrow (1986). The major proposition of this theory is identifying electoral behaviour as a rational choice among the electorates. The theory postulated that, economic indicators, resources allocation and goods and services distribution are related with the outcome of political choice in an election.

It is assumed that if rational choice can clearly explain the market in the society, then it can comfortably explain the political functioning particularly election. The theory established a similar correlation between consumers of goods and services and voters and between enterprises and political parties. This is because if corporations seek to maximise profit while consumers seek to maximise utility, then it can be theorised that, voters seek to maximise the utility of their votes as the parties act to maximise electoral gains obtained from their political proposals (Downs, 1957 and Arrow, 1986).

The Rational Choice Model is built on two major perspectives, evaluation and non- evaluation. The first one which is evaluative voting rational is anchored on voters’ evaluation of regime performance. On the other hand, the non- evaluative perspective is based on clientalistic considerations such as patronage, ethnic

and family ties (Lindberg & Morrison, 2008). The same view is also presented by Animashaun (2015) in his discourse. Farber (2009) observed that Rational Choice Theory is built on the perception that, individuals similarly derived utility from the act of voting. It is on the premise that individuals assume that, their votes determine the outcome of election either in the favour of their rationalised chosen candidates or against them.

Lindberg & Weghorst (2010) further expanded the Rational Choice Theory in what they tagged as “Swing voters in new democracies”. While observing that, voters in democracies used rationality in determining maximum utility they can derive from their votes in terms of political parties and candidates that can give them maximum satisfaction, swing voters analysis examine whether strength of ethnic identity, political parties’ candidates campaign strategies, poverty or evaluation of Clientalism versus collective public goods all together determine who succeeded in persuading voters in new democracies and outcome of election results (Lindberg & Weghorst, 2010).

Antunnes (2010) stressed that, there are three basic assumptions of the Rational Choice Theory. They are discussed below.

- (I) All Decisions are Rational: all decisions that are made by voters and political parties are rational. Self-interest and maximisation of benefits are deriving factors that inform the decisions taking by the two parties;
- (II) The democratic political system is consistent: this is in order to support the decision with predictions about the aftermath of the decision made by voters and political parties resulting from different choices and

(III) There is a level of uncertainty in the process of choice: this means that the democratic system assumes despite the consistency in it, a level of uncertainty. This is enough to influence different options in the process.




Figure 2.1 Illustrating the link between the Three Main Assumptions of Rational Choice Theory

Source: Developed by the Researcher 2017

This theory is a good explanation of elections in Nigerian context in general and in particular in the 2015 General Election. The political parties are expecting a maximum utility to derive in their emergence as winners in the contest. While the then; ruling PDP continued to build on the status quo and want to maintain power at all cost amidst several corruption charges, the APC is capitalising on political and socioeconomic changes it was anticipating to bring to the electorates through a decisive stern promise of anti-corruption crusade. Thus, the two major strong political parties in the 2015 General Election in Nigeria have a rational for their contest and the maximum utility they sought to achieve on assuming office. The other political parties that contested the elections though; knew probably that they might not win, they still have a rational choice and reason that influenced their decision to participate.

On the other hand, the electorates or voters are like consumers in the market under a competing demand for patronage. They voted in the 2015 General Election based on rationality for the maximum benefits that they will derive when the outcome of the election is favourable to them. Many electorates are believed to have voted for the opposition political party; the APC as a result of their high expectation of the utility they will maximise from the outcome of the emergence of APC's Presidency. The APC contestant for Presidential Election built his campaign promises on three major issues: fight against corruption, fighting insurgency and reinstating economic development of the country. Many voters from all the six geo-political zones subscribed to the ideas of the APC Presidential candidate and were expecting a positive change and a better restructuring of political and socioeconomic sectors of the country. The outcome of the election results proved so.

The theory also justified the fact that, not only voters are rational but, the politicians too are rational in devising a means of acquiring power either for their personal purpose or other reasons. They tend to use money and other tricks to get their way through an electoral position by malpractices including vote buying, rigging, manipulation of ethnic and religious sentiments and all forms of methods that they could find feasible in achieving their political ambition. The politicians are in a similar explanation of corporations, trying to maximise profit by using their resources in return for more accumulation of resources and personal ambition of accessing political power.

In addition, the theory also suggests that, in the process of rational choice, a cliental structure might occur where the voters can decide to vote for economic

benefit and patronage of ethnic, religious and regional candidate. Lindberg & Weghorst (2010) further added that swing voting can occur during the process of rational choice voting where ethnic and religious as well as other sentimental factors can influence the decision of the voters especially in new democracies.

Nigeria is a new democracy and of course, one cannot deny the fact that such cliental or swing voting took place during the 2015 General Election. If we look at the geographical distribution of the results (see Appendix III), it can be inferred that, despite massive allegations of corruption against President Jonathan's government and poor performance, his political base, the South-South and South East voted for President Jonathan massively. The APC candidate won in his traditional stronghold in the whole North. This indicates clearly that, cliental voting or swing voting took place despite the influence of rational choice in decision making. Thus, Rational Choice Theory can exactly explain clearly the nature and context of the 2015 General Election in Nigeria. However, owing to its proximity and similarity with Clientalism, it can be merged with the Theory to further strengthen the context of the research arguments and analyses.

2.2.2 Clientalism

Clientalism is a framework of analysis developed by many scholars for many decades in an attempt to explain the process that is taking place in politics and elections that resulted in corruption and corrupt practices.

The term Clientalism originates from the term "cluere" which means "to listen, to obey". In ancient Rome client was a person who had a lawyer speaking for him/her in

trial. In court, this meaning exists still today. At the same time, “Clientela”, was a group of person who had someone prompting for them in public, the “Patronus”. The clients were the patrons of an aristocrat; both were related through sacral code of ethics and conducts. The clients were free, no slaves, no bondmen but the relationship were inherited. They offered work, but especially political support. The patron gave them protection, jobs or even land to work on it (Weber, 2005 cited in German Institute of Global and Area Studies GIGA, 2010).

Clientalism is seen as a pre-industrial phenomenon that transpired for many decades but waned with the emergence of modern societies (Morse, Mazzuca & Nichter 2010 and Daramont 2010). Clientalistic practices and patronage ridden-politics are found in many contemporary societies. In the 1970s and 1980s, an interpretive approach dominated studies in this field. It assumed that Clientalism was a vestige of early modern development and that political and economic modernisation would render it obsolete and ultimately end it (Roniger, 2004).

Since the late 1970s and 1980s there has been an upsurge of works on Clientalism. The first wave of research in the late 1970s and 1980s involved case studies, along with important attempts in conceptualisations, carried out by anthropologists and political scientists. Most of these studies assumed that Clientalism and patron-client relationships will eventually appear in the course of development or democratisation (Roniger, 2004). The second research wave was in 1980s and early 1990s which tried to systematise the field, and added historical works, tracing Clientalism back to early modernity and even antiquity. This wave identified Clientalism as a model of social exchange and a specific strategy of political

mobilization and control. Clientalism involves complex networks of patron brokerage selectively reaching different strata, sectors and groups and pervading political parties, factions and administrations (Roniger, 2004).

The third wave of research on Clientalism was around 1990s and 2000 when interest by civil societies, informal groups and citizen-politician linkages rekindled study in Clientalism. The study identifies Clientalism as a phenomenon that runs against the ideal model of democratic life and autonomous civil society. The new studies suggest that analysis move beyond formal principles and ideals of universal citizenship, procedural versus participatory democracy, towards the real workings of democracy, citizenship and civil society. For example they suggested a focus on patronage practices through identifiable parameters such as political use of public jobs, or the biased use of developmental projects as a means of patronage (Roniger, 2004).

Clientalism is a model developed by scholars to explain the political economy of governance where a historic cultural assessment of patron-client relationship led to a widespread emergence of a primitive form of organisation that would be destroyed by democratisation or strengthening of state (Daramont, 2010). However, Daramont (2010) suggests that, the prophecy of self- defeat of Clientalism by democracy proved to be false as Clientalism persists in both developed and developing countries disregarding the system of rule. Therefore, Clientalism was not crushed by democracy and programmatic platforms, but forced to evolve into a more complex pyramidal exchange network of client-broker patron exchange.

According to Morse & Mazzuca (2010), Clientalism is a model or a political act

and a strategy which involves vote buying thus, rewarding opposite voters for switching votes in an inappropriate way that leads to corruption and misuse of political office. This means that the political and democratic process is corrupted by manipulation and patronage that resulted into corrupt public office holders who utilised the opportunity of their office for private gain and rewarding their political allies instead of just and equitable distribution of resources and developmental projects. They summarised their arguments by giving a good example of Nigeria where vote buying has been the practice for long during election. And this paved the way for corrupt politicians to control power for personal motive since they used their resources to acquire the power (Morse et al. 2010). Isaksson & Bigsten (2013) also agreed that Clientalism is a model that attempts to explain how a patron-client relationship emerged in a state right from the struggles for power particularly in democratic regimes.

However, not all those who postulate the theory of Clientalism perceive it as patron-client relationship. It is sometimes seen also as the use of threats rather than inducements to acquire and manipulate power as in the case of Stocks (2013:67). He further sees Clientalism as a model in explaining political corruption which simply denotes” proffering for material goods in return for electorate support, where the criterion of distribution that the patron uses is simply, will you support me in return for material favour? If allowed, Political Clientalism slows economic development, vitiates democracy, allows dictators to hold onto power longer than they should and leads to massive political corruption (Stocks, 2013: 67).

It slows economic development by discouraging government from providing public

goods and by creating an interest in the ongoing poverty and dependency of the constituents. It vitiates democracy by undermining the equality of the ballot, allowing some voters to use their votes to communicate policy preferences while others use their votes only as an exchange for minor side payments. It keeps dictators in power by allowing them to stage election in which competition is stifled and where voters who would prefer to vote against the regime are kept from doing so for fear of retaliation. It leads to massive political corruption because the entire system that led to the emergence of the rulers itself is corrupt and they utilised public offices for patronage and private gain. Here, the corruption is turned systemic permeating all level and scope of the state including the policy makers and the governed.

Clientalism is sometimes interchangeably used with Patrimonialism which means the process of struggling to have access to power for private allocation of scarce resources where policy makers or political office holders bend the law, rule of law violated, accountability and transparency are ignored for shoddy deals in order to enrich the cronies and sycophants that assist the office holders into power (German Institute for Global and Area Studies GIGA, 2010). GIGA (2010) identifies main assumptions or basic features of Clientalism as follows:

- (a)The relationship is dyadic;
- (b)The relationship is asymmetrical;
- (c)The relationship is personal and enduring;
- (d)The relationship is reciprocal and
- (e)The relationship is voluntary




Figure 2.2 Showing the Circular Relationship of the Assumptions of Clientalism

Source: Developed by the Researcher 2017.

The relationship is dyadic because is a relationship between two persons, patron and client with the patron controlling some resources such as money, goods, jobs, access to services etc. and is available to the client under some conditions and circumstances. But, there are brokers sometimes who are patron's agent that communicate between the patron and the client. While this is obtainable sometimes, most of the times it is dyadic restrictedly.

The relationship is always asymmetric leading to vertical or hierarchic relationship. It is marked by asymmetrical distribution of information, resources, money, goods, prestige etc. with the patron controlling resources while the client does not. In other words, there is the monopoly of the patron. The relationship is termed personal because it is done at personal level and not emanated because of business. Patron and client know each other and trust each other. Sometimes patron-client relationship is inherited. The relationship is reciprocal in the sense that exchange of material or immaterial benefits is the main feature of Clientalism. The client accepts and uses

resources in return for offering of their own resources too. And it is voluntary because it is not normally coerced though the exit process is difficult sometimes.




Figure 2.3 Showing Patron-Client Relationship in Clientalism
Source: GIGA, 2010




Figure 2.4 Showing Patron-Broker-Client Relationship
Source: GIGA2010

The first diagram indicates a pure dyadic relationship between the patron and the client without any intermediary. It is more personal and hierarchic as presented above. The second diagram represents a three way relationship between the patron who controls the relationship, the broker who is the patron's agent and the client that is receiving patronage from the patron above in terms of material benefits while offering in return a kind of favour needed by the patron.

In linking the model of Clientalism and Patrimonialism with Nigerian context, it is pertinent to examine the issues from the perspective of African politics. This is because African scholars used Clientalism to explain the nature and context of politics in African countries which seems almost unique. Although, there are many scholars who attempted to narrow the framework of patron-client relationship within Nigerian state, the assumption is Nigeria is a good representative of Africa and also fits in within the realm of the uniqueness and sheer experience of African countries in their political development. There are two major works here that linked Clientalism and Patrimonialism; that of Isaksson & Bigsten (2013) and Ogundiya (2009).

African politics is often described as clientalist. African rulers tend to rely on the distribution of personal favours in exchange for political support, and that voting is often on particularised loyalties based on kinship and ethnic ties and to the extent that benefits accrue to the own group rather than broad based policy accountability and this set the foundation for official or institutionalised political corruption in most African countries (Isaksson & Bigsten, 2013).

Since Clientalism from African perspective is seen as transactions between politicians and citizens whereby material favours-goods or services- are offered in return for political support at the polls, the politics relying on Clientalism focuses on private transfers rather than provision of goods or projects of national interest. Not only is this likely to have significant distributional consequences, it also discourages a democratic system where citizens vote for broad-based policy accountability rather than narrow personal gain, and governments formulate development policy that

places the long term common good ahead of short-sighted narrow and local interest (Isaksson & Bigsten, 2013).

In the African context, Clientalism is often suggested to have an ethnic dimension. Ethnically based parties tend to redistribute towards their ethnic groups rather than provide public goods, the argument goes, and citizens tend to vote for candidates who represent their group, regardless of their quality. Voters being less stringent in terms of holding politicians accountable are suggested to undermine the quality of political candidates and leads to undesirable governance outcomes such as corruption (Isaksson & Bigsten, 2013).

To further situate this theory within the confine of Nigerian politics and the incidence of political corruption, Ogundiya (2009) presents a thesis on political Clientalism and Patrimonialism in Nigeria. According to him, the state is central to any analysis of corruption in Africa. Indeed, there is virtually no subject that one considers in Africa without emphasising the role of the state (Osaghea, 1988 cited in Ogundiya, 2009). This is so because the state not only leads, but it embodies society in Africa. One fundamental fact to note from the onset is that, the Nigerian state, like most African states and Third World Countries is a product of colonialism. It is not surprising therefore that the cliental theorist of African politics traced the problem of political corruption from the debauchery of colonial rule (Ekeh, 1985 & Osaghea, 1988 cited in Ogundiya, 2009).

Nigerian case turned into a complex wave of Clientalism, Prebendalism and Patrimonialism in explaining political corruption (Ogundiya, 2009). By way of

merging cliental and prebendal thesis, Ogundiya (2009) notes that, the politics of competition over allocation of resources turned Nigerian political offices into prebends. This means state offices are seen as prebends that can be appropriated by office holders, who used them to generate material benefits for themselves and their constituents and kin groups in a patron- client relationship.

While Clientalism and Prebendalism are mutually reinforcing, these concepts are separate. Clientalism is the nature of individual and group relationships within a broader social and political space, but Prebendalism are essentially a function of appropriation of the offices of state (Soteolu, 2005 cited in Ogundiya, 2009). Clientalism assists in understanding how the mechanism of class control legitimises the lopsided distribution of resources among social groups and enhances the status of the political elite. Therefore, Nigerian political culture is hinged on Clientalism and Prebendal politics which further enhance our understanding of the prevalence of political corruption (Ogundiya, 2009).

Clientalism therefore, explains the incidence and nature of election and corruption in Nigerian State through the mechanism of struggling to acquire power and the examination of what the leaders do with the political power after the election in the case of democratic regimes. They negotiate, re-negotiate and trade power for personal gain. Voters are lobbied in material benefit negotiations and politicians used the mandate given to them by voters to enrich themselves in corrupt practices in collaboration with their brokers and clients who broker contracts and kickbacks for them while the clients are also beneficiaries in the dubious transactions for their political support.

The process led to Prebendal politics in Nigeria where the politicians now utilised the negotiated power and enforced themselves onto power through vote buying, ballot stuffing, rigging of elections, electoral malpractices, intimidation of voters and harassment of opposition as well as the use of thuggery to acquire power. The cliental role leads to the systemic corruption in the entire Nigerian political system in three way processes. This includes the corruption of voters and general public at large, corrupting the entire political system, corruption of political office holders. Such political corruption heralded economic corruption which in turns leads to bad governance, national underdevelopment and challenges of nation building even though, the country is now under democratic regime which is supposed to be accountable, transparent, responsible and representative of public interest.

2.2.3 The Applicability of Rational Choice Theory and Clientalism in the Research Work

The two theories presented above so far disclosed a very sharp and clear understanding of Nigerian election and it would be pertinent to merge them in explaining further the nature and uniqueness of the 2015 General Election. In the first place, the two theories are contemporaries with both surfacing within the arena of academic realm in the mid 20th century. Secondly, they share similar assumption in terms of identifying the relationship between the voters and the political parties in the case of Rational Choice Theory and Patron-Client relationship in the case of Clientalism which are synonymous. This is because the political parties and patron as well as the voters and the client are equal. The relationship is mutual, beneficial and rational where each of the parties assumes an expected reward from his loyalty to the other parties.

In explaining the 2015 General Election in Nigeria, the two theories captured vividly the processes, issues and elements in terms of the anticipated benefits from the voters as rational choice for a party or candidate that will improve the economy, generate employment, reduce poverty, fight corruption all in order to make their life better. While on the other hand, there are other voters who patronised candidates on cliental basis for the economic and material benefits they will gain from the emergence of a particular candidate. Both of the two assumptions are evidence in the 2015 General Election from the distribution of the results.

In addition, the two theories can explain the impact of political party financing as evidence in corruption in the electoral process through financing of campaigns particularly Clientalism. The politicians and their patrons shared money in the process of campaign to the voters and other parties involved in election which are corrupt practices. This include spending of above the financial ceiling set up by the electoral body, siphoning of public treasury by the incumbent for financing of campaign activities, fund raising above the set limit, failure to disclosed how much is raised by the political parties and their candidates and the distribution of money to individuals for vote buying and bribing of INEC officials as well as security personnel. All the above are evidence of patron-client relationship in an election process. Such activities are presented in the figure below.




Figure 2.5 Rational Choice Theory and Clientalism Merged in Applicability within the Context of Research Work

Source: Developed by the Researcher 2017

2.3 Summary

This chapter discussed and analysed diverse scholastic views and arguments on the subject matter of study particularly the major features of the 2015 General Election, the issues and events that are associated with the conduct of the elections, nature and perspective on political party financing in Nigeria, rules and regulations governing political party financing and other themes related to it. The researcher reviewed their arguments and identified their points of convergence and divergence and what needs to be done which they failed to do or which the scholars did not give adequate attention in their expositions. The chapter also discussed on two major theories adopted for the research; the Rational Choice theory and Clientalism in an attempt to support the literature with empirical interpretations. The chapter is the analytical and theoretical aspects of the research. This leads the work in the next chapter to examine the rules and regulations on political party financing during the process of campaign in 2015 General Election and how they were violated.

CHAPTER THREE

PROVISIONS AND REGULATIONS ON POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING IN NIGERIA

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, issues and provisions as well as regulations that are associated with financing of political parties and contestants that are representing the platform of political parties are discussed and analysed with specific reference to Nigerian Constitution 1999 as amended and Electoral Act 2010. In addition, this chapter further explored diverse views and issues of political party financing from a global viewpoint using the approach of continental presentation, the discussion of political party financing regulations in Nigeria according to the various republics, examination of financing of the electoral body, the role of international donor agencies in the financing process of political activities in Nigeria during the 2015 General Election and the analysis of the informants' views on the provisions and regulations and their applicability within the context of the 2015 General Election.

3.2 Political Party Financing: A Global View

The issue of political finance is of great concern to many including analysts, policy makers, electoral bodies, international agencies etc. It is a premise of promoting fair

play and ensuring transparency as well as eschewing corrupt practices during the contest for political offices universally. There are studies existing on the subject matter by some scholars. One of these scholars is Biezen (2003). Biezen (2003) observed that citizens all over the world today show growing concern on influence of financial activities on political parties and how this led to corrupt practices and criminal sponsorship of parties and candidates which is affecting democracies and electoral process. In recent years, there are lots of scandals associated with financing political parties which questioned the validity of elections and democratic process. In order to curb this, the European Union for example, suggested a benchmark for financing party activities (Biezen, 2003: 9).

Biezen (2003:10) added that, the rules on financing political parties and electoral campaign should include some principles such as; a synergy between public and private sponsorship, fair play for political parties in the state distribution of funds for political activities, strict censorship of private contributions, absolute transparency of accounts, an independent audit authority and adequate sanctions for parties and candidates that violate the rules.

The status and transparency of political parties is very important for healthy democracy to thrive. And for a transparency of political parties to be achieved, there is need for observation of those involved in political activities and sound rules governing donations and political party account. This is because some countries have regulations governing political party funding but, they do not regulation for campaign spending. By ignoring the former, the latter will open a loophole for corrupt activities in the name of financing election campaigns. This is because it will undermine the

principles of equal opportunities and will violate the process of transparency of political parties (Doublet, 2012: 8).

Financing a political party should be accountable as article 12 of the Council of Europe recommends that donations to political parties should be registered. The specifications should include the amount, nature and value of the donations and the donor. However, such monitoring should be flexible. A few anonymous donations should be allowed. But, the problem of donation by some business companies is; contract might be awarded to such donors which is a kind of corruption. As such, there is need for donor companies to be banned from bidding for contracts. The political parties should be required to publish their statement of accounts quarterly to have a better means of monitoring. The monitoring should be carried out by an independent electoral body like in most of European countries. Failure to adhere to regulations provided by legislation should be sanctioned against a political party or candidate (Doublet, 2012:8).

Citizens are becoming more concern with transparency in public life owing to economic crisis. The concerns are growing particularly due to the various scandals that were emanating in the recent years with regard to financing of political parties and candidates during electioneering campaign. Most citizens in Europe believed that there is corruption in the process of political financing and electoral campaign. For instance, 87.9 % of people interviewed in Greece believed that political parties and politicians are corrupt, 80.8 % in Spain and Italy, 70.9 % in Portugal, 66.1 % in UK, 57.3 % in Germany, 53.8 % in France and 61.9 % in Hungary (OECD, 2012). In Africa, it is also the same as 86.7 % in Kenya agreed that political parties and

politicians are corrupt while in Nigeria 88.6 % believed so (Innocent & Nkechi, 2014).

Member countries of OECD set some regulations to ensure transparency in political financing and electoral process which include; regulating private funding, increasing public funding and setting spending limit. However, realising that, these regulations are not enough, the members resorted to improve the process of transparency by including; disclosing candidate/ party financing. This is very important because regulating financing of political activities will prevent illicit financing and corruption which might lead to squandering of public resources and misplacement of priority in the policy making (OECD, 2012).

There are various international efforts in managing political financing with varying degrees of success. The study conducted by international IDEA Database on political finance examined 180 countries worldwide in which it was discovered that all the countries used one way or the other of regulating political financing. Political spending is now limited which formed part of political transition (Ohman, 2014). The goal of such regulations is to prevent corrupt behaviour and maintain transparency in political system. Regulations were made to enforce such provisions and to sanction those who violate the rules. The international IDEA Database offers access to 180 countries on the issues related to political regulations of the countries studied. The Database identified that, the level of political financing and regulations vary from one country to another depending on the nature and availability of funds in the countries and the flexibility of the political system in place.

The best way to have a better reform in political financing regulation worldwide is to have an access and a clearer understanding of respective challenges and legal situations in each country. A simple way of universal regulation is donations bans and limits, public funding, spending bans and limits and financial reporting. For regulations to be reliable there must be enforcement. There should be thought on how to regulate political parties' campaign activities and candidates as well as a step to be taken to facilitate that (Ohman, 2014). The IDEA Database study conducted a regional study of political funding in all the continents starting with African continent. These studies are presented regionally or continentally below.

3.2.1 Africa

In Africa, the major problem identified with political financing are; access to funds for all political actors, abuse of state resources, clientalism, vote buying, illicit funding, dependency on foreign funds and the cash nature of the African economy. The nature of regulation on political financing in Africa is commendable. For example, all countries in Africa except for Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Somalia and South Sudan have signed and ratified the 2005 United Nations Conventions against corruption (UNCAC) which states that all countries should enhance transparency in the political spending of candidates and the financing of political parties (IDEA, 2014).

In an African context, the overall guidance comes from the African Union Convention on preventing and combating corruption. The sources of income for political parties and candidates are identified to have included contribution bans, contribution limits, private income, foreign funding, illicit funding, and public funding. There are means

of enforcing regulations on political financing existing conventionally among African countries and sanction measures. Media and Civil Society play an important role in this aspect (IDEA, 2014).

3.2.2 America

America is one of the most expensive democracies in the world which encourages private financing of parties and candidates and private donations. The rules on party financing remain flexible thereby allowing for excessive spending beyond the set limit. In addition, there is no enough legal enforcement for monitoring or sanctioning of violators. While the rules state that, disclosure is compulsory on all sources from the personal and private donations and the rules also forbid all forms of foreign donations in cash, kind or any other means, there are still loopholes that allow for illicit spending and campaign spending in the United States of America (IDEA, 2014).

In America, the 2016 Presidential Election witnessed a greater influence of money as reported by The Guardian online in July that money played a crucial role in the campaign and election process in America. The winner Donald Trump on many occasions reiterated that, he is onto himself in terms of finances and his supporters should only support his emergence and not financing the campaign. Many Americans are of the view that campaign finance reform is very vital owing to the devastating influence of money they saw in the campaign process. This was partly influenced by the 2010 Supreme Court ruling that removed many existing limitations on outside groups' spending money to influence an election. The Guardian Newspaper concluded that the 2016 Presidential Election is a good example of electoral process hijacked

going by the illicit financial activities of Trump and Sanders (The Guardian Online, 2017).

3.2.3 Asia

The study by IDEA (2014) discovered that the issue of political financing and financial regulation of party activities as well as funding of campaign activities by contestants in Asia differ from the challenges found in Africa. State funding is minimal in Asia as such; candidates with low financial muscles find it very difficult to contest for an electoral office. Most often, parties too do not finance their candidates' campaigns. As a result, private donation is pivotal in political financing. Currently, there is awareness on the influence of big business and commercialisation of politics which led to calls for regulation of private donations and demand for transparency in political financing in the region. This is spearheaded by national and international NGOs who emphasise on fighting corruption and promotion of good governance.

The problems with Asian political finance according to IDEA Database are corruption, clientalism and clans, linkages between political parties' voters and business, ineffective implementation, illicit funding, lack of resources for opposition parties and female candidates, abuse for state resources and vote buying. There were efforts to address the above problems since 1990s in the awakening for democracy and democratisation in Asia. For example, the vision of a blueprint for ASEAN Democracy Free and Fair Elections from 2009 by the Asian Network for Free Election (ANFREL) and the 2012 Bangkok Declaration on Free and Fair Elections.

3.2.4 Europe

In the case of Eastern, Central and Southeastern Europe, they have no uniform means of regulating political financing due to their dictatorial nature with majority of them being communist weak democracies. The political funding is bedeviled with the problem of the abuse of state resources, state control over the political arena, private sector kickbacks and buying of government favours, illegal and illicit funding and dodging rules and avoiding transparency. Despite the above obstacles, there are some measures for financial regulations of political campaigns and spending in the region. Indeed, the IDEA Database (2014) discovered that the region is the most regulated in the world in terms of political financing because there were efforts at introducing diverse means of facilitating the regulations by all the countries in the area studied (Smilow, 2014).

In the Northern, Southern and Western Europe, money played a crucial role in determining who will contest for a political position owing to the nature of modern democratic system that they operated. An important factor that made money influential is the fact that the region is rich and economically buoyant. The liberal democratic system did not care to regulate political financing strictly compared to the Eastern and Central European countries. Political financing in this region as discovered by IDEA Database (2014) is marred with political corruption, weak enforcement, party's state dependency and gender inequality. The level of liberty is however, declining in political financing as there were regulations and reforms being introduced in the 1990s and they became more active in 2000 and beyond. This helped in curbing the corrupt activities of politicians and political parties in the region (Piccio, 2014).

3.2.5 Latin America

One region in which money plays an important role in election process and that is marred with corruption is Latin America. Even though the rise in the influence of money in the region's politics coincided with increase in democratic consolidation, there were lots of corruption scandals and criminal control of the politics which raised a point for concern. The major problem of political finance in Latin America stems not from lack of regulations but, rather, from inability to enforce them strictly as provided. This created the problem of lack of transparency and reliable information, poorly conceptualised regulations, infiltration of illicit financing and absence of strong monitoring and enforcement agencies (Londono & Zobatto, 2014).

The major sources of finance for political parties and candidates involved contribution bans, private sources of income, limits on contribution, public financing and abuse of state resources. There are efforts at ensuring compliance and sanctions but, the problem is oversight activities and lack of strict adherence to regulations which give windows to corrupt activities in political funding.

3.3 Overview of Political Party Financing in Nigeria

In this section, the political party financing in Nigeria was observed and discussed according to the four major republic or civilian rules that took place in the country in order to enable for a better understanding of the gradual establishment and emergence of rules sequentially from one experience to another and from one democratic system or regime to another. The period between one republic to another signifies the military rule and a setback to democracy and democratisation where coups and counter-coups

occurred among the military while each republic indicates re-emergence of civilian rule after a transition to democracy prepared by the military to restore the country back on the track of democratic rule.

3.3.1 The First Republic (1960-1966)

The 1959 General Election took place before the grant of political independence in 1960. The electoral laws during the times under which the elections were conducted in the 1950s and 1960s were obtained from the laws of the British Representation of the People's Act of 1948/1949 and the regulations made in it. The 1959 elections were conducted under the provision of the Nigeria (Electoral Provisions) Order-in-Council LN 117 of 1958 enacted by the British Parliament. During this period, there was no clearly defined regulatory framework on party finance and the funding of political parties as such; candidates were responsible for election expenses (INEC, 2005:7).

The absence of clearly defined regulations to regulate party finance made it possible for politicians and political parties to engage in illicit party financing and corruption in Nigeria's First Republic (1960-1966). There were two cases of corruption in political party financing investigated by the judiciary. The Foster Sutton Tribunal of Enquiry in 1956 investigated allegation of impropriety in the conduct of some politicians from the National Council for Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) with business interests in the African Continental Bank (ACB). Also, in 1962, the Coker Commission of Inquiry was set up to look into the affairs of six Western Nigeria public corporations that were allegedly involved in corruption with the leadership of the Action Group (AG) (INEC, 2005: 7).

3.3.2 The Second Republic (1979-1984)

In the Nigeria's Second Republic (1979-1984), a mixture of private and public funding was used for the first time. The political parties played a major role in the politics of the Second Republic. The 1979 Constitution clearly states that "No association other than a political party (was allowed to) canvass for votes for any candidate at any election or contribute to the funds of any political party or to the election expenses of any candidate at an election". The 1979 Constitution in Section 205 empowers the National Assembly to make laws "for an annual grant to the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) for disbursement to political parties on a fair and equitable basis to assist them in the discharge of their function". Government thus, provided financial aid to the parties by way of subventions. In addition, private financing, except from outside Nigeria, was allowed, according to Section 205 of 1979 Constitution (INEC, 2005: 7).

There was no limit on how much corporate body and individuals could contribute to political parties. Apart from the ban on political parties from receiving external funds and the prohibitions of association other than political parties from making contribution to the funds of political parties or the election of any candidate at any election, as provided by Section 201 of the 1979 Constitution, there were no stricter Constitutional or Statutory regulation on the use of party financing such as those of disclosure of donations to political parties. The outcome of such faulty rules was the illegal use of money to influence decision making in political parties and the political process in general particularly elections results (INEC, 2005:8).

Although, the 1979 Constitution provided, however, for some of check especially with respect to external control of political parties. Even that was not achieved in the Second Republic. The vacuum was exploited by the financially and politically ambitious few that eventually were able to use their wealth to hijack political parties of their choice. With unrestricted use of money little or no attention was paid to political mobilisation by those seeking for elective positions. Politicians attached much importance to money which they used to buy the votes of the electorates (INEC, 2005: 8).

The experiences in the general elections during the Second Republic (1979 and 1983) were such that political parties and politicians had unlimited freedom to use money from both legal and illegal sources to finance their campaigns and other activities associated with their election expenses. During the Second Republic, the role and activities of contractors in government and godfathers in political parties, and other cases of political patronage became very rampant. The reports of the various special tribunals that tried politicians and other office holders revealed gross abuse of public offices and impropriety in dealing with political parties (INEC, 2005: 8). Thus, it can be inferred from the above submission that, clientalism of a large magnitude took place in the political party financing process in the Second Republic through a chain of client-patron contract awarding and other dubious corrupt scandals.

3.3.3 The Aborted Third Republic (1990-1991)

It is popularly called the Aborted Third Republic because the military regime of President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida promised to hand over power in 1992 and political transition started in 1990s until the Presidential Election hold on June 12 1991

where MKO Abiola won the election but it was annulled and the military continued to rule after the annulment.

In the Aborted Third Republic (1991), there were no clear regulations known. The Constitution of 1979 was not used but, the military Decree was utilised to conduct the election which was annulled on June 12, 1991. Little or none was known on the provisions and regulations of the electoral acts that guided the finances of political parties. It seemed a normal routine of illegal use of money excessively as most of the politicians that sought for an elective office in the Aborted Third Republic were either seasoned politicians that hold public offices or international business tycoons that are wealthy.

3.3.4 The Fourth Republic (1999-Date)

The mistakes on the constitutional provisions for political party financing in the previous Republics made the designers of the 1999 Constitution to enshrine some sections that will regulate political party funding. However, the 1999 election and the previous electoral acts up to 2006 still maintained the past tradition of public funding of political parties through subventions from the government.

However, details of subventions to political parties are not readily available. But, it is common knowledge that political parties to some extent are funded by Nigerian taxpayers. This makes accountability and transparency in party financing very imperative and also an issue of great national value. There were no available records on the exact amount of money spent by candidates and political parties. However, there are indications of heavy reliance on private funding in the last two elections in 1999

and 2003 in the Fourth Republic. Former President Obasanjo declared that “the parties and candidates spent together during the last election (2003) more than would have been needed to fight a successful war” (INEC, 2003: 9).

A financial ceiling was set up in the 2006 Electoral Act to curb such excessive spending but it was violated by the politicians and their political parties alike. As such, the 2010 Electoral Acts recommended and withdraw public subventions from the government to political parties and made the affairs of political party financing an exclusive affair of political parties and candidates’ private sponsorship.

3.4. Constitutional Provisions and Regulations on Political Party Financing

The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 confers general powers on INEC under part I of the third schedule to the Constitution particularly paragraph 15 thereof to monitor the organisation and operation of the political parties including their finances. Further down to paragraph 15 (d), the INEC is also empowered to arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of political parties and publish a report on such examination and audit for public information.

Finances of political parties are covered by Section 225 of the Constitution while annual reports on finances are covered by section 226. The provisions are presented below (see table 3.1 and table 3.2 below).

Table 3.1

Section 225 of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution on Finances of Political Parties

Sections and Sub-Sections	Regulations and Provisions
Section 225(1)	Mandates every political party to submit to INEC its published statement of assets and liabilities.
Section 225(2)	Requires every political party to submit to INEC its annual analysis of sources of funds, assets and expenditure.
Section 225(3)	Prohibits every political party from holding of funds or assets outside Nigeria and retaining them sent from outside Nigeria.
Section 225(4)	Provides that the funds or assets in Section 225(3) must be forfeited to the INEC within 21 days.
Section 225(5)	Provides that INEC can give directions to political parties on regarding the records of their financial transactions and its scrutiny.
Section 225(6)	Provides that INEC has powers to delegate auditors to audit political parties or member of its staff.

Source: Nigerian 1999 Constitution (the compilation in a tabular form was made by the researcher 2017).

In addition to the above sections, the next section provides for the annual auditing of political party finances as applicable in order to ensure for proper monitoring and control of political parties spending. It is presented below.

Table 3.2

Section 226 of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution on Annual Auditing of Political Parties Finances

Sections and Sub-Sections	Regulations and Provisions
Section 226(1)	Makes it mandatory for every political party to prepare its annual statement of account and balance sheet and submit to INEC
Section 226(2)	Provides that it's the duty of INEC to ensure whether proper records of accounts of political parties are kept or not and to prepare the records and send to the National Assembly
Section 226(3)	Provides that every INEC official has powers to request the financial statement of political parties and must have unlimited access to them at all times in the discharge of his duties

Source: Nigerian 1999 Constitution (the compilation in a tabular form was made by the researcher 2017).

3.5. Electoral Acts 2010 Provisions on Political Party Financing

The 2010 Electoral Acts in addition to Nigerian Constitution provides some amendment that empowers the electoral body (INEC) to monitor and regulate financial activities of political parties and contestants. The provisions are as follows.

3.5.1 Offences in Relations to Finances of a Political Party

Section 88 (1) of the 2010 Electoral Act provides that any Political Party that committed an offence in violation of financing rules shall be sanction accordingly (see table 3.3 below):

Table 3.3

Offences in Relations to Political Party Financing and Sanctions

Sections	Offences	Sanctions
Section 88(1a)	Holding or possessing any funds outside Nigeria in contravention of section 91 (3) (a) of this Act	a fine of not less than N500, 000.00 (USD1, 373.40)
Section 88(1b)	Retaining of any fund or asset remitted to it from outside Nigeria in contravention of section 91 (3) (b) of this Act	a fine of not less than N500, 000.00 (USD1, 373.40)

Source: 2010 Electoral Act (Tabulation was made by the Researcher 2017 and the conversion date was November 2017)

3.5.2 Period to be Covered by Annual Statement

Section 89 and its sub-sections of the 2010 Electoral Act provides for a period of time that all political parties need to present their annual statement to the electoral body (INEC). It has been presented below (see table 3.4).

Table 3.4

Period of Presenting Annual Statement by Political Parties to the INEC

Section and Period	Sub-Section
Section 89(1)	Every political party shall submit to the Commission a detailed annual statement of assets and liabilities and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets with statement of its expenditure.
Section 89(2)	The statement of assets and liabilities referred to in subsection (1) of this section shall be in respect of the period 1 st January to 31 st December in each year.
Section 89(3)	Every political party shall grant to any officer authorised in writing by the Commission, access to examine the records and audited accounts kept by the political party.
Section 89(4)	The Commission shall publish the report on such examinations and audit in three National Newspapers.

Source: 2010 Electoral Act (Tabulation was made by the Researcher 2017)

3.5.3 Power to Limit Contribution to a Political Party

Section 90(1) of the 2010 Electoral Act provides for limitation on campaign spending and limits of political party financing as follows (see table 3.5 below).

Table 3.5

Power of INEC to Limit Contribution to a Political Party

Section	Contribution Limit
Section 90(1)	The Commission shall have power to place limitation on the amount of money or other assets, which an individual or group of persons can contribute to a political party.

Source: 2010 Electoral Act (Tabulation was made by the Researcher 2017)

3.5.4 Limitation on Election Expenses of Candidates and Sanction for Offenders

Section 91 of the 2010 Electoral Act provides for a limit of maximum campaign spending for various elective offices and the offences for the violaters of the provisions as presented in table 3.6 below.

Table 3.6

Limitation on Election Expenses of Candidates and Sanction for Offenders

Sections	Maximum Campaign Expenses	Sanctions for Offenders
Section 91	Election expenses shall not exceed the sum stipulated in Sub-Section (2-7) of this Act	

- Section 91(2)** Maximum expenditure to be incurred for Presidential election shall be **one billion naira (N1, 000, 000, 000=USD2, 746, 339.891)**. A fine of N1, 000, 000=USD 2,747.060) or imprisonment of 12 months or both.
- Section 91(3)** The maximum election expenses to be incurred by a Governorship election shall be **two hundred million naira(N200, 000, 000=USD549, 304.773)**. A fine of N800, 000=USD 2, 197.10) or imprisonment for 9 months or both.
- Section 92(4)** The maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred for a Senatorial seat shall be **forty million naira (N40, 000, 000=USD109, 873.99)**. A fine of N600, 000=USD 1, 647.93) or imprisonment for six months or both.
- Section 92(4)** The maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred for a House of Representatives shall be **forty million naira (N40, 000, 000=USD109, 873.99)**. A fine of N500, 000=USD 1, 373.3) or imprisonment for five months or both.
- Section 92(5)** In the case of State Assembly election, maximum of election expenses to be incurred shall be **ten million naira (N10, 000, 000=USD27, 468.690)**. A fine of N300, 000=USD 824.042) or 3 months imprisonment or both.

Section 92(6) In the case of a Chairmanship election, A fine of N300, 000=USD the maximum election expenses shall be 824.042) or 3 months ten million naira (N10, 000, imprisonment or both. 000=USD27, 468.690).

Section 92(7) In the case of councillorship election, the A fine of N100, 000.00=USD maximum amount of election expenses 274.697) or 1 month shall be one million naira (N1, 000, imprisonment or both. 000=USD2, 747.060).

Section 92(8), a, b, c) In determining the expenses, no account Contravention of subsection shall be taken of; any deposit made in (9) shall on conviction be compliance with the law, any liable to a maximum fine of expenditure made before the election N500, 000=USD 1, 373.49) date and party expenses in respect of or 9 months imprisonment or candidates both.

Section 92(9) No individual or other entity shall donate more than one million naira (N1, 000, 000 USD2, 746.98) to any candidate.

Source: 2010 Electoral Act (Tabulation was made by the Researcher 2017).

3.5.5 Election Expenses of Political Parties

This section provides rules and regulations for election expenses of political parties as provided by the 2010 Electoral Act see table 3.7 below.

Table 3.7

Provisions on Election Expenses of Political Parties

Sections	Provisions
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- Section 92(1) “Election expenses” means an expense incurred by a political party within the period from the date notice is given by the Commission to conduct an election.
- Section 92(2) Election expenses incurred by a political party for the management or the conduct of an election shall be determined by the Commission in consultation with the political parties.
- Section 92(3a) Election expenses of a political party shall be submitted to the Commission in a separate audited return within six months after an election.
- Section 92(3b) Any political party which commits a breach of this section is guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a maximum fine of N1, 000, 000=USD2, 747.060.
- Section 92(4) The return referred to in subsection (3) of this section shall show the amount of money expended by or on behalf of the party on election expenses.
- Section 92(5) The political party shall cause the return submitted to the Commission pursuant to subsection (4) of this section to be published in at least two national newspapers.
-

Section 92(6)	Any political party that election expenses is beyond the limit stipulated in this Act is guilty of an offence and shall be liable on conviction to a maximum fine of N1, 000, 000.00=USD2, 747.060 and forfeiture to the Commission.
Section 92(7)	The Commission shall make available for public inspection during regular business hours at its Headquarters and state offices

Source: 2010 Electoral Act (Tabulation was made by the Researcher 2017).

3.5.6 Disclosure by Political Parties

The regulations on political party financing provides for disclosure of income and expenditure in the following section. It has been summarised and presented in table 3.8 below.

Table 3.8

Disclosure of Parties' Income and Expenditure

Sections	Provisions
Section 93(1)	No political party shall accept or keep in its possession any anonymous monetary or other contribution, gifts, properties, etc.
Section 93(2a,b)	Every political party shall keep an account and asset book into which shall be recorded: All monetary and other forms of contribution received by the party; and the name and address of any person or entity that contributes any money or assets which exceeds N1, 000, 000.00=USD2, 747.060.

Section 93 (3) No political party shall accept any monetary or other contribution exceeding N100, 000=USD274.697 unless it can identify the source of the money or other contribution to the Commission.

Section 93(4) Every political party sponsoring the election of a candidate shall, within three months after the announcement of the results of the election, file a report of the contributions made by individuals and entities to the Commission.

Source: 2010 Electoral Act (Tabulation was made by the Researcher 2017).

The above provisions by Electoral Act 2010 are well articulated and composed to cater for a more transparent and accountable campaign and political party financing if the rules and regulations are to be adhered to or precisely if the electoral body will be bold and independent enough to impose the legal provisions, but the problem is the implementation in terms of monitoring, sanction and other related issues. The revelations from the informants and other scholastic views will disclose how failure to monitor or impose the regulations tantamount to violation of the rules with impunity leading to massive use of money in the electioneering campaign by political parties and their candidates. This would be analysed in the later section in this chapter. For instance, many informants from all categories agreed in one word or the other that, electoral regulations were violated in the 2015 General Election by both the parties and contestants in terms of maximum campaign spending and that, the electoral body also did not monitor adequately the parties and candidates as it is empowered by the Constitution and Electoral Act 2010. These views are discussed below.

3.5.7 Political Party Financing, Spending Limits and Other Issues in Nigeria: The Views of Informants

There are many issues and perceptions from the public on the nature of political party financing and electoral process in Nigeria's Fourth Republic. Most of the literature consulted above indicates a clear case of violation of existing rules and regulations and loopholes in the laws such as relying on private funding which gave room for corruption and illegal activities in the campaign process and elections. Those consulted in this research revealed their views and understanding of this subject matter based on the questions asked. The following is an analysis of the informants' views and responses on the subject matter. It has been organised in themes and sub-themes and analysed using the informants views and other documented sources to support or debunk a given position or information.

In this section, informants were grouped into six according to their organisation or agency into category A (politicians), category B (party stakeholders), category C (INEC officials), category D (EFCC officials), category E (academicians) and category F (focus group discussion with civil societies and general public). See Appendix I for further details.

3.5.7.1 Violation of Campaign Spending Limit Provided in Electoral Regulations

The informants were asked in this section; whether the set maximum limit by the 2010 Electoral Act for spending by various candidates seeking for different elective offices is feasible and is adhered to or it was violated. It should be recall that; the Electoral Act specified a sum of N1 billion Naira as maximum spending for a Presidential candidate, N200 million for Governorship candidate, N40 million for a Senatorial

candidate, N20 million for a Member House of Representatives, N10 million for a Member State House of Assembly, N10 million for Chairmanship election and N1 million for Councillorship election. Majority of the responses disclosed that, in most of the elective seats particularly at the top, it is practically impossible but it may be feasible at lower levels. Below are their arguments and views.

The 2010 Electoral Act set a certain limit for campaign as discussed in section 3.5 of this chapter in details. There are also provisions on punishment for the violators all provided in the Act. The question here is whether campaign spending limit was adhered to by the parties and their contestants in the 2015 General Election or not. In this theme, most of the informants or almost all of them in categories A to F (except the category D EFCC officials who claimed ignorance of elections and campaign process since they only deal with anti-graft issues) insisted that the campaign limit was not adhered to. According to one of the informants:

“There is no any law or act that can set limit to the politicians in their spending because the way one can determine the spending is even questionable how can it be determined isn’t pre-election or during elections or after elections and how. To me, this part of the law should be abrogated because there is no need for enacting a law that cannot be obeyed or implemented practically” (Personal interview with an informant in category A6, 26th May 2017).

In the same view another informant lamented how and why such law should exist because it is not meant to be obeyed in the first place. He said:

“I did not see the rationale behind this law at all in trying to limit campaign spending. Those who made the laws were the same group that is violating the law at will. Do you expect them to make laws that

will affect them negatively or follow rules that will hinder them from their criminal activities. I am telling you they have spent trillions of Naira both from PDP and APC so the issue of campaign limit is not in question at all here” (Personal interview with an informant in category B1, on 30th June 2017).

In contradiction of the above views by the two informants, an informant in category C stressed that:

“The campaign spending limit set by the 2010 Electoral Act is helpful to some extent in curbing excessive use of money in campaign and elections. Many politicians could not spend much because they fear disqualification by the Commission in doing so. However, I must admit that, the politicians are very tricky and they always find their ways of evading rules which means the maximum limit is not practically realisable as they always find their ways (Personal interview with an informant in category C1, on 11th June, 2017).

In a contrary view, one of the informants revealed that the rules are deliberately allowed with loopholes for manipulation by politicians where he said:

“Those who made the law enacted it with a deliberate intention to allow for a loophole which enables them to continue to manipulate the electoral process so as to remain in power. Do you expect them to make laws that will affect them negatively and when the power to do so is within their jurisdiction? Of course they will not. I see most of them as criminals who can bend any law to satisfy their want. Neither the PDP nor the APC follow any rules on political party financing” (Personal interview with an informant in category B1 30th June 2017).

In addition, another informant believed that his party (PDP) spent massively as revealed in the following words:

“I can tell you authoritatively that my party (PDP) spent N30 billion in Lagos alone during the 2015 General Election in order to win at Presidential and National Assembly levels but still we lost. Now, imagine if in Lagos alone we spent N30 billion, what about other big states like Kano, Ibadan, Port Harcourt you know we have spent billions or to be precisely trillions in order to win but, the voters are wiser since they have decided to vote for APC instead in Lagos, Kano, Ibadan and many other states that we spent billions. However, one factor contributed to that and that factor was the candidacy of President Jonathan” (Personal interview with an informant in category B1 30th June 2017).

The above view supported the propositions of the two theories used in the research work. First is the Rationality of the voters in collecting money in billions in major cities of Nigeria during the 2015 General Election but, instead of voting the PDP, they instead voted for APC and that shows the rationality of the politicians in paying much in order to secure power through any manipulative way possible while it also indicates the rationality of the voters in deciding for choosing leaders based on anticipated performance ahead of monetary value received. The second aspect is the cliental nature of the political party financing where political financiers used money illegally above the maximum campaign spending to secure victory and a contract was entered into in three phase; between the patron who provided the money, the brokers who engaged voters in the field and the voters who were intimated for the deal of vote buying and other bribe acts.

In addition, another informant disclosed that his party (APC) too spent massively in the electoral process at all levels above the set maximum financial ceiling where he mentioned that:

“In a small state like Gombe, I knew that the APC national headquarters sent N200 million for the Presidential Election but, the gubernatorial candidate of the APC in Gombe used his own pocket money to supplement it and made it N1 billion. That is, in Gombe alone and the maximum spending limit entirely is N1 billion for the Presidential candidate what about biggest states such as Kano which is the most populous, Lagos, Kaduna, Ibadan, Port Harcourt. To be frank billions were spent and the spending limit was violated”
(Personal interview with an informant in category A5 02nd May, 2017).

In another words, the above informant added that:

“On the elections I still maintain my stand that, it is the most credible in the history of this country but, when it comes to money spending, I can say it is beyond spending it is investment. Massive money was invested beyond quantification by both the APC my party and the PDP but particularly by PDP. If you just take the \$2.1 billion arms scandal which was confirmed officially to have been diverted by the ruling PDP in 2015 alone will give you Nigerian Naira equivalent to N777, 672, 521, 285.82 (seven hundred and seventy seven billion six hundred and seventy million and two hundred and eighty five Naira) is almost equivalent to N1 trillion in Naira. This is equivalent to one/fourth of Nigerian total annual budget for four consecutive years in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015. If we assume that PDP only spent that amount alone without any addition, where is the issue of financial regulations of N1 billion maximum spending, where is the issue of transparency, how could a public official obtain such outrageous amount and where will he spent such amount on this earth? Of course, from the public treasury and it was spent in corrupting all segments and facets of the Nigerian

state. But, let me tell you, the PDP spent far beyond that using many other sources apart from the arms money”(Personal interview with an informant in category A5, 02ndMay 2017).

The above statement by one of the informants in category B and A revealed clearly that the regulations were violated by both the former ruling PDP and current ruling APC in terms of campaign spending however, that of the PDP was higher and it has the implication of corruption in it as the campaign money was drawn directly from the statutory allocation of a certain sector of government and diverted for PDP campaign. Furthermore, such information was also given by another informant in the same category above which strengthened the above view and gives it a sense of reliability where he said:

”In this one, only our God Almighty Creator can determine what we spent both the APC and PDP but I am sure you know that \$2.1 billion was diverted by the PDP for campaign in 2015 in addition to many revelations today. APC too spent much but less than half or even quarter of what PDP spent. I can only conclude that billions or even trillions of Naira were spent by both parties. Many electoral body officials were bribed, religious clerics, royal fathers, opposition political parties, security agencies etc. Corruption is there and if not because of the massive use of money, PDP will not obtain half of its votes from the elections while the APC will not emerge as the winner”
(Personal interview with an informant in category A2, 7thMay 2017).

What the above views are expressing here is the indisputable fact that rules were violated with impunity from the major contenders. This has been supported by the prepared report of USAID/UKAID in 2015 which shows how the two major parties of APC and PDP spent above the set financial limit in the 2015 General Election in media

alone without considering other sectors of campaign funding. However, one of the informants did not agree that only PDP spent much he pointed that APC too spent hugely he only perceives that, their own has been more popularised in which he said:

"The APC is making a scapegoat of our party PDP but they too have spent much beyond imagination. I can only agree that, they didn't spend as much as our party has spent. There is corruption in all the parties and both rigged in areas of their influence we have witnessed that visibly. I can tell you that the parties spent billions in every state of Nigeria dazzling money around in buying votes, bribing INEC officials and all sorts of dubious acts"(Personal interview with an informant in category A6, 21st May, 2017).

In a group discussion by some selected informants from civil societies, many of them also expressed their concern that the rules were violated and money was spent by both APC and PDP in billions or even trillions as narrated below:

"Money was used beyond commonsense in billions by both APC and PDP which corrupted the entire system and if such trend is not curb particularly by this regime that advocate for change and commitment towards fighting corruption, the nation is bound to collapse sooner than later"(Personal interview with an informant in category F5, 16th June, 2017).

The theories used in the research fit into the interpretation or support of the views of the informants above because the responses above are clearly showing how the politicians and the voters rationalised the process of using money to get what they want or power in the case of the candidates and their parties and how to use the electoral proceeds to secure material benefit as in the case of the voters but, with a wise choice. One major issue here is the existence of what is called swing voting in the process

under the Rational Choice Theory in one of its interpretations as observed by Lindberg & Morrison (2008).

Swing voting occurred where the electorates in Nigeria desired for change also followed it up with nepotism by voting for their ethnic candidates. For instance, the APC candidate Muhammadu Buhari swept all the states in the North entirely and all the Southwestern states except one because he and his party were strong in these regions and it was replicated in the states governorship election and National Assembly elections. In the same vein, President Jonathan was overwhelmingly voted in his region of Southsouth and Southeast. This means the voters displayed rationality in choosing the candidates that they believed will confer benefit and advantage of kinship on them apart from the expected performance which was another factor.

In the second instance, Clientalism is visible in the views of the informants in the sense that, a correlation was indirectly disclosed between the patron, brokers and clients in an asymmetrical voluntary relationship that is dyadic as presented in the assumptions of the theory. Voters' consent was sought, and different political groups were drawn by both APC and PDP and influenced with monetary benefit in order to win so as to have access to power control. This is the meaning or interpretation of the repeated excessive spending in billions and trillions that the informants insisted in their responses.

The above has been corroborated by many works that, there was no any means of measuring campaign spending and it is not possible to curtail excessive spending. For instance, the former President Jonathan in his built up to 2015 Presidential campaign

made a fund-raising dinner where an amount was raised above the spending limit set up by the Electoral Act. This has been displayed below.

Table 3.9

List of Donors to President Goodluck Jonathan 2015 Campaign

Donors	Amount
Tunde Ayeni	N1 billion
Tunde and Group of friends	N2.6 billion
Jerry Gana and friends	N5 billion
National Automotive Council	N450 million
PDP Governors Forum (50 million x 21)	N1.0 billion
Bala Shagaya representing the oil and gas sector	N5 billion
Construction sector	N310 million
Transport and Aviation Sector represented by Didi Ndimou	N1 billion
The Real Estate Sector represented by Oluchi Okoye	N4 billion
Food and Agric Sector represented by Chief Ominife Uzeogbu	N500million
Cizally Limited	N250 million
Power sector represented by Tunde Ayeni	N500 million
National association of Stevedores	N2 million
Mr. Sam Egwu	N1 million
Halima Jibril	N5 million
Ajuji Best Hotel	N1 million
Total	N22, 442 billion

Source: Ukase, 2014.

The above table indicated clearly that, right from the fund-raising dinner by the ruling PDP in 2014 and in preparation for the 2015 Presidential campaign it was generated more than 20 times the maximum amount that is expected to be spent in the campaign process. The electoral body was aware of such development and could not intervene or monitor or sanction the incumbent President simply because of the nature of corruption and incumbency in the country. This vindicated the informants above that; INEC is incapacitated to monitor campaign spending to ensure compliance.

The APC candidate Muhammadu Buhari too did his own fund-raising through the populace. He created an account name Buhari Support Organisation (BSO) with an account number 2026724405 in First Bank of Nigeria for his supporters to donate for his campaign. On December 23, 2014, while rendering an account of the funds donated by his supporters, General Muhammadu Buhari revealed a total donation of N4 million and as at January of 2015, the sum has grown to N118.7 million (USAID & UKAID, 2015: 24). This was obtained through the sale of recharge card in denomination of N100, N200, N500 and N1, 000. However, one cannot believe that, the above raised fund was what sustained the entire campaign of President Muhammadu Buhari as narrated by one of the informants above from the category of party stakeholders who said that:

“Not even Muhammadu Buhari could tell you the exact source of his campaign money as the new PDP and other decampers came into APC with huge money and spent for the success of the party in the elections”
(Personal interview with an informant in category B1, 30th June, 2017).

And it is not a hidden knowledge that the government spent above the limit as disclosed by another study undertaken by USAID in collaboration with UKAID in 2015. The study examined the expenditure of both the ruling PDP and opposition APC and concluded that campaign spending in the 2015 Presidential Election alone is above the ceiling. The study revealed the following:

Table 3.10

Media Spending of two Major Political Parties in the 2015 General Elections: APC and PDP

Campaign Expenses	PDP Presidential Candidate	APC Presidential candidate
Campaigns and Rallies	N1, 280, 374, 870.00	N671, 062, 200.00
Expenses on Billboards	N473, 160, 000.00	N190, 380, 000.00
Electronic Media Campaign	N532, 100, 000.00	N410, 050, 000.00
Electronic Media advert	N3, 988, 822, 125.00	N1, 064, 706, 805.00
Print Media Campaign	N2, 475, 228, 301.00	N5 79, 647, 687.00
TOTAL	N 8, 749, 685, 296.00	N2, 915, 846, 737.00

Source: USAID & UKAID, 2015

The above report also added that, money and administrative resources played an enhanced role in the 2015 Presidential Election. The election appears to have been the most costly and keenly contested since the return to civil rule in 1999. The expenditure ceiling of N1 billion was largely ignored by the candidates whilst administrative resources were deployed by the two major contenders. Public financial resources were deployed to the election by the two political parties and candidates. The link between the run down finances of states and FGN, the inability to pay workers salaries at the state level and the 2015 General Election was very clear. The context of the coming together of the opposition to form the APC which squared up with the PDP candidate

provided a near level playing field in terms of access to resources for the candidates (USAID & UKAID, 2015: 103).

The above spending is only a part in media sector. What about transport, logistics and other means? And the same scenario is applicable in other candidates that contested for Senatorial position, Member House of Representatives, Governorship and all other position down to Councillorship. Although, one of the informants consulted declared that:

“At the level of State House of Assembly, Chairmanship and Councillorship, the maximum amount stipulated is much and needs to be reduced by half but, at higher level is, unrealistic” (Personal interview with an informant in category A5, 02nd May 2017).

This is a contrary view from many informants and scholars (Nwagwu, 2015, Ayanda & Odunayo 2015 & Lawal 2015) that the spending limit at all levels is inadequate and needs to be revisited since this is a testimony from a direct experience of one of the political office holders that participated in the 2015 General Election. In essence, it can be unrealistic at higher levels and realistic at lower levels as he said but, it is beyond expectation that, there is likely hood of such trend to continue until a strict legal enforcement regime is installed in place after a realistic revisitation of the amount to tally with reality. However, the view can be used in making adjustment since it seems those at the lower level are allocated higher amount than those at the higher elective offices among the categories of contestants.

3.5.7.2 INEC Monitoring of Campaign Finances, Parties and Candidates

Another major issue in the 2015 General Election in terms of campaign spending limits and other electoral activities by politicians and their parties is the monitoring responsibility by INEC as provided in section 89(1) of the 2010 Electoral Act which empowers INEC to monitor income and expenditure of parties and also section 226 of the 1999 Constitution. However, it has been realised from this study that INEC is not monitoring the parties and their expenditure as required by the law or it has been doing so but with limitations which makes it insignificant in ensuring of compliance and restrictions against the excessive use of money during campaigns. Some of the informants see it that INEC is not discharging its responsibility while others believed it is doing so. In the view of those that did not agree with INEC in discharging the role of monitoring:

“INEC is not powerful and capable enough to monitor campaign spending and other activities of politicians and parties because of political manipulation from the ruling class, bribery and corruption and weak regulations emanating from lack of political will from the policy makers and lawmakers. This is the reason why politicians spent billions of dollars and trillions of naira in the just concluded 2015 General Election without any restriction or sanction” (Personal interview with an informant in category E2, on 27th May, 2017).

In a different view from the above, those other informants that believed that INEC is monitoring the financial and other activities of the parties and politicians believed so but also lamented that it is not effective. Their views are summarised as follows:

“INEC has been forthcoming and doing its best in making sure that parties and candidates comply with the existing laws in terms of spending and rally activities but, it cannot be effective because the policymakers and lawmakers are involved in such offences and you

know it is very difficult to sanction them” (Personal interview with an informant in category E3, on 6th June 2017).

However, some informants especially in the category of C insist that, INEC has done its own best and it has monitored the parties’ activities and politicians even with many political constraints. In the view of one of them:

“INEC has established a Department in 2010 for Political Party Monitoring to ensure transparency and accountability of the parties as enshrined in the Constitution and Electoral Act 2010. The Department keeps a close watch on campaign activities and expenditure as well scrutinise the sources of parties’ income. However, lack of full autonomy and political will from the political class impedes the full operation and success of the monitoring. Indeed, the Department has limit and many challenges that affect its operation” (Personal interview with an informant category C1 on 11th June 2017).

Another informant in this category however, attributed the failure of INEC to monitor political parties and contestants appropriately to the nature of Nigerian politics:

“INEC has the statutory powers in the 2010 Electoral Act to monitor political parties and contestants and it has the will to do so but, politicians deny them the opportunity to do so for instance, I have witnessed many cases where you will demand a statement of income and expenditure of parties but the answers they always give is we must await the approval of the Presidency or state Governor before they release them even when they know that constitutionally we have the powers to demand them within 30 days. The Nigerian politics impedes us from our statutory responsibility in essence” (Personal interview with an informant category C2 on 3rd May, 2017).

In relation to the above, another informant attributed the failure of INEC to monitor effectively the financial activities and campaign spending of political parties because of corrupt practices among their staff where he revealed that:

“INEC as a Commission that is responsible for monitoring financial activities of political parties and audit them as appropriate are found wanting in their discharge of responsibilities. I believed it is well known to all Nigerians that, our staff, including senior officials were found involved in bribery scandal and corruption allegations during the 2015 General Election. In this case, how can these corrupt elements monitor the financial activities of parties? We have the law but we lack the enforcement and the will to implement” Personal interview with an informant category C3 on 16th May, 2017).

However, in contrary to the above, one of the informants agreed that, there is a significant improvement in the role of INEC in monitoring parties and their financial spending and campaign activities especially during elections. He narrated that:

“We may recall that it was the first time that the INEC asserted its authority on political parties by calling the ruling PDP to order in 2014 when the opposition petitioned INEC that the PDP started campaign even before the ban was lifted for political activities. It was of course an improvement from the leadership of the electoral body. However, there is limited possibility for INEC to monitor the campaign spending of parties and politicians because it is very difficult to determine, measure or detect as monies exchange hands in a clandestine manner so how could they detect that?” (Personal interview with an informant category E1 on 29th June, 2017).

There is in addition a strong applicability of the two theories used in the research in terms of the relativity provided by the informants above. A good example here is; INEC failed to monitor the campaign spending of the parties and candidates because they used the rationality in avoiding all means that will hook them in abiding by the

regulations strictly. The voters on the other hand are rational in getting their benefits from the parties and contestants through a kind of a mutual and consistent rational relationship for ensuring that they benefit from the proceeds of the campaign expenditure either directly or indirectly or from the proceeds of office on assumption of power by those they supported for a return benefit. This is why they can use any means possible to defy INEC from a proper monitoring and violate the rules for personal benefit which, even if is perceived as illegal it is rational to them.

From the perspective of the other theory Clientalism, buyout took place where the political sponsors of the contestants used money massively from the two major contenders as against the rule which set a certain maximum limit to ensure transparency and eschew corrupt practices. The cliental nature of the patron, their brokers who are field agents and the clients who are the voters made it compulsory for excessive spending to secure victory. The massive illegal spending in the electoral process emerged in a cliental relationship directly where there are those who anticipate immediate benefit by collecting money to vote for some candidates while there are those who envisage a future benefit by sponsoring politicians so that they would be rewarded later after electoral victory with contract kickbacks and other unofficial benefits or lucrative appointments. All these expectations and interplay led to the huge campaign expenditure for parties which were carried out in violation of the rules and regulations for party financing.

Notwithstanding, the members of civil society believed that INEC has the capacity to monitor parties and their campaign spending especially if they work hand in hand with the civil societies even though there might be challenges as they revealed below:

“INEC as the Commission responsible for monitoring of political parties and their activities especially campaign expenditure has the powers constitutionally and the zeal to do so if they collaborate with civil societies” (Personal interview with an informant category F1 16th June 2017).

Another stated that:

“It is very difficult for the electoral body to monitor properly according to the law campaign spending of parties except if the politicians are willing to foster transparency which is lacking for now” (Personal interview with an informant category F2 16th June 2017).

In the view of another:

“INEC made a good attempt in monitoring campaign expenditure of political parties in the 2015 General Election in collaboration with civil societies but it must improve”(Personal interview with an informant category F5 16th June 2017).

In addition another informant stressed that:

“In the time being, it is impossible to compel parties and candidates to adhere to the strict maximum spending limit if we are to be honest with ourselves, what needs to be done is severe punishment of the violators to deter others if not the trend will continue unabated” (Personal interview with an informant category F8 16th June 2017).

However, some of the informants attributed the violation of electoral rules and regulations in terms of political party spending due to the lapses in the law and inadequacy of the maximum spending limit set which failed to meet the reality of the current situation in the country as they narrated below:

“Looking into the current inflationary trend in the country and the nature of Nigerian politics where money influenced election and electoral process, it is inadequate for the maximum campaign spending limit set up by the Electoral Act 2010. It needs to be revisited upward otherwise the law will be there in writing, but it cannot be enforced sincerely” (Personal interview with an informant category F3 16th June 2017).

Furthermore, another informant emphasised that:

“It is in my opinion that what is obtainable now in form of regulations for maximum campaign spending is just a law and it remains so but implementation is another issue because it is not feasible for even a honest politician to strictly follow these rules in Nigerian context where moneybags determine who wins” (Personal interview an informant in category F4 16th June 2017).

In a different view, another informant revealed that:

“The political party financing regulations are violated because those who made the law failed to carefully design them in such a way that Nigerian factor (money politics) can be accommodated. How can you ask a Presidential candidate in Nigeria to spend only N1 billion and expect that to be real? It’s practically impossible” (Personal interview with an informant in category F7 16th June 2017).

It is not only the civil society members that believed the maximum campaign spending is not feasible or realisable even the INEC senior officials that are expected to monitor and sanction violators believed as mentioned by one of them in an interview below:

“Currently, I do not see honestly how the maximum campaign spending limit set can work out considering the inflationary trend and other issues at stake as well as national politics which is money politics. I think the INEC needs to review the provision upward if we are to tackle appropriately the problem of excessive spending and violation of the

rule and the civil society too needs to come in” (Personal interview with an informant in category C2 3rd May 2017).

The above diverse views indicated that INEC might have been monitoring the activities of the parties and politicians but at the same time cannot sanction any or deter them from their corrupt practices because of the difficulties involved in the process. Some scholars supported the position that INEC is not properly monitoring the activities particularly financial spending of parties (Innocent & Nkechi 2014; Olorunmola 2016 and Omilusi & Adu 2016) as well the INEC (2017) itself. There are many works that indicated the level of expenditure of major political parties in the 2015 General Election in violation of the 2010 Electoral Act. It is pertinent to observe them here. However, it is also vital to summarise in tabular form the opinions and responses of the informants above for a better clear perception.

Table 3.11
Summary of Campaign Spending Limit and INEC Monitoring according to Responses

Category	Informants	Responses
A (Politicians)	First	Impossible at higher level but feasible at lower levels.
	Second	Impossible at all levels with INEC incapacitated to act.
	Third	Not feasible and INEC is incapacitated.
	Fourth	INEC attempted but it was overpowered by money Politics.
	Fifth	There was an improvement but still lots need to be done.
	Six	It is not possible because of the nature of Nigerian politics
B (Party Stakeholders)	First	Impracticable at all levels.
	Second	Impossible and not feasible for INEC to monitor.
	Third	Not feasible and INEC is incapacitated to monitor.
	Fourth	Impracticable for both politicians and INEC to adhere.
C (INEC Staff)	First	Not possible and INEC has no powers to impose sanctions.
	Second	Not practicable and INEC was sabotage in the monitoring process by parties and politicians.
	Second	
E (Academicians)	First	No enforcement of legal regime so it is not possible.
	Second	Corruption and weak political institutions in addition to poor monitoring make it impossible.
	Third	There was a good attempt but the laws have lapses.
F	First	INEC was working hard but hindered by politics.

(Focus Discussion)	Group	Second	Corruption from politicians prevents INEC from monitoring.
		Third	INEC is corrupt too and not discharging its duties
		Fourth	The monitoring is not effective.
		Fifth	Civil societies must be involved.
		Six	The regulations are faulty and inadequate.
		Seven	There should be severe punishment or else the rules will fail
		Eight	The rules are not feasible to be abide by in Nigerian context.

Source: Field Survey 2017

3.6 Regulations in Financing of Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

Section 3 (1) of the 2006 Electoral Act provides that; there is to be established for the commission a fund to be known as the Independent National Electoral Commission fund. But, section 3 (1) of the 2010 Electoral Act suggests that, the source of funding for INEC should be extracted directly from the consolidated revenue fund budgeted by the Commission, presented by the executive and approved by the lawmakers. Section 3 (2) of the 2010 Electoral Act identifies other sources of the Commission's funds to include: monies allowed by the Federal Government to enable it to exercise its constitutional functions, monies accruing to it by way of interests from investments made on the fund, aids and grants made by development partners to facilitate its ability to carry out its functions. Furthermore, the Commission subject to section 3 (3) of the 2010 Electoral Act is to be funded under six budgetary heads namely (Omeiza, 2012):

- (1) Consolidated revenue fund charges (including personal emoluments of national commissioners and resident electoral commissioners).
- (2) Cost comprising salaries and allowances of staff of the Commission.
- (3) Overhead comprising office running costs, travels and transportation, the maintenance of equipment, utilities, bank charges etc.

- (4) Special electoral capital comprising the cost of balloting instruments (i.e. ballot papers, results sheets, ballot boxes e.t.c).
- (5) Special electoral capital (including ad-hoc staff training cost, allowances of ad-hoc registration and poll officials, e.t.c) and other structural capital (comprising the construction of buildings, purchase and installation of equipment like generators e.t.c)
- (6) Purchase of vehicles etc.

However, over the years, two key issues relating to the funding of INEC have garnered debates; the approval of the elections' expenditure and the method of the disbursement of the approved funds. While the salaries and allowances of commissioners are drawn directly from the consolidated revenue fund, the elections expenses are not. This creates a serious problem for election administration in Nigeria (Omeiza, 2012).

A whopping sum of N125 billion (\$340, 863, 696.382 million) was provided by the government for the electoral body (INEC) for the conduct of the 2015 General Election. It is the highest since that of the 2011 which claimed N80 billion (\$218, 152, 765.68 million). It is really a huge sum of money and the Nigerian Government demonstrated a serious commitment towards funding of INEC in undertaking electoral process. Unlike many African countries, this explains further why Nigeria or specifically INEC does not require external funding from foreign donors (Ahar, 2015).

It is not only the scholars mentioned above that perceived the fact that INEC was adequately funded in the 2015 General Election, many informants also agreed with that. For instance, one of them revealed that:

“There is no doubt that INEC was adequately funded in the 2011 and 2015 General Elections in order to ensure that a credible and fair

elections were carried out with less obstacles and logistics problems that INEC faced in the 2003 and 2007 Elections” (Personal interview with an informant in category C1 11th June 2017).

In the same vein, another informant disclosed that:

”Having examined the problem of underfunding which bedeviled the previous elections in Nigeria, the electoral reforms recommended for increased funding of INEC and the government responded positively” (Personal interview with an informant in category C2 3rd May 2017).

Besides, another informant in the same category said:

“INEC was funded with the highest allocation in the history of the country in 2015 in its preparation to conduct an election that will improve the process and it paid off because a significant improvement was recorded” (Personal interview with an informant in category C3 16th June 2017).

In addition to the above, other informants in other category also support the position that INEC was given full pledged funding by the government and it also received assistance from international donors as discussed below:

“As the 2015 General Election was the most expensive in the history of Nigeria in terms of campaign spending, so also it was the most expensive in terms of preparation where INEC spent a huge sum of N125 billion” (Personal interview with an informant in category E1 29th June 2017).

In another version, an informant narrated that:

“The INEC recorded success in its conduct of 2015 General Election largely due to huge cash back up from the government and logistic support from international donors and agencies in terms of training of staff, provision of vital information and supply of equipment as well as

observation” (Personal interview with an informant category E3 6th June 2017).

In an additional interpretation of the role of financing of INEC towards achieving a successful and credible election in the 2015, informants in category F (FGD with civil society members) agreed that the adequate funding of the electoral body enabled for procurement of equipment, training and services for the conduct of the election with less difficulty in comparison with the previous elections. Their views were summarised below:

“The electoral body got enough funding from the government and this helped immensely in procuring equipment for the conduct of the 2015 General Election such as card reader which assisted in the easy conduct of the election” (Personal interview with an informant in category F1 16th June 2017).

To add to the above view, another informant narrated that:

“Since foreign funding of the electoral body was prohibited by Nigerian law, the government found it necessary to provide adequate funding for INEC and this helped immensely in an improved electoral conduct” (Personal interview with an informant in category F2 16th June 2017).

Also, another informant in this group revealed that:

“INEC was better prepared in the 2015 General Election than the previous ones because it was sponsored adequately by the government making it independent and reliable to some extent” (Personal interview with an informant in category F3 16th June 2017).

In additional view, another participant added that:

“The INEC Chairman was asked to prepare a sufficient budget that will make the election easy to facilitate and conducted; he made that including the procurement of card reader and the government approved as it was and that made the process successful” (Personal interview with an informant in category F6 16th June 2017).

The above diverse views of the informants have been supported by many scholars (Ahar, 2015, IRI 2015, NDI 2015 and Chukwudi 2015) as discussed previously that the 2015 General Election was the most expensive in Nigeria’s history in terms of expenditure by parties and the electoral body alike going by the amount of money budgeted for INEC to undertake the election. This according to them had helped in recording success and improvement by the INEC in the election.



3.7 International Donor Agencies and Political Financing in Nigeria

Elections have become international affairs and the growing interests by the developed democracies to support, sustain and consolidate democracy led to the emergence of international agencies and national governments that provide assistance in the conduct of elections in developing democracies. Nigeria is one of the beneficiaries of such international donor agencies in elections. While the Nigerian Constitution and 2010 Electoral Act are very clear in regulating that no assistance should be received by either candidates or political parties from external donors and any such receipts should be forfeited to the electoral commission or sanction of such violation should follow, the laws are silent on other participants of elections such as the electoral body, civil societies, groups e.t.c and therefore, there are evidences of international donor funds coming to Nigeria to assist in the electoral process as can be seen below.

“Section 90 of the 2010 Electoral Act and its Sub-Sections declared clearly that no political party or candidate should receive any donation from foreign source of whatsoever and if it does, it must forfeit the disclosed amount or face sanction. This means clearly there is no provision for external political party financing in Nigeria. But, INEC can receive assistance from international donors in terms of technical expertise, logistics and training” (Personal interview with an informant in category C2 3rd May 2017).

The above statement of the informant is supported with the following views. The US Government has been assisting Nigeria in the conduct of elections since 1999 through the agency of international development; USAID when it returned to democratic rule in the Fourth Republic. USAID in partnership with DFID provided USD868. 8=N316, 840, 21, 86.73 billion of assistance to improve performance of elections management institution. Other key areas of assistance include diplomatic engagement of Nigerian candidates, political party leadership, civil society, business leaders and prominent individuals with the hope of promoting credible elections (US Factsheet2015). It should be noted that all the amount provided cannot be use for assisting parties or candidates, however, a training and awareness can be arranged for parties in collaboration with the agencies and civil societies as revealed below:

“The Nigerian Constitution and Electoral Act 2010 are unequivocal in their provisions that no party or any candidate can receive external donations. But, the electoral body (INEC) can receive funds for training of its staff from international donors and other gadgets such as computers and office equipment and securing of election materials sometimes. However, it is allowed for the international donors to organise workshop and awareness for parties and its members in collaboration with civil societies and other political groups without receiving a penny from the donors or materials for campaign activities

or operation in parties' secretariat" (Personal interview with an informant in category E1 29th June 2017).

The above position is supported below. Western donors in their efforts to strengthen democracy in Nigeria co-funded projects with a view to improve the quality of elections and the credibility of INEC. The support here includes technical assistance and training of electoral officers in the areas of election management and deployment of elections materials. The donors assisted in the civic voter education through funding for the production and dissemination of non-partisan voter education materials and campaign. They empowered civil society's activities in the 2015 on youth participation, eschewing violence and peaceful voting (Bariledum et al., 2016).

The Western donors also supported international and domestic observers' missions in Nigeria during general elections. They also supported in securing elections materials. Between 1998 and 1999, the European Union supported Nigeria in the area of human rights and democracy promotion with the sum of Euro 7 million=N3, 001, 497, 100.00 billion (Bariledum et al., 2016).

The US has been providing support to Nigeria's election particularly before the 2011 General Election with USD17.2 million=N6, 40, 91, 6.00 billion provided in 2008, USD13.448 million=N4, 909, 931, 206.38 billion in 2009. Earlier, the US Government also assisted with USD74 million= N27, 022, 99, 07.0 billion to strengthen democracy in Nigeria in which out of it, USD5 million was spent for training of poll workers in 1999, USD2 million spent for training of 10, 300 elected officials in the area of accountability and transparency. On the other hand, EU also spent E92 million=N396, 626, 402, 00.00 billion from 2010 to 2013 to promote democracy in Nigeria. The

money came into categories with DFID made valuable E810.9 million and CIDA expended E83 million spent on civil society activities to promote democracy in Nigeria (Bariledum et al., 2016).

In an interview with an informant in category C, it has been observed that:

“Donor agencies support to electoral process should only be in the form of technical assistance, logistics and training of INEC staff to acquire better skills and improve and to channel their support to weak groups such as women and disabled, civil societies and training of political party leadership and civic voter education” (Personal interview with an informant in category C2 3rd May 2017).

Another informant is of the view that:

“Nigeria does not require financial assistance directly for election funding as the country is wealthy enough to sponsor her elections comfortably as it has been doing so since 1999. The INEC was not underfunded and all the funding for electoral process is coming from the Federal Government. I view the motive for donor with suspicion of Western agenda and disregard for indigenous values. Also identified are communication in local languages and ignorance of majority of the voters as other factors that made the donor assistance less influential in elections results outcome in Nigeria. Even with the existence of donor support from 1999, the elections were not credible in 2003 and 2007” (Personal interview with an informant in category E2 27th May 2017).

Thus, it can be perceived from the above that, while the assistance from international donors is not meant to sponsor any politician or political party and the electoral body; it is playing an important role of strengthening democratic institutions such as civil

societies and other political groups in the country. Furthermore, some even felt that there was no need for the assistance at all due to suspicion of Western agenda since Nigeria is wealthy enough to undertake the full responsibility of financing the electoral body to conduct the election no matter what it will cost as exhibited in the huge sum allocated for INEC in the 2015 General Election. In summary, political financing by international donors in Nigeria is limited and has little influence in the money politics and electoral outcome in the country.

3.8 Summary

The chapter is a thorough examination and analysis of the political party financing from a global view using the rank of continental approach and the entire means, sources and processes of political party financing in Nigeria in the First Republic, Second Republic, Aborted Third Republic and Fourth Republic including the discussion of campaign spending for candidates of various elective offices, donation to political parties, maximum spending limit and sanction for offenders, financing of the electoral body (INEC), the role of international donor agencies in political financing in Nigeria and many other issues. The chapter studied the divergent views of scholars and informants on the sources for campaign spending, adherence to maximum spending limit and the role of INEC in the monitoring of political parties in relation to its effectiveness or otherwise in the process. The chapter concluded from the existing literature and different views of informants that the maximum spending limit was violated without any sanction taken against them. This will link this chapter with the next one which is an examination of the sources of political party financing in Nigeria during the 2015 General Election.

The next chapter has a direct link with this one in the sense that, since campaign expenditure or political party financing process was violated in the 2015 General Election; it will be relevant to know how it was violated. This chapter discussed the violation in detail but, what are the sources and means that were used to violate the process? This is what the next chapter addressed.



CHAPTER FOUR

SOURCES OF POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING IN NIGERIA'S 2015 GENERAL ELECTION

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, an attempt was made to link the previous chapter with the discussion in terms of examining the various sources of political party financing in Nigeria during the 2015 General Election to support the evidence of how and why the previous chapter revealed the essence of violation of the regulations on political party financing. In doing so, the researcher felt it is pertinent to discuss briefly the concept of political party here particularly with reference to Nigerian political parties and the parties in the Fourth Republic in which the 2015 General Election fall within its scope.

4.2 Concept and Nature of Political Parties

Political parties are considered as the engine room of democracy and democratic rule. They are institutions that provide a platform for leadership, governance and recruitment of the citizenry for training in politics and governance. In this regard, this section will briefly examine the concept and nature of political parties in general and their nature in Nigerian context particularly in the Fourth Republic.

It is very difficult to accurately define a political party. The reason is that, the views of the Liberal and Marxist writers differ sharply on this point. Not only this, even the views of the English Liberals differ from their counterparts (Johari, 2012:423). For instance, Burke hold the view that political party is a body of men united for promoting the national interest on some political principles in which they are all agreed. But, the American view is different in the sense that here a political party is taken as an instrument of capturing power.

Political parties serve as the motive force in crystallising the public opinion, and as the unifying agency which make democracy workable. They are the indispensable links between the people and the representative machinery of government. Thus, a political party, is an organized group of citizens who hold common views on public questions and acting as a political unit seek to obtain control of the government with a view to further the programme and the policy which they profess (Kapur, 2009:638).

Similar to Kapur's analysis, Agbaje (2008) conceptualises political party as a group of persons bonded in policy and opinion in support of a general cause, which essentially is the pursuit, capture and retention for as long as democratically feasible, of government and its office (Agbaje,2008:195). Appadorai (2004) may not have any different opinion of the term political party from that of Kapur (2009) and Agbaje (2008) where he stated; that a political party is a more or less organised group of citizens who Act together as a political unit, have distinctive aims and opinions on the leading political questions of controversy in the state, and who, by acting together as a political unit, seek to obtain control of the government (Appadorai, 2004:538). Appadorai (2004) further added that, it is on two fundamentals of human nature: men

differ in their opinions and are gregarious; they try to achieve by combination what they cannot achieve individually. Religious and communal loyalties, and the attachment to a dynasty or leader, also help parties to develop.

Unlike the above conceptualisations which perceived political parties as formidable and necessary, Adamolekun and Osuntokun (1977) see political party as voluntary and not involuntary for governance to occur. In their own words, political parties are voluntary associations of people who are agreed on a cooperative effort to win political power and exercise it. The origin of modern political parties dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century when electoral committees and parliamentary groups multiplied in number in most European countries because of the extension of a popular suffrage and the increase in the powers of their parliaments (Adamolekun and Osuntokun, 1977:44).

A distinguishing analysis of what the term political party is; is the one given by Johari (2011) which analysed it from the two contending views; Liberal versus Marxist views. The Liberal view according to Johari is; the appreciation of the existence and role of political parties as the agencies of organised public opinion with the help of which a political system operates. The English, French and Italian Liberals lay emphasis on the factor of 'principles' on which a political party is organised and functions, the typical American view is to treat a political party just like a machine or a platform for taking part in the struggle for power on democratic lines (Johari,2011:254).

On the other hand, the Marxist view of a political party and its role is quite different from the one we have seen above. Here the liberal emphasis on party as a doctrine has been replaced by the idea of a party as a class that will fight for inaugurating a new era culminating in the phase of communism developing the idea of Marx in the name of making it up-to-date, Lenin say that the proletariat has no weapon in the struggle for power except organisation. Constantly pushed down to the depth of Poverty, the proletariat can and will inevitably become an unconquerable force only as a result of this; that its ideological union by means of the principles of Marxism is strengthened by the material union of an organisation, holding together millions of toilers in the army of the working class (Johari, 2011: 257).

Political parties as one of the major tools of democracy exercise vital functions in sustaining democracy as presented by many scholars (Johari 2012, Heywood 2007, Kapur 2009, Johari 2011, Agbaje 2008, Appadorai 2004 and Salih 2003). The functions are categorised and summed up as follows: i. Political parties unite, simplify and stabilise the political process; ii. Political parties struggle for capturing power; iii. The parties provide a link between the government and its people. They seek to educate, interact and activate the electorate; iv. While increasing the scope of political activity and widening popular participation, political parties perform the important function of recruiting political leaders; v. Political parties present issues; they set values goods for the society; vi. The parties serve as a broker of ideas by selecting number of issues and focusing attention on them; vii. In the newer and developing countries of the world where political habits and traditions are yet to grow up, political parties do the job of political modernisation and viii. Political parties also perform social welfare functions that may be termed their ‘non-political activities’.

4.2.1 Nature of Nigerian Political Parties

African political parties are portrayed as similar in structure but different in operation to western political parties. Parties are instruments of collective human action and creatures of political elite either politicians trying to control governments or government elites trying to control the masses. In competitive systems, Parties are organised by politicians to win elections; in authoritarian systems, parties are organised to affect the attitudes and behavior of the population. In both instances, an organisational structure must be forged, money must be raised, cadres recruited, officers elected or selected, and procedures for internal governing established and agreed upon. In short, party building has logic of its own' (Salih, 2003:3).

Salih (2003:1) added that, the factors that influenced the emergence of African and western political parties vary immensely due to differences in the socio-economic circumstances that shaped the histories of each. Not only do Western political parties date back almost two centuries, whereas that of Africa dates back only to the beginning of the twentieth century, but both are informed by different historical experiences. In the case of Africa, the pervasive impact of colonialism, abject poverty and political dynamics made parties quite different to those in the West.

However, most of these political parties are not ideologically oriented but ethnically based as observed by Salih (2004:16). Due to the speed with which political development took place; numerous ethnically based parties emerged in opposition to other ethnic parties. The political elite had consumed the goal of national unity and fell back to sub-nationalist politics. In some countries like Nigeria, sub-nationalism has flared in civil wars of liberation from what some in the marginalised and ethnic

minority political elite conceived as a form of internal colonialism exacted by the ruling ethnicity.

Ethnic politics affected party politics in the First Republic even in foreign policy of Nigeria with NPC; Northern and Muslim dominated being sympathetic towards Palestinian cause while NCNC Southern and Christian dominated having more affiliation to Israel's cause (Gambari, 1980:49).

Many other scholars (Almond and Powell 2005, Meredith 2006, Babawale 2006, Ake 1996, Aziegbé 2008, Kurfi 1993, Crowder 1986 and Maier 2000) characterised Nigerian political parties as ethnic in outlook, regional in orientation, elite based and not democratically situated for grassroots mobilisation. Instead of attaining to cross-cultural and heterogeneous mobilisation for institutionalisation of democratic practices, they resorted to ethnicity, regionalism and religious sentiments to mobilise support instead of ideological and secularistic multi-cultural mobilisation for political participation and representation.

Most of the African political parties including that of Nigeria emerged from the decolonisation process through nationalist movement which mobilised citizens for independence. Thus, African political parties and African democracies at large suffered from traumatic experiences such as revolution, decolonisation, independence or severe repression during authoritarian or military regimes (Salih, 2003:181). This denotes that political parties in most African countries and Nigeria in particular by their nature are devoid of ideological or nationalistic values but rather decolonisation

and later serving other purposes. Such has been the nature of political parties in Nigeria since political independence.

Political parties are the cornerstone of democratic rule as they are the extending tools of linking politicians and electorates towards a democratic sustainability. Indeed, political parties create democracy and one cannot imagine a democratic rule without political parties. Political parties provide political education, screen candidates, provides alternative platform for voters and play the role of opposition. Political parties emanated in Nigeria since colonial rule and during independence and beyond but their culture and nature did not change since their inception. Political parties in Nigeria are still underdeveloped and less institutionalised in comparison with their counterparts in developed liberal democracies. Political parties in Nigeria are characterised with political thuggery, political godfatherism, absence of ideological framework of action, ethnic and regional politics; non-issue based political campaign, money bag politics, exclusion of women, corruption and absence of internal democracy (Mohammed, 2015:8).

Summing all the above together, political parties can be viewed as an organisation of individuals with the same political and ideological interest to capture and control power democratically. But, one missing point is the simple fact that, political parties may also be formed by selfish motives such as ethnic chauvinism or personal enrichment. This is particularly the case in post-independence Africa and specifically in Nigerian context. The first is the case in Nigerian colonial and post-colonial political parties of First and Second Republics which were mainly ethnic base and regional in outlook mobilising support and exercising representation regionally and ethnically.

4.2.2 Political Parties in the First Republic (1960-1966)

Party politics has been the bedrock of political parties in Nigeria (Akinboye and Anifowose, 2008:246). As far back as the early 1920s, political associations had been in existence in the country. The most powerful group that emerged during the period was the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP), formed in 1923 by Herbert Macaulay. The activities of the party were restricted in Lagos. The Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM) which emerged in 1936 was also restricted to Lagos and Ibadan (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2008: 246).

Since then, various political associations have emerged. These were however, often, regionally and ethnically based. The three prominent ones were National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) which later became the National Council of Nigerian Citizens formed in 1945, the Action Group (AG) established in 1951, and the Northern People's Congress (NPC), which also emerged in 1951. Majority of NCNC's support came from East, AG from the West and NPC from North (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2008: 246).

From independence to the First and Second Republics, there existed a multi-party system. Between the periods of independence to First Republic, the three formed political parties (NCNC, AG and NPC) dominated political activities and formed the government. The NPC and NCNC formed a coalition government from 1959 to 1966. Several smaller parties also emerged, including the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC), the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) and the United National Independent Party (UNIP). Some of

them later formed alliances such as NPC and NNDP that formed Nigerian National Alliance (NNA). Similarly, there emerged the United National Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA), an alliance of NCNC, AG and NPF (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2008: 246).

4.2.3 Political Parties in the Second Republic (1979-1984)

In the Second Republic, 1979-1983, the country also practiced multi-partism. The five political associations that fulfilled the stipulated conditions and requirement for party formation were registered as political parties in December 1978. These were the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigeria's Peoples Party (NPP), Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) and Peoples' Redemption Party (PRP). The NPN dominated the politics of the Second Republic. Most of these Second Republic parties were tagged "old wine in a new bottle" or the reflection of older regional and ethnic political parties (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2008: 246).

4.2.4 Political Parties in the Aborted Third Republic (1990-1991)

In the Aborted Third Republic i.e. 1991-1993, the pendulum changed its swing as the country witnessed the emergence of two party system. The Babangida Military Government imposed two political parties, Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) and National Republican Convention (NRC).

Following the collapsed of the Aborted Third Republic and the emergence of Abacha's Military Regime in November 1993, the nation was returned to multi-party system. The following political parties were registered; the United Nigeria Congress Party

(UNCP), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), National Centre Party of Nigeria (NCPN), Grassroots Democratic Movement (GDM) and Congress for National Consensus (CNC). Abacha's sudden death in June 1998 however, led to the dissolution of the five political parties by the new regime headed by Abdulsalami Abubakar who, put in place a new political transition programme scheduled to terminate in May 1999. A multi-party system was again endorsed.

4.2.5 Political Parties in the Fourth Republic (1999-Date)

In the beginning of the Fourth Republic, three political parties were registered. These were the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), All Peoples Party (APP) and Alliance for Democracy (AD). PDP emerged as the dominant party in the 1999 elections (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2008: 246).

The Fourth Republic multi-party system was expanded where more than fifty political parties were registered between 2003 and 2011. There were also alliances and re-alliances. The APP became ANPP, AD became ACN. The Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) registered in 2010 became the major opposition party in the 2011 Presidential Election that challenged the ruling PDP. After post 2011 election, a new alliance emerged where four major mega parties unite to become one. They are ANPP, ACN, faction of APGA and CPC which was registered by INEC in June 2013 as All Progressives Congress (APC). The APC went ahead to win the 2015 General Election at national level with majority seats at state level for Governorship election (Omilusi, 2016).

In the Fourth Republic, initially, three political parties were registered which are APP, AD and PDP and those parties contested for the 1999 General Elections. Later, other political parties emerged that were registered by INEC making the number of registered political parties as at 2017 around 60 (Sixty). But, the most formidable ones are the APC currently the ruling party, PDP and APGA (Saka & Ifejika, 2015: 50).

The history of Nigerian political parties shows that Nigeria maintains a multi-party system and the parties are ethnic and regional in nature. In order to arrest the daunting effects of ethnic and regional influence of political parties in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, it was regulated that for a political party to be registered, it must have at least state offices in two third of the states which is 24 in addition to Federal Capital Territory in Abuja. While many political parties were registered from 1999, INEC deregistered some of them based on the ground of poor performance and lack of national outlook with a view to minimise ethnic and regional politics. Regulations were provided in the Constitution for the operation and registration of political parties as well as financing of political parties to ensure transparency and fair play in the rules of the game (Benjamin, 2011: 68).

Political parties in Nigeria play the act of electoral misconduct which affects democratic governance. The quest for power has inspired Nigerian politicians to resort to acts that constitute security breaches like political assassination, political thuggery, bribery, ballot snatching, underage voting, distortion and manipulation of elections results, disenfranchisement of voters, intimidation and arson etc. Thus, the 1999 elections that brought Obasanjo into power was full of fraud and afore-mentioned characters and it was the same with 2003, 2007 and other subsequent elections leading

to lose of lives and destruction of properties as well as obliteration of democratic process (Auwal, 2015: 82).

Political parties in Nigeria played a role of electioneering campaign in a different order with peculiarities from other African countries and developed democracies. Candidates and political parties are allowed to cater for their campaign expenses or rely on godfathers and that practice in either way leads to corruption and illicit financial activities on assumption of offices after election. Political parties are caught in the act of politics of unregulated use of money which escalates corrupt practices in addition to politics of ethnicity and religion during electioneering campaign. These are the issues which depict Nigerian political parties in the Fourth Republic as parties lacking in ideology and principle (Gambo & Ribadu, 2015: 99).

Intra-party conflicts is another character and nature of political parties in the Fourth Republic most especially the then ruling PDP which recorded many cases of intra-party conflicts in many states and at the Federal level. Other major opposition political parties too faced internal conflicts. Such conflicts were attributed to lack of ideology and the politics of winning power at all cost which pitch many party members against each other in their quest for selfish and personal ambition. Such conflicts can be either constructive or destructive. It may make the party restructured and stronger after the conflicts for sometimes misunderstanding led to better understanding. In some other instances, it will be destructive as in the case of the internal conflicts that rocked PDP for many years that led the party to lose power in the 2015 General Election (Ibrahim & Abubakar, 2015: 112 and Jude & Ika, 2013).

It is not only intra-party conflicts that characterised the political parties in the Fourth Republic as there are also inter-party conflicts. There were recorded series of disagreements and conflicts between the major political parties which led to defections and anti-party activities. Sometimes there are allegations of the ruling party instigating conflicts among the opposition political parties to widen the sharp division among them which will deter them from uniting to challenge the ruling party. Such intolerance for opposition has been identified as one of the major obstacles towards genuine democratisation in the Fourth Republic (Joseph & Wilson 2015: 137 and Hassan & Lamidi, 2015: 18).

Defection from one political party to another in the Fourth Republic has rendered the politics devoid of morality. There were lots of defections from especially the ruling party from 2007 with the Vice President Atiku Abubakar defecting to ACD and the most popular one is the defection of five PDP Governors in 2014 and many lawmakers at both upper and lower chambers from the then ruling PDP to newly formed APC. This matter of defection leads to instability and chaos in the polity (Jiddere, 2015: 180 and Nwanegbo & Nnorom, 2015).

Apart from defection, political party primaries is another problem that characterised the nature of the Fourth Republic political parties as most of the primaries were mere imposition and anointment of candidates against the wish of the members which violated the process of internal democracy among the political parties. In some cases, the primaries are not conducted at all as the incumbent at either Presidential or Gubernatorial levels compelled all party stakeholders to succumb to their candidacy without opposition or any resistance. Thus, democracy was strangled at the party level

and the practice is across all political parties without exception (Lamidi, 2015: 197 and Ikechukwu, 2015).

Political parties breed violence as they are mostly often associated with recruitment of ethnic and regional militias during the First and Second Republics. The parties were ethnic and regionally oriented to the extent that conduct of general elections during the military regimes seemed more viable and reliable than in the current Fourth Republic under the civilian regime. While political parties perpetuated violence and political thuggery using ethnic and regional platform to pursue their political ambition, the parties in the Fourth Republic sponsored violence from a new perspective of economic and social survival such as poverty, unemployment, hunger, disease, corruption, insecurity and other threats to survival (Abdullahi, 2015: 206).

One critical issue with Nigerian political parties in the Fourth Republic is gender empowerment and political participation. It has been observed that, political parties failed to empower and encourage women participation in politics. The movement initiated in 2003 resulted in the agreement to allocate at least 3 percent of electoral seats to women. But, neither the then ruling PDP nor other opposition parties have implemented that proposal. The political parties impeded women from achieving an active participation and the women politicians themselves. Some women advocates blame on the existing cultural practices, godfatherism, inferiority complex and consensus candidature as the major obstacles that blocked women from getting a better participation in Nigerian politics (Nuruddeen, 2015: 227).

Financing of political parties is very vital in every democracy. The means and regulations of financing political parties have been provided in Nigeria's Fourth Republic in both the Constitution and electoral laws as amended in 2010. For instance, section 91 of the Nigerian Constitution provides for the maximum financial spending and auditing of parties' financial activities. Despite all the regulations, there are foul play and illegal practices in political party financing as they tend to spend too much money in the campaign process and election far above the regulated amount. In addition, the parties do not usually submit their audited financial report to the electoral body as required in the 2010 electoral laws as amended (Manu & Ibrahim, 2015:30).

A study conducted on the capacity assessment of political parties in Nigeria's Fourth Republic disclosed that there are two issues which are party system and party capacity components. It is discovered that there are key gaps in the party system of Nigeria including an unclear legal framework, poor relationship between parties and INEC, lack of civility and insufficient inter-party dialogue, lack of cohesion in political parties leading to cross carpeting between parties, lack of ideological and policy orientation and a limited ability of opposition to compete with the ruling party. In the individual party capacity, challenges were also unveiled as follows: human resource capacity at both state and local level, lack of effective communication between national and sub-national branches, limited abilities in use and application of technology, lack of databases, lack of organised method of recruitment of members, limited competence in research and analysis for party building, lack of well organised party manifesto and lack of ideological or institutional identities (Liebowitz & Ibrahim, 2013).

Party politics is healthy and relevant for a successful democracy in any country that is practicing democratic rule. In Nigeria, there was a level of party politics and party activities which contributed in the development and consolidation of democracy in the Fourth Republic. However, lack of ideology and principles impede political parties from setting a well institutionalised party politics which is a major problem of political parties in the Fourth Republic in Nigeria (Omilusi & Adu, 2016). Parties are bedeviled with leadership crisis because of competing interest of the leaders who are struggling to push for their ambition and interest instead of party ideology and goals. This created conflicts and which in turn led to leadership crisis at the national level since it's the same party leaders that emerged as political leaders (Oluwaseun, 2012 and Toyin, 2015).

Ideology is a fundamental pillar of political parties and it serves as the guiding principles for their operation. The Nigerian political parties despite a well-designed and articulated ideological tenets are bereft of any activities that portray their ideological underpinnings as the politics of issues are relegated to politics of vagrancy and money politics. This has been consolidated by politics of ethnicity, selfishness, corruption, indiscipline and weakness resulting from lack of internal democracy (Omotola, 2009).

Nigerian political parties played a critical role of merger towards a build in the 2015 General Election which was the first time in the history of the nation for major opposition political parties to form a strong merger. This has been due to their determination for wrestling of power from the ruling PDP. The Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), a faction of All Progressive Grand

Alliance (APGA) and Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) form a coalition which later became the All Progressives Congress (APC). The merged party APC set to capture power in the 2015 election (Ibrahim and Hassan, 2013). The merger that produced APC later captured and took over control of power at the national level and in the majority of the states after the 2015 General Election as predicted above. Thus, political parties in Nigeria's Fourth Republic played the greatest role of forming a coalition that will turn positively the destiny of Nigeria's democracy.

Political parties play the role of representation most importantly in multi-party system like that of Nigeria. The political parties keep on increasing from three in 1999 to about fifty by 2010 and still many are registered. The expectation is as more political parties are surfacing, they will provide an alternative and a platform for representing many diverse groups. However, the Nigerian case seems different. As many political parties are emerging, proper representation remains elusive. Factors that are attributed to such condition are lack of internal democracy, godfathers, electoral malpractices, absence of ideology and partisan role of electoral management body (Omodia & Egwemi, 2011).

The political parties are saddled with the responsibility of recruitment, interest articulation, interest aggregation and representation; they seldom do so in Nigerian context most especially in the Fourth Republic. Rather, the political parties became the tool of creating an additional chasm and a wide gap between the elite ruling class and the common man as they don't represent the interest of the people but rather the elite agenda (Omodia, 2010). This explains the nature of political parties as dominantly lacking in ideology as they became the apparatus of acquiring power by all means from

the ruling class irrespective of what the parties stand for provided they will offer a platform for politicians to get access to power (Shola, 2015).

Political parties are fore runners in the consolidation of democratic rule in any country that practised democracy as a system of government. But, the ruling PDP which maintained power for more than a decade in Nigeria failed to mobilise people for proper democratisation. This has also affected the opposition parties. On many occasions, the ruling PDP was found to be playing either overt or covert roles in destabilising opposition parties to strangle them and deny them any influence in challenging the ruling party (Dode, 2010). However, this jinx had been broken as the major opposition parties of ACN, ANPP, faction of APGA and CPC decided in 2013 to form a strong merger which eventually succeeded in ousting the ruling PDP from power. But, for the merger of these major opposition parties, PDP will continue to sail smoothly in the ocean of general elections continuously for many decades unchallenged.

4.3 Sources of Political Party Financing in Nigeria's 2015 General Election According to Informants

In this theme, the informants were asked on their understanding of the major sources of campaign finances for parties and candidates in which they provided some information based on their personal experiences, existing knowledge of the situation and revelations from the happenings after the 2015 General Election. Their responses were grouped in sub-themes for easier understanding and analysis as presented below.

4.3.1 Grant from Parties

In this category, few of the informants agreed that grants from parties are the major source of political party and campaign funding. In an interview:

“There are various sources of political party financing out of which grants from political parties form a large part of it. Once you secured the nomination of your party and you will contest under its platform as its representative, there is a considerable amount of money given to cover up campaign expenses” (Personal interview with an informant in category A 5, 02nd May, 2017).

In another separate interview, another informant revealed that parties give grant to its flag-bearers, but it is insignificant in comparison with what they actually spent in financing their campaign activities. In his words:

“Political parties provide grants to its party flag-bearers to undertake the responsibility of campaign activities but, to be honest, the amount given by our party did not constitute even 20 percent of what I had actually spent in my campaign expenditure. The parties do not have enough resources to give. In most often times, the party executive relied on what the contestants will offer as a bribe to them to secure the nomination instead of what they can give to the contestants” (Personal interview with an informant in category A1 2nd June 2017).

The above view from the informant is strengthened or rather implies the applicability of the Rational Choice Theory of Election and Clientalism clearly. In the first instance, parties nominate candidates according to him based on the strength of their financial capability which is a rational choice in fielding candidates that will be suitable for the nature of Nigerian politics where money politics has great influence. In the second instance, the parties' executive offered the platform of representation for contestants

based on who pays higher which is a patron-client relation where the politicians are the patrons in this case and the parties' executive members are the client. This means that clientalism is not only between the politicians or parties and the electorates but also between or among the parties and their representatives too. The above application of the theories in the context of information provided by the informants has been reiterated by another view below in another separate interview where an informant disclosed that parties:

“Are also part of the campaign sponsors of politicians particularly the ruling party which has the advantage of accessibility to public treasury as in the case of 2015 the General Election where they used the public resources to address their campaign expenditure. But, parties cannot give a candidate what is enough and as such, one needs to rely on other sources from personal savings, family, friends and fund raising or on wealthy individuals” (Personal interview with an informant in category B1 30th June 2017).

Furthermore, other informants too believed that parties offered grant to its candidates that are representing them in an election, but the grant cannot be sufficient and as such they have to source for extra means to supplement for their campaign expenditure as disclosed above. Other studies also support the above position as in Wakili, Zango and Mohammed (2008) that parties offered grant to its contestants where a minority of 24.6 % agreed that candidates were assisted by their parties but, the majority of 86.4 % in the study believed that donation from wealthy individuals is the major source of campaign funds for political parties. This further consolidated the applicability of the Clientalism theory which assumes a beneficial relationship between political sponsors and the sponsored. These wealthy individuals are called godfathers in Nigerian context who are the patron sponsoring politicians for an expected returned benefit in the future.

This has been discussed in detail in the next section as another source of political party financing.

There are no controversies in this regard only that the informants in the same categories and other categories did not mention grants from parties as a major part of what they perceived as the sources of party funding. Waliki et al. (2007) and INEC (2017) however, reiterate the notion that parties offered grants to its flag-bearers and are one of the major sources of campaign financing in the Fourth Republic in Nigeria.

4.3.2 Godfathers and Godfatherism

It will be incomplete if one discusses political party financing in Nigerian context without examining the role of political godfathers in political sponsorship and politics of money in Nigeria. Godfathers are well known to have include international oil moguls, international business tycoons, local oil dealers, local business men, old generation politicians, retired military generals, traditional rulers, bureaucrats and technocrats as well as other wealthy men who have resources at their disposal to sponsor politicians for an elective seat with a view for a return or contract influence and allocation of office positions and resources as well as developmental projects.

One of the major sources of political party financing identified by the informants in Nigeria's Fourth Republic especially in the 2015 General Election is godfatherism or godfathers/sponsors. Many of the informants (two in category A, two in category B, two in category C, two in category E and three in category F) identified that godfathers whether within or outside the corridors of power are the major financiers of politicians in elections in Nigeria. This position was articulated below:

“Godfathers are the major financiers of elections in this country using their resources to sponsor politicians in return for a material benefit ranging from lucrative contracts, appointments, award of projects in favour of their locality. Indeed, godfathers sponsored politicians while at the same time control the government comfortably after the elections. It was an agreed personal contract on mutual understanding sometimes sealed under spiritual spells for repayment” (Personal Interview with an informant in category B1, 30th June 2017).

The above view has been consolidated by another informant where he stated that:

“Most of the politicians or candidates have no sufficient resources to undertake their campaign expenditure as they rely heavily on wealthy individuals to support their political ambition and election expenses” (Personal interview with an informant in category A2 7th May 2017).

The above statement is a clear application of Clientalism within the political context of Nigeria especially election. The electoral process has become so expensive that only the wealthy or those supported by godfathers can run. There is the disturbing issue of dubious business tycoons sponsoring candidates with questionable source of money. The increasing influence of godfatherism in contemporary Nigerian politics can be linked to the influence of money in electoral politics through unlimited party financing as was witnessed in all the elections so far in the Fourth Republic. The absence of effective regulation of the amount of private funding that political party can receive from private sources made all forms of political clientalism attractive and possible (INEC, 2005: 9).

Godfathers according to one of the informant are the major financiers of both political parties and contestants in return for an agreed term as he mentioned below:

“The dilemma of political party financing for both the parties and the candidates are readily resolved by godfathers or wealthy individuals who provide adequate funds for financing parties and elections of the parties’ candidates where an agreement was reached between the two for a certain favour in terms of contracts, paybacks, lucrative appointments and other undue advantages” (Personal interview with an informant in category B2 19th June 2017).

Not all political contestants are financially sound and therefore cannot raise on their own substantial amount of money to finance their political campaign and compete in a violently corrupt political system in Nigeria (Human Rights Watch, 2007: 32). In return, they demand for a substantial degree of control over the sponsored politicians and government at large not for public benefits but, rather, for direct financial returns in the form of resources stolen by their protégés or lucrative government contracts awards without following the due process as further opportunities for graft and wealth accumulation (Human Rights Watch, 2007: 33). Godfathers are service providers who resolved the voter compliance problem of political parties in their scramble to dominate political power in Nigeria. Godfathers are brokers or intermediaries between political parties and the electorates as well as political power control (Olarinmoye, 2008).

A study also by Wakili et al. (2008) also confirmed the above statement by the informant where the respondents were reported to have agreed by majority of 77.9 % that parties source for their campaign funds from wealthy individuals and the wealthy individuals or godfathers controlled the parties and invest for a return. This has further confirmed the clientalism theory that election financing is a business of investment

between the godfathers and their godsons. In another separate view from the informant, it was revealed that:

“Godfathers have three major relationship or activities in Nigerian politics. They establish a relationship between the sponsored godsons and the electorates for securing electoral victory. They also invest for ruling indirectly and influencing decision making and they also ensure that they determine the direction of the politics especially the election through financial sponsorship. The case of Femi Otedola and Faruk Lawan and Andy Uba with Chris Ngige are few examples of godfatherism in operation in Nigeria (Personal interview with an informant in category E1 29th June 2017).

The pre and post elections activities of the godfathers efficiently ensured that the electorates maintain their contract with political parties and that political parties and politicians secure the control of political power (Olarinmoye, 2008). The godfathers bankroll their godsons' campaign finances for a beneficiary-benefactor relationship or cliental-patron relationship where the beneficiary or the client made available his resources for unlimited access to the benefactor or the godfather (Ayoade, 2008: 89). The godfather is selfish and deceptively philanthropic working for other people sometimes as a samaritan for extreme recompense. Infact, the major intention of godfather is to rule by proxy (Ayoade, 2008: 90).

From the above informant view and scholars' views, it is seen that not only clientalism that is taking place or applicable theoretically within the context of the work here but also Rational Choice Theory of Election. The rationality here is the role of godfathers in investing for their selfish personal motive of indirect controlling of power and secure of other benefits while the voters who received benefits from the godfathers to

vote for their godsons indicate the choice of a certain electoral benefit in anticipation for an expected outcome.

Godfatherism has serious effects on Nigerian politics especially election as identified by an informant below:

“The effect of godfathers in Nigerian politics is that they blocked democratic process by anointing candidates; they forced the cost of elections up by spending above maximum limits, violation of electoral process, and production of unresponsive leadership. Above all, the godfathers violated electoral acts particularly in overspending and breaking the jinx of maximum spending turning Nigerian politics into money business and money-making venture. It resulted in bad governance, corruption and disempowering credible candidates who are less financially sound from contesting as they cannot compete with the super-rich godfathers” (Personal interview with an informant in category E2 27th May 2017).

The provision by the 2010 Electoral Act of stopping the governmental funding of political parties and allowing for private and personal funding undermined transparency, accountability and responsiveness of elected public officials. Financial controllers or godfathers of any party take over control of the party. They manipulate all its major activities. Godfatherism is therefore, the main defining character of party politics in Nigeria (Kura, 2014). Godfatherism flourishes more in the Fourth Republic because of the increasing cost of elections which made many candidates unable to sponsor their political campaign (Nwagwu, 2016).

One major discovery in the field work from the informants is the notion that, godfatherism has taken a new dimension in Nigerian politics during the 2015 General

Election where from the previous culture of using the resources of wealthy individuals to sponsor politicians for elective offices. Now the trend has been reversed where the political ruling class established their own godfathers and financed them to sponsor their political ambition as revealed by the following information:

“Unlike the previous trend, in the 2015 General Election, the political class or public office holders created their own godfathers by looting massively from the public treasury and equipped the agents or brokers to finance their campaign as we witnessed in Dasuki and Diezani case with PDP” (Personal interview with an informant in category E1 29th June 2017).

Another informant narrated that:

“Politicians sourced for their own campaign financing money by stealing from public treasury and identifying some front runners for the politicians which has not been witnessed previously” (Personal interview with an informant in category B2 19th June 2017).

In addition, another informant also narrated that:

“Parties and politicians in 2015 General Election relied on the looted money from public treasury where some public offices were used to divert money for campaign expenditure of some political parties and their candidates” (Personal interview with an informant in category B130th June 2017).

The above views can be supported by the incidence of Dasuki USD 2.1 billion money provided for purchase of weapons to tackle insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria but was diverted by the ruling PDP then to address their campaign expenditure in 2015 using the means of his office of National Security Adviser and Mrs. Diezani a former Petroleum Minister who diverted N23 billion from the Petroleum Ministry for PDP

campaign in 2015 Presidential Election. This means godfatherism or clientalism has been extended or reshaped in Nigerian context from mere political financing to public treasury looters for the political class as a return for an investment and benefits as well as agreement among them in their quest for power competition.

The above position of the informants has also been supported by many works such as INEC 2005, Human Rights Watch 2007, Olarinmoye 2008, Ayoade 2008, Nkechi & Innocent 2014, Kura 2014 and Nwagwu 2016 that godfathers are major key players in political party financing and that they determine the direction and type of politicians to be sponsored and occupy certain political offices at the Federal, State and Local level. It has also implied the application of the theoretical framework within the context of the information and the literature discussed above. For instance, the role of godfathers and the trio relationship of patron-broker-client indicate that, the theory is practical and suitable in this context as this is exactly what the theory assumes, and it has been displayed here by the information provided by the informants and scholars as discussed above.

The second instance is the Rational Choice Theory where the godfathers displayed their rationality in spending their money through a consistent rational choice as identified by the rationalist in order to get return for investment with multiple reward and profit and the sponsored godsons offered their political leadership for a rational choice of acquiring power with the resources of others in order to have all the influence and advantages of power holding. In addition, the rationality also displays the voters' choice in two contexts. In the collection of material benefit to vote for their leaders

and in the collection of money to benefit from and choose the leaders they wish there by choosing leaders and getting rewarded with material benefit at the same time.

4.3.3 Loot from Public Treasury

One of the major social issues in Nigeria is corruption at all levels and in all ramifications. Looting of public treasury has become a norm among Nigerian politicians for their personal enrichment. It is believed that one of the methods that the politicians sponsored themselves or finance their elections campaigns is by illegal looted money. There are many works that justified that allegation in addition to the views provided by informants here in respect to that. Some of the informants that were interviewed in different groups agreed with that (two from category A, Two in category B, one in category C, two in category D, three in category C and three in category F). They all believed that:

“Politicians engaged in the dubious practices of looting the public treasury through false contracts awards and inflation of contracts as well as other corrupt practices in order to self-enrich themselves and these illegal monies in return are also spent illegally through sponsoring their political campaigns in terms of vote buying, bribing of electoral officials and the sponsorship of thugs to intimidate voters and opposition all in order to win at all cost”(Personal interview with an informant in category D1, 17thMay, 2017).

It has been established by the informants that public treasury has been looted for the 2015 General Election as revealed by one of them below:

“The money itself was sourced through looting of public treasury and was redistributed to different groups of public opinion makers and important players. Both the APC and PDP achieved in getting

desirable results in many places but, who wins is what matters and in this regard the APC laughs last” (Personal interview with an informant in category A4, 3rd June, 2017).

The Clientalism theory can be established here practically considering the fact that, public office holders used the public treasury to sponsor their campaign activities which is cliental activities; a corrupt practice where illegal financing occur through dubious means with the power holder, godfathers and voters engaged in the act of money sharing for electoral victory by one group and for electoral support by the other group. A new fresh character of political party financing emerged where from the previous reliance on godfathers, the political class now used the public treasury to finance the godfathers in the other way round where they will use the looted money to sponsor the political elites.

Another view from the interview also support the above information that parties and their contestants sourced for their campaign expenditure from public treasury in an illegal manner:

”It is not a secret that the two major political parties spent billions of Naira during the campaign and both siphoned the money from the public treasury but that of PDP is outrageous and beyond common sense (Personal interview with an informant in category B4, 23rd May, 2017).

This view is supported by many works like a study conducted by Wakili et al. (2007) which studied political party financing using survey method in Nigeria and one of their findings was that, the electorates themselves admitted that they were aware that politicians steal public funds to sponsor their campaigns. Other scholars too support

this view including Walecki 2003, Olarinmoye (2008), Adetula 2008, Nkechi and Innocent 2014, Kura 2014 and Nwagwu 2016. This simply means that political financing was conducted in Nigeria from illegal sources and is undertaking in illegal spending.

4.3.4 Personal/Private Source

Most of the informants agreed that personal/private funding of elections campaign is the major source of political party financing in the 2015 General Election with all the informants from categories A to F agreeing unanimously that personal funding is the actual source of campaign funding in Nigeria. Even the electoral body INEC testified to this fact, since the abolition of state grants to parties, the major source of campaign financing is now private source (INEC, 2010). This view has been quoted below:

“The major source of campaign financing in Nigeria today is of course private sources and personal means even the APC that claimed to be a saint cannot reveal to you the sources of its campaign finances not even President Muhammadu Buhari himself” (Personal interview with an informant in category B1, 30th June 2017).

However, the above view cannot be relied upon to say that source of political party financing is heavily on personal/private sources. Most of the informants mentioned instantly this aspect as the first or major source but, at the same time, many informants believed that, other sources are relied upon to supplement the personal/private funding as indicated below:

“In the real sense of it, nobody can tentatively tell you his actual source of campaign financing apart from the private source but, it is not the only source that politicians and parties relied on to finance their campaign expenditure as they sourced from many other sources

especially wealthy individuals and parties' grant" (Personal interview with an informant in category A3 7th June 2017).

Another version stressed that:

"Most of the politicians and their political parties used their private and personal income for campaign spending but often times few are wealthy enough to undertake the full responsibility of their political activities as such; other sources are look for" (Personal interview with an informant in category B1 30th June 2017).

In the same view, another informant declared that:

"Parties relied on wealthy individuals and their private personal income for campaign financing while some politicians used their own money and other source from financiers of elections known in Nigerian environment as godfathers" (Personal interview with an informant in category E3 6th June 2017).

Furthermore, another informant emphasised on the same subject matter by declaring that:

"Personal source is the main means of political party financing but, in Nigerian context where money politics is highly influential, other sources must be explored in addition to personal source because few politicians are wealthy enough to undertake their campaign activities adequately" (Personal interview with an informant in category F8 16th June 2017).

The above disclosed clearly that, source of campaign financing is mostly from the private source and personal income and this clearly explains why monitoring of such funds or setting maximum spending limit is very difficult and cannot be possible because nobody knows how private income was generated or disbursed. Many scholars

(Biezen 2003, Walecki 2003, Adetula; Aiyede 2008, Olorunmola 2016 and INEC 2015) believed that campaign finances are a very difficult task to monitor or to limit or to avoid corrupt practices in it. They, also like the informants above agreed that, private funding is the major source so far.

In addition, it has been clear that the Rational Choice Theory of Election can be used here to explain further the rationale behind why those who are seeking for political offices are going to the extreme of using personal/private sources to secure victory and control power. It is a simple explanation. It is for the sake of acquiring in return more benefits and advantages than what they have spent, and, in this case, it can be seen as a rational choice of investment as explained by the theorist just like a manufacturer who invested his personal/private money in the manufacture of a commodity so as to secure return in investment and profit. It also explains that, voters are like consumers of the manufactured goods who buy what will give them maximum satisfaction for spending less as in the case of choosing those candidates who will incur on them material benefit or other influences either directly or indirectly.

4.3.5 Selling of Forms and other Charges

Another source of campaign financing identified by the informants is the selling of forms and other charges such as fines, fees, administrative charges and other services like party membership card registration. However, few of the informants see this source as a reasonable or strong source for political party financing. For instance, only one informant in category A, one in category B, one in category C, one in category E and two in category F mentioned this source in the interview. In a viewpoint from an interview:

“Sometimes political parties sponsored their political activities and their candidates through sourcing of funds from the sale of nomination forms, party membership card registration, fees, fines, administrative charges and other services” (Personal interview with an informant in category A5, 02nd May, 2017).

The above position has been supported by the survey work of Wakili et al. (2007) in their studies of financing political parties in the 2003 and 2007 elections where they revealed that about 16.7 % of their respondents narrated that selling of nomination forms and other charges provided a considerable source of income for parties in which they used for funding of their campaign activities.

From the above views, it can be seen that, the Clientalism theory can explain both the informant's position and the scholars' views because the parties' charges and selling of forms denotes an agreed investment where the candidates feel that for the services or platform given to him to acquire power and other material benefit after winning offices, he continues to pay dues and other charges as well as donation to the party or membership registration continuously while the party in return get the material benefit or appointments or contracts for its members from the person if he wins an influential political position from the party' platform. This is a clear application of cliental activities practically. This is exactly what was obtainable in the financing of the 2015 General Election and indeed, the previous elections.

4.3.6 Donations

Many of the informants that were interviewed also believed that, donations from family and friends form a significant part of the sources of campaign expenditure in

political financing in Nigeria's Fourth Republic particularly the 2015 General Election where informants from categories A, B, C, E and F revealed that, donations is one of the major sources with three of the informants in category A, three in category B, one in category C, two in category E and three in category F all believing in this position. The most articulating view is presented below:

“Donations from family and friends is one of the major means of sourcing for campaign funding by politicians and parties during elections and it is mostly generated either through a fund-raising committee or at private level by the politicians and the donators”
(Personal interview with an informant in category A5, 02nd May, 2017).

Also, the survey study conducted by Waliki et al. (2007) revealed the responses of the respondents indicating that donations is one of the major means of political party financing in Nigeria with a frequency of 22.3 %. This means that, donation is one of the sources and it is on record that both the existing study and the informants' views testified to that from this study.

In addition, other informants also believed that in the 2015 General Election, donation was one of the sources of political party financing and campaign expenditure as revealed by some of them below:

“The politicians seek for donations to run for an office while in some instances, like the incumbents, they tend to be pampered by their cronies through organising a fund-raising dinner the way they raised about N23 billion for President Jonathan in August 2014” (Personal interview with an informant in category B1 30th June 2017).

Also, another informant disclosed that:

“Some political office contestant in the 2015 General Election had their supporters organising a fund raising for them through various means as in the case of President Jonathan it was organised by his party members while President Muhammadu Buhari sold recharge card using one of the telecommunication companies for the masses to contribute in his campaign financing. He was able to raise around N190 million from that source” (Personal interview with an informant in category E2 27th May 2017).

Still, another informant also confirmed the above positions where he narrated that:

“Donations are agreed and provided in the law for parties and their contestants, but, their sources must be revealed, and they must be within the Nigerian territory and not more than N1 million by an individual either to a party or a candidate according to our law” (Personal interview with an informant in category C2 3th May 2017).

The above information can aid in the explanation of the applicability of both the theory of Rational Choice Theory of Election and Clientalism. In the case of the former, we know that, voters just like consumers or buyers of a commodity, only tend to vote for candidates that they expected will accrue benefit to them. Such anticipation of benefits as good governance, provision of infrastructures, transparency and the fight against endemic corruption, employment generation, poverty reduction, security and other benefits made the electorates to donate their own pockets money for the APC Presidential aspirant which was not occurred before in the history of the country. It depicts a clear case of rational choice for the voters in deferring the immediate material benefits perhaps, from other candidates for a future long-term benefit just the way a consumer will defer less beneficial commodity for a more important one immediately. In the second aspect, the theory of Clientalism fits in where it has been exhibited clearly how the incumbent President in 2014 was surrounded by his political stooges

and godfathers to raise a huge sum of N23 billion for his re-election campaign. It is indisputably clear here that all those who contributed did so with an anticipated expected benefit in future with extra profit if President Jonathan wins. It simply shows how clientalism works practically within the cycle of power brokers.

The study also summarised the above informants' views in a tabular form to reveal the pattern of the responses and how they believed in the frequency of the sources according to their categories (see table 4.1 below).

Table 4.1

Summary of Sources of Campaign Funding for Political Party and Candidates in the 2015 General Elections

Category	Informants	Responses
A (Politicians)	First	Self-sponsorship, donations, grants from parties and gifts.
	Second	Gifts, personal sources and loots from public treasury.
	Third	Gifts, personal savings, donations and private sources.
	Fourth	Personal/private source, wealthy individuals and parties.
	Fifth	Godfathers, public treasury and donations.
	Six	Private funding, rich individuals and grants from parties.
B (Party Stakeholders)	First	Unknown, loots from public treasury.
	Second	Private funding and grants from political parties.
	Third	Selling of forms by parties and personal for candidates.
	Fourth	Selling of forms, donations and personal savings.
C (INEC Staff)	First	Private sources, personal savings, donations and fund raising. Looted public funds, godfathers and private sources.
	Second	Godfathers, private sources and fund raising.

	Third	
E	First	Private funding, godfathers and personal sources.
(Academicians)	Second	Godfathers and looting of public treasury.
	Third	Personal means and political financiers as well as grants.
F (Focus Group Discussion)	First	Donations, godfathers, private funding and looting
	Second	Personal savings, donations and administrative charges
	Third	Private sources, donations and anonymous sources
	Fourth	Donations and sell of party charges.
	Fifth	Private means and other personal support.
	Seven	Personal sources and godfathers.
	Eight	

Source: Field Survey.

The above analysis can be presented in a chart for easier perception.




Figure 4.1 Statistical Analyses of Informants on the Sources of Political Financing in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

Source: Field Survey, 2017.

4.4 Summary

The chapter studied the divergent views of scholars and informants on the sources for campaign spending, adherence to maximum spending limit and the role of INEC in the monitoring of political parties in relation to its effectiveness or otherwise in the process. The chapter concluded from the existing literature and different views of informants that campaign spending is sourced from mostly personal/private and unknown or often times illegal sources and the maximum spending limit were violated without any sanction taken against them. It also discussed the role and influence of money on the 2015 election. This will link this chapter with the next one which is an examination of the 2015 General Election as the case study where the regulations and sources of political party financing are applied.



CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS OF ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA’S FOURTH REPUBLIC AND REFORMATIONS IN THE 2015 GENERAL ELECTION

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter, an attempt was made to examine the concept of election, roles of election in a democratic society, processes that took place in the transition to democratic governance in the Fourth Republic, the electoral body that is responsible for the conduct of election in the Fourth Republic (INEC), challenges of conducting a credible election in Nigeria, election pattern in the Fourth Republic, the 1999 General Election, 2003 General Election, 2007 General Election, 2011 General Election and 2015 General Election. This enabled for a significant comparison in terms of credibility and success recorded in the 2015.

In addition, some analysis was made with reference to the informants’ views on the factors or elements that made the election in the 2015 an improvement or successful in comparison with the previous elections in the Fourth Republic. A contribution to the literature was made in this regard by coming up with a model different from the previous studies to showcase the other issues that were not considered by the studies in terms of the general conduct of the election. Also, theoretical perspective was critically applied within the context of the work to support the literature and informants’ views practically particularly using the adopted theories in the research.

5.2 The Concept of Election

Election is the engine room of any democratic system and without it, there will be no democracy. Election offers freedom of choice and the ability of the voters to hold their leaders accountable. Election matters most for both the rulers and the voters. Election has been seen as an organised event in which somebody is chosen by vote for something, especially in a public office (Kapur, 2009). Periodic elections are accepted global method by which public in each society determines how and by whom its affairs would be conducted. The legitimacy of any government can be derived from the will of the people as expressed in credible, free and fair election periodically. Election has been the usual mechanism by which representative democracy operates since the seventeenth and eighteenth century (Almond & Verba, 1963).

Election is viewed as a legitimising institution functioning to give elected leaders the wire withal to govern. Democracy necessitates participation, equality in voting, citizen understanding and control over the political agenda. This system is based on elected representation, fair and frequent elections, freedom of expression, associational autonomy and inclusive citizenship (Dahl, 2000). Thus, elections are necessary requirement for a healthy democracy and the survival of democratic rule depends solely on the ability of any democratic system to undertake an election that is acceptable in the society.

Against the backdrop of the above conceptualisation, election in Nigeria's Fourth Republic is undertaking periodically as stipulated by the law. What leaves much to be desired in the electoral process in Nigeria is the nature in which the process is subverted,

distorted and abused. The Civil Societies, international observers, local monitors, opposition, and analysts have all expressed repeatedly the lapses in the Nigeria's electoral process which leads to flawed elections full of irregularities. But, recently, there was an improvement and still there is an expectation for more improvement in the future elections (Isma'ila & Yusuf, 2016).

5.2.1 Election and Electoral Rules and Regulations in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

The 1999 Nigerian Constitution as Amended and the Electoral Act 2006 and the amended Electoral Act 2010 are the electoral legal document specifically that have several provisions targeted for electoral conduct, electoral offences, parties' activities, political party financing and other regulations related to the election as provided in Section 227 and its Sub-Sections in the Nigerian Constitution and Section 82 to 90 of the Electoral Act 2010 which were used during the 2015 General Election.

Thus, all the requirements for the contest in an elective office, political party activities especially financing and campaign expenditure, offences and their sanctions, powers and role of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and electoral procedures are all designed and stipulated clearly in the sections and the sub-sections mentioned above.

5.2.2 The Challenges of Election in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

One of the greatest challenges of election in Nigeria's Fourth Republic is the transition process itself which is faulty and pseudo in nature mostly supervised by military which is a faltering process that led to a poor democratic governance and violation of electoral

process (Yagboyaju, 2011). In addition, the electoral body (INEC) is another great challenge of democratic rule and elections in Nigeria. The electoral umpire is supposed to be transparent, neutral, accountable and independent. But, in many instances, there were evidences of complicity and complacency in the subversion of electoral process (Yagboyaju, 2011).

Another challenge of election in the Nigeria's Fourth Republic is the politics of ethnicity, religion, regionalism and sentiments instead of politics and campaign on issue-based and national question (Adeyemi, 2012). Additionally, Violence characterised the Nigerian elections where political thugs and ethnic militias are sponsored by politicians to intimidate and terrorise opposition and voters to have a free for all means of manipulating elections especially by the incumbent rulers (Abdullahi, 2015). Similar to the above, is the attitude of political parties in electoral malpractices which made elections in Nigeria far from free and fair (Auwal, 2015).

Another major challenge of election in the Fourth Republic is money politics. The politics of money plays a vital role in determining who gets what, when and how in Nigerian elections. Godfathers sponsored their godsons into power in a cliental relationship where their anointed candidates were ushered into corridors of power in return for contracts, favours, kickbacks and corrupt practices (Adetula, 2008).

5.3 Transition to Democracy in the Fourth Republic

The nature of general elections in the Nigeria's Fourth Republic depicts a transitional democracy after decades of prolonged military rule. The Nigerian attempt at practising democracy has been always interrupted severally by military coups and

counter coups which led to series of transition to democracy. Transition to democratic rule in Nigeria like in most other African countries entails an arrangement for registering of viable national political parties, establishment of an independent electoral body, registration of potential voters, guidelines for election and transfer of power and other principles associated with democratic rule.

Transition to democratic rule in Nigeria's Fourth Republic like in most African countries is faulty because of pre-conditions that made democratisation very difficult. Traditional political institutions including ethnicity hold a great influence in the determination of African politics (Salih, 2001:20). Transition to democratic rule in Africa in general and Nigeria in particular has drawn the attention of many international organisations all in order to ensure that a sustainable democracy is guaranteed and consolidated. One of these organisations is the African Union which set some point of agenda in ensuring that democratisation process in Africa has not been tampered with by the military in the 21st century (Omotola, 2014).

However, despite the various national and international attempts at sustainable democratisation in Nigeria, there are flaws that made the process very weak and faulty. For instance, the inherent weakness of the military supervised transition to democratic rule in the Fourth Republic in 1999 left a political, economic, social and infrastructural failure in Nigeria which made democratisation a failure (Nyewusira & Nweke, 2012). There are political cleavages in Nigeria that always made transition to democratic rule problematic and these political cleavages include the politics itself, ethnicity, religion, elite class and regionalism (Okolocha, 1992: 167).

The Military Regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar took over power in 1998 after the death of General Sani Abacha and quickly fulfilled its promise of a short transition to democratic rule in 1999. The new electoral body, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) registered three political parties out of the twenty-six that applied. The registered political parties were All People's Party (APP), Alliance for Democracy (AD) and People's Democratic Party (PDP) (Lucky,2017).

However, the 1999 election in the transition to democratic Fourth Republic were no different in any way with the previous elections in the country as the political parties involved massively rigged the elections, candidates were anointed, and military was involved in every process of it (Lucky, 2017).

While Nigeria has made a giant effort in its return to democratic rule for sustaining a longest civilian rule in the history of the country so far, the history of the experiences of the democratic rule leave much to be desired as the transition process to full democratic rule was marred in political quagmires such as ethno-religious factor, absent of true federalism, poverty, corruption, election rigging, politics of godfatherism, security challenges and many other socioeconomic and political obstacles (Adeosun 2014, Oyediran & Nweke 2014 and Usman & Avidine 2016).

Nigeria's Fourth Republic was in its 16th year in the 2015 General Election and the 2015 General Election is the fifth in the row. This shows a major sign of progress given that the First Republic lasted only for five years and three months, the Second Republic ended after four years and three months and the Aborted Third Republic was a stillbirth. However, longevity is not the only reason why people should celebrate

democratic transition in Nigeria. Other matters of vital importance are relevant too including a credible election, security of lives and properties, good governance, socioeconomic and political stagnation enshrouded in the ruling PDP for more than fifteen years and the freedom of opposition political parties to contest without harassment or manipulation (Buhari, 2015).

Nigeria's transition to democracy in the Fourth Republic has been weakened particularly in the institutionalisation of good governance and democratic values because of electoral malpractices even after a decade and a half of democratic rule (Zagel, 2010 and Isma'ila & Yusuf, 2016). But there was also a significant improvement in the activities of civil societies. Civil societies too play an essential role in the transition to democracy and democratisation process in Nigeria (Omodia & Erunke, 2009).

Democratic transition in Nigeria has not been a success story as a result of succession problem. This problem of succession emanated from the prolonged interrupted years of military rule which was always violent and intransigent in nature as the military only left through counter coup or pseudo arrangement in a faulty transition (Olaniyi & Bello 2014 & Rufa'1 2014). Political culture contributed in the problems of succession in the Fourth Republic as identified above. Nigeria has the political culture of violence and a politics of winning at all cost which led to the succession problems even among the civilian rulers after the democratic transition in 1999 (Baba 2015 and Okoli & Chukwuma 2014).

It has been observed that despite all the shortcomings and other obstacles related to democratic transition in Nigeria, the democratisation process in Nigeria has yielded a positive result and it has shown that democracy is gaining a firm ground in the country most especially with the outcome of the 2015 General Election which for the first time in the history of the country led to the smooth change of power from the ruling party to the opposition in an election (Lucky, 2017).

Nigeria's transition to democracy in the Fourth Republic has been seen as the spread of liberal democracy from America and Europe to Africa and Nigeria specifically. It was perceived simply as the transfer of power from the military to civilian regime which was seen as a means of fostering economic, political and social development. Such has been made possible by the internal and external dynamics that made democratisation possible in Nigeria (Isma'ila & Madu, 2016).

The Nigerian experience of transition to power and democratisation in the Fourth Republic displayed that democracy has not taken a firm root in the country as it has been pursued and practised in accordance with the Western style of liberal democracy. But, the expectation of development that democracy should provide has not been met so far (Aderonke, 2012). Election is one of the major crises and obstacles that bedevil the Fourth Republic. It is expected that, every liberal democratic government should made elections a centerpiece of enduring democratic process by allowing for a free, fair and credible elections periodically but in Nigeria it is a hoax (Ighodalo 2012, Oni, Felix & Godwyns, 2013).

Democratic transition that brings about civilian rule is expected to foster national unity and national integration since democratic governance encourages participation, good governance, transparency, accountability and responsiveness. But, the transition to democratic rule in Nigeria from 1999 to present does not make such effort or rather the effort at national integration is very scanty (Dawood, 2015). The fifteen years of democratic rule in Nigeria in the Fourth Republic has disappointed many from democratic governance. Many Nigerians in 1999 had high expectations of good governance and democratic rule that will lead to national development and a better leadership but it failed to do so (Yagboyaju 2011, Omotola 2013 and Isma'ila & Othman 2016).

Nigeria after military rule from 1999 with the transition to democracy successful still encounters the inherent national problems that were yet to be resolved. Such problems consist of the national question, the Federal question, legal dualism, legitimacy crisis, national elite coalition, resurgent regionalism, ethno-linguistics and religious identity and issues of governance. Such problems are still the burden that the Nigerian democratisation must deal with if the country is really to attain genuine democratisation and good governance (Sklar, 2003).

One vital aspect that the transition to democratic rule in Nigeria ignored is the gender question. The 1999 transition to democracy according to one study recorded a very low level of women participation in politics in terms of occupying political offices with women as having only 2.8 % of the total seats in the Senate in 1999 and 2003, 5.8 % in the House of Representatives also in 1999 and 2003, 5.6 % respectively for Deputy Governors and State House of Assemblies. This clearly indicated that the

democratisation process in Nigeria has relegated women and disempowered them which is against the tenets of liberal democracy (Obiorah, 2005).

The democratisation process in Nigeria neglected one vital aspect of democratic governance which is a sound political party with party ideologies. The political parties that contested for power in 1999 were bereft of any ideological leaning as their main aim was just to capture power from the departing military rulers and utilise the power for personal benefit only (Omotola 2009 and Akubo & Umoru 2014).

Nigerian transition to democracy perhaps might not be successful without the immense contribution of the media. The Nigerian media collided with the authorities under the military in their quest for aspirations towards democratisation in Nigeria (Mohammed & James 2017 & Egbe 2014).

Political corruption is a serious issue that affected the performance of democratic rule or democratisation process in the Fourth Republic (Bamgbose, 2010). The military continues to play a significant role in democratisation process in Nigeria which made the entire process corrupt, flawed and faulty (Udogu 1996, Ojo 2014 and Obioha 2016).

Democratisation is also expected to be accompanied with state intensified security services as the individuals felt insecure under authoritarian military regime with a curtailed freedom of speech and movement as well as other civil liberties. However, the transition to democracy in Nigeria or simply the Nigerian democracy proved

ironically to be the negation. Lives and properties became more secured and protected during military regime (Malasowe, 2016).

In conclusion, the above analysis by various scholars revealed that, while democratisation has stayed and its process remains the longest in Nigerian history in the current Fourth Republic, it has many flaws and inconsistencies that are yet to be rectified. The impact of military rule and the attitude of the ruling class made transition to democratic rule less viable and beneficial to the common man in the country.

5.4 The Electoral Body in the Fourth Republic: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

During the process of transition to democratic rule in the Fourth Republic in Nigeria, a new electoral body was established which is designed and proposed to be independent and with a structural difference from the previous electoral bodies in the past republics. The electoral body called the Independent National Electoral Commission was established to supervise elections in 1999 for handing over of power to civilian regime and to continue to supervise and conduct election generally in Nigeria. INEC has so far conducted five general elections in 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015.

5.4.1 The Establishment of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

The Nigerian electoral empire INEC was established by the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria by section 153 of the Constitution. The Constitution

thereby confers on the commission powers and responsibilities to undertake the following activities:

- i. Organize, undertake and supervise all elections to the offices of the President and the Vice President, the Governors and Deputy Governors of the 36 States of the Federation and to the Senate, the House of Representatives and the House of Assembly of each state of the federation;
- ii. Register political parties in accordance with the provisions of the constitution and an act of the National Assembly;
- iii. Monitor the organisation and the operations of political parties including their finances;
- iv. Arrange for an annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of the political parties and report on such examination and audit for public information purposes;
- v. Arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote, as well as prepare, maintain and revise the register of votes for any election under the constitution;
- vi. Monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern the political parties;
- vii. Ensure that all electoral commissioners and returning officers take and subscribe to the oath of office prescribed by law;
- viii. Delegate any of its powers to any of the states' Resident Electoral Commissioners and
- ix. Carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by an act of the National Assembly.

In June 2006, the National Assembly passed into law the Electoral Act of 2006, which spelt out the statutory functions, rights, obligations and liabilities of the Independent National Electoral Commission. Accordingly, the activities leading to the conduct in

the 2011 and 2015 general elections derived their mandates from the 1999 Constitution and the Electoral Act of 2006 and updated in 2010 as 2010 Electoral Act (INEC, 2017).

5.4.2 Organisational Structure of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)




Figure 5.1 Organisational Chart of Independent National Electoral Commission

Source: Designed by the Researcher 2017

5.4.3 INEC and the Conduct of Elections in the Fourth Republic

Generally, INEC as an electoral body that is constitutionally provided with the powers of conduct of election in Nigeria is supposed to be independent according to the regulations of its establishment in 1999. However, few years after the inception of democratic rule and experiment with elections in 2003 and 2007, many analysts

(Mohammed & Aluigba 2013, Ighodalo 2012, Oni & Godwyns 2013 and Yagboyaju 2011) observed that elections conducted by military during transition were far better to some extent than the current ones conducted by INEC under the civilian regime.

The whole electoral process was abuse by politicians disenfranchising many voters while the electoral body was hijacked by the cliental and prebendal politicians who used excessive money that were mostly looted to bribe their way into power (Abdullahi, 2015). Even with the determination of INEC to conduct free and fair election in the previous 2011 and 2015 general elections, still there were perceived attempts to manipulate the process by the politicians leading to violence and lamentations by the losing parties (Abdullahi, 2015).

In order to address the problem of election rigging and manipulation, INEC attempted to introduce electronic voting through the use of smart card readers which were used to accredit and screen voters before they were qualified to vote in the 2015 General Election. The use of electronic voting system left the contesting parties with little option of rigging. The electoral body INEC was showered with encomium for its exhibition of neutrality and less corruptible stand that guided the electorates towards making their choices which led to the opposition in wrestling power from the ruling PDP that ruled the country for sixteen straight years.

5.5 Analysis of General Elections in the Fourth Republic

Elections took place in the Fourth Republic five times and the results disclosed that one party dominated the electoral scene for straight twelve years from 1999 to 2011 at

both Federal and State levels. This section analysed critically the elections sequentially and its dimension in order to identify the nature of politics and elections in the Fourth Republic.

5.5.1 The 1999 General Election

The military regime of General Abdulsalami Abubakar designed a shortest transition time table of returning Nigeria on the path of democratic rule scheduled on May 1999. A number of fifty-seven million three hundred and sixty-nine thousand and five hundred and sixty (57, 369, 560) was registered as voters by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Political parties must open and maintain offices and membership in two-third of the states in Nigeria which is 24 states out of 36 and Federal Capital Territory (FCT). As a result of such stringent conditions, only three political parties fulfilled the criteria and got registered. They are PDP, APP and AD (National Democratic Institute, 1999).

The results of the 1999 General Election showed an early and quick domination of the Federal and State elective seats by the PDP as shown in the tables below.

Table 5.1

Showing the 1999 February Presidential Election Result

Party	Candidate	Results	Percentage
A D	Olu Falae	11, 110, 287	36.69%
APP	Did not field a candidate	-	-
PDP	Olusegun Obasanjo	18, 738, 14	61.88%
Other	Invalid	431, 611	1.43%
Total		30, 280, 043	100 %

Source: INEC 2000 (Computation and analysis made by the researcher)

The above indicated a landslide victory for President Olusegun Obasanjo who was the PDP candidate. The PDP also won the majority seats in the gubernatorial election in the states (see table 5.2 below).

Table 5.2

Showing the Results Of 1999 Governorship Results Won By Parties

Party	Frequencyby states	Percentage
AD	6	16.67%
APP	9	25%
PDP	21	58.33%
Total	36	100%

Source: INEC 2000 (Computation and analysis made by the researcher)

In the parliamentary election, the same fate was recorded as the PDP continued to dominate the majority seats and leadership of the upper and lower houses as indicated below (see table 5.3).

Table 5.3

Showing the 1999 National Assembly Election seats won by parties (Senate and Federal House of Representatives)

Party	Senate	Percentage
AD	19	17.43%
APP	23	21.10%
PDP	66	60.5%
Undecided	1	0.92%
Total	109	100%

Party	House of Reps	Percentage
AD	44	12.22%
APP	110	30.56 %
PDP	206	57.22%
Total	360	100%

Source: INEC 2000 (Computation and analysis made by the researcher)

The above results revealed the dominant PDP victory in the elections and the same fate was repeated in 2003 and indeed, the PDP expanded its domination beyond that of 1999 as indicated in the following section.

5.5.2 The 2003 General Election

The 2003 General Election is the first successive election in the Fourth Republic after handing over power in 1999. The election recorded a participation of multi-party system especially in the Presidential Election. There was the presence of a strong opposition candidate in All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) which was transformed from the former APP in person of retired General Muhammadu Buhari who holds a strong followership in the Northern part of the country which is the most populous with voters' strength.

Yagboyaju (2012) observed that, the 2003 election were seen as worse than the one performed by the military. The expectations of the people were shattered of free and fair credible election that will usher in good governance. The use of money by the incumbents dislodged opposition from winning many seats in the states and National Assembly elections. Thus, the results indicated clearly the continued domination and expansion of the ruling PDP as analysed below:

Table 5.4

Showing the 2003 Presidential Elections in Nigeria

Candidate	Party	Votes	Percentage
Olusegun Obasanjo	PDP	24, 456, 140	58.20%
Muhammadu Buhari	ANPP	12, 710, 022	30.25%
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu	APGA	1, 297, 445	3.09%
Jim Nwobodo	UNPP	169, 609	0.40%
Gani Fawehinmi	NCP	161, 333	0.38%

Sarah Jubril	PAC	157, 560	0.37%
Ike Nwachukwu	NDP	132, 997	0.32%
Chris Okotie	JP	119, 547	0.28%
Balarabe Musa	PRP	100, 765	0.24%
Arthur Nwankwo	PMP	57, 720	0.14%
Emmanuel Okereke	APLP	26, 921	0.06%
Kalu Idika Kalu	NNPP	23, 830	0.05%
Muhammadu Dikko Yusuf	MDJ	21, 403	0.05%
Yahaya Ndu	ARP	11, 565	0.03%
Abayomi Ferreira	DA	6, 727	0.02%
Iheanyichukwu Godswill Nnnaji	BNPP	5987	0.01%
Olapade Agoro	NAC	5756	0.01%
Pere Ajuwa	LDPN	4, 473	0.01%
Mojisola Adekunle Obasanjo	MMN	3, 757	0.01%
Total	19	42, 018, 73	100%

Source: INEC 2003 (computation into percentage made by the researcher)

The above is the Presidential Election results analysis in 2003 with the existence of multi-party in the election. There were outcries and allegations of manipulations and riggings of election most especially by the Buhari supporters who alleged that the votes secured by Obasanjo in the North should not be obtainable but for the state governors in the areas who rigged for him. The international observers and analysts also reported massive riggings in all nooks and crannies of the country by the ruling PDP. As a result, the PDP also went ahead to win most of the seats in the state governorship election and National Assembly as shown below (see table 5.5& table 5.6).

Table 5.5

Showing The 2003 Governorship Elections Results

Party	Frequencyby states	Percentage
AD	1	2.78%
ANPP	7	19.44%
PDP	28	77.78%
Total	36	100%

Source: INEC 2003 (Computation into percentage was made by the researcher)

The 2003 governorship election consolidated the domineering nature of PDP setting to turn Nigeria into an unofficial one-party system. It has also shown the same scenario in the National Assembly Election as indicated below:

Table 5.6

Showing the 2003 National Assembly elections seats won by parties (Senate and House of Representatives)

Party	Seats (Senate)	Percentage
AD	6	5.50 %
ANPP	27	24.77%
PDP	76	69.72%
Total	360	100%

Party	Seats (House of Reps)	Percentage
AD	34	9.44%
ANPP	96	26.67%
APGA	2	0.56%
NDP	1	0.28%
PDP	223	61.94%
PRP	1	0.28%
UNPP	2	0.6%
Vacant	1	0.28%
Total	360	100%

Source: INEC 2003 (Computation into percentage made by the researcher)

In general, the 2003 General Election was just an electoral exercise to ensure that periodic election was maintained in a country that professed to be operating a democratic rule. There were according to UNDP Report in 2003 massive gunshots in the Niger Delta area during the election, ballot snatching and stealing of ballot boxes in many parts of the countries, electoral materials were supplied late or not provided at all in some areas, vote buying, corruption, bribing of INEC officials, use of security personnel, harassment and intimidation of opposition as well as naked violation of electoral laws in the process. The 2007 General Election still replicated the same phenomenon of the dominance of PDP in all the elections at all level as shown below.

5.5.3 The 2007 General Election

The 2007 General Election took place in the month of April which further witnessed the domination of PDP as the ruling party into a decade of democratisation in Nigeria. Controversies and allegations heralded the election especially speculations of rigging and violation of electoral rules for campaign and other practices. The election just like that of 2003 witnessed many contestants for the post of the President but it reflected the straight contest between the PDP's Umaru Musa Yar'adua and ANPP's Muhammadu Buhari. The election is the most controversial in the Fourth Republic due to the allegations of massive rigging by the opposition. The results indicated the following trend.

Table 5.7
2007 Presidential Elections Results in Nigeria

Candidates	Parties	Votes	Percentage
Umaru Musa Yar'adua	PDP	24, 638, 063	69.82 %
Muhammadu Buhari	ANPP	6,605, 299	18.72 %
Atiku Abubakar	AC	2, 637, 848	7.47 %
Orji Uzor Kalu	PPA	608, 803	1.73 %
Attahiru Bafarawa	DPP	289, 324	0.84 %
Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu	APGA	155, 947	0.44 %
Pere Ajuwa	AD	89, 247	0.25%
Chris Okotie	FDP	74, 049	0.21 %
Patrick Utomi	ADC	50, 849	0.14 %
Ambrose Owuru	HDP	28, 519	0.08 %
Emmanuel Okereke	ALP	22, 677	0.06 %
Lawrence Adedoyin	APS	22, 409	0.06 %
Habu Fari	NDP	21, 934	0.06 %
Maxi Okwu	CPP	14, 027	0.04 %
Bartholomew Nnaji	BNP	11,705	0.03 %
Emmanuel Obayuwana	NCP	8, 229	0.02 %
Olapade Agoro	NAC	5 , 752	0.02 %
Mojisola Obasanjo	NMM	4, 309	0.01 %
Total	18 Parties	3, 288, 990	100 %

Source: INEC 2007

The above statistics indicated an increase in the frequencies of political parties and contestants that contested for the post of the President of the Federal Republic of

Nigeria in the 2007 Presidential Election. While there were eighteen (18) candidates, only the two major parties and their contestants showed a serious contest and performance the PDP candidate and that of the ANPP; Umaru Musa Yar'adua and Muhammadu Buhari. The result further disclosed a drastic fall in the performance of the ANPP's candidate Muhammadu Buhari with about 50% of the votes he obtained in the 2003 election. The Governorship election also indicated a further control of more states by the ruling PDP as shown below.

Table 5.8

Showing the 2007 Governorship Election in Nigeria

Party	Seats	Percentage
AC	1	2.78%
ANPP	7	19.44%
APGA	1	2.78%
LP	1	2.78%
PDP	25	69.44%
PPA	1	2.78%
Total	36	100%

Source: INEC 2007 (Computation into percentage was made by the researcher)
In the National Assembly Election, the following result was obtained.

Table 5.9

*Showing the 2007 National Assembly Elections Results based on seats won by parties
(Senate and Federal House of Representatives)*

Party	Seats (Senate)	Percentage
AC	6	5.50%
AP	1	0.97%
ANPP	16	14.67%
PDP	85	77.98%
PPA	1	0.97%
Total	109	100%

Party	Seats (House of Reps)	Percentage
AC	30	8.33%
ANPP	63	17.5%
PDP	263	73.06%

PPA	3	0.83%
LP	1	0.28%
Total	360	100%

Source: INEC 2007 (Computation into percentage was made by the Researcher)

The 2007 General Election was the most controversial as mentioned above. The Observer Book of Scandal in 2010 mentioned that, the 2007 General Election in Nigeria was recorded as the third most scandalous elections in the history of the world where it was perceived as a broad daylight robbery and the mockery of elections (Observer Book of Scandal, 2010: 12).

In another study conducted by the Centre for Democracy, Development, Research and Training (CEDDERT) Bayero University Kano, the researchers, Mohammed and Aluigba (2013) disclosed that majority of the respondents more than 60% of them agreed that the 2007 election and indeed other previous elections in the country were rigged. They maintained that, the election was full of malpractices including vote buying, bribery, corruption, thuggery, violence, ballot snatching, ballot stuffing, ballot stealing, intimidation of opposition and other forms of electoral irregularities. The international observers too support the above position such as NDI, IRI, Commonwealth, European Union, Human Rights Watch, USAID, UKAID and UNDP. Therefore, the ruling PDP consolidated its control of power at the national and regional level as observed in the 2011 General Election below.

5.5.4 The 2011 General Election

The 2011 General Election rekindled the hope of a common Nigerian voter while overheating the polity at the same time. The appointment of Professor Attahiru

Muhammad Jega as the Chairman of the electoral umpire restored confidence in many Nigerians. With the death of President Umaru Musa Yar'adua in 2010, the Vice President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan was determined to continue the mandate of his boss despite all attempts by the Northern PDP cabals to dissuade him from contesting citing their arguments on the premise that the Northern mandate which President Yar'adua started must be completed. The major opposition contestant as in 2003 and 2007 was Muhammadu Buhari of Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). After failing twice under the platform of ANPP, Muhammadu Buhari sensed sabotage from his party members and decided to form his own party. The result of the election gave PDP a continued domination all over the country at all levels as shown below.

The election took place in April with a total number of registered voters as 73, 528, 040 million. The total voter turnout is 39, 469, 484 (53.7%) with total valid votes of 38, 209, 978 million and invalid votes of 1, 259, 506 million votes. The Presidential Election result revealed that the ruling PDP maintained power in the 2011 as presented below (see table 5.10).

Table 5.10

2011 Presidential Elections Result In Nigeria

Candidate	Party	Votes	Percentage
Goodluck Jonathan	PDP	22, 495, 187	58.89%
Muhammadu Buhari	CPC	12, 214, 853	31.98%
Nuhu Ribadu	CAN	2, 079, 151	5.41%
Ibrahim Shekarau	ANPP	917, 012	2.40%
Mahmud Waziri	PDC	82, 243	0.21%
Nwadike Chikezie	PMP	56, 248	0.15%
Lawson Aroh	PPP	5 4, 203	0.14%
Peter Nwangwu	ADC	51, 682	0.14%
Iheanyichukwu Nnaji	BNPP	47, 272	0.12%
Chris Okotie	FP	34, 331	0.09%
Dele Momodu	NCP	26, 376	0.07%
Solomon Akpona	NMDP	25, 938	0.07%

Lawrence Adedoyin	APS	23, 740	0.06%
Ebiti Ndok	UNPD	21, 203	0.06%
John Dara	NTP	19, 744	0.04%
Rasheed Shitta Bey	MPPP	16, 492	0.04%
Yahaya Ndu	ARD	12, 264	0.03%
Ambrose Owuru	HDP	12, 023	0.03%
Patrick Utomi	SDMP	11, 544	0.03%
Christopher Nwaokobia	LDPN	8, 472	0.02%
Total	20 parties	38, 209, 978	100 %

Source: INEC 2011(Computation into percentage was made by the Researcher).

The PDP in its usual tradition won majority of the seats in the state Governorship election as in the case of the previous years in 2003 and 2007. This has been highlighted below (see table 5.11 below).

Table 5.11

Showing the 2011 Governorship Election Results won by Parties

Party	States	Percentage
CAN	6	16.67%
ANPP	3	8.33%
APGA	2	5.56%
CPC	1	2.78%
LP	1	2.78%
PDP	23	63.89%
Total	36	100%

Source: INEC 2011 (Computation into percentage was made by the Researcher)

It is the same result that was reflected in the National Assembly election as can be seen below (see table 5.12 below).

Table 5.12

2011 National Assembly Elections based on the Seats won by the Parties (Senate and House of Representatives)

Party	Seats (Senate)	Percentage
CAN	21	19.27%
ANPP	11	10.09%

APGA	1	0.92%
CPC	8	7.34%
DPP	1	0.92%
L P	3	2.75%
PDP	64	58.72%
Total	109	100 %

Party	Seats (House of Reps)	Percentage
ACN	69	19.17%
ANPP	28	7.78%
AP	5	1.39%
APGA	7	1.94%
CPC	38	10.56 %
DPP	1	0.28 %
PDP	203	56.39%
LP	8	2.22%
PPN	1	0.27%
Total	360	100%

Source: INEC 2011 (Computation into percentage was made by the Researcher)

Also, the election was followed with a terrible post-election violence in the North and rejection of the results by the CPC candidates. Despite all the allegations, the election according to monitors and observers recorded a better credibility than the 2003 and 2007 elections. But, for the emergence of the coalition of opposition merger in APC, it is likely that PDP might have continued with its dominance beyond 2015.

5.5.5 The 2015 General Election

The 2015 General Election is a watershed in the history of Nigerian democracy and most especially in the Fourth Republic. This is because the seemingly unending dominant ruling of PDP was suddenly brought to a halt. The election is considered as an improvement from the previous ones (Nwachukwu, 2015 and Ayanda & Odunayo, 2015). The electoral bodies learnt from the lessons of the 2011 General Election and strive to improve the subsequent elections by adopting measures that will minimise

electoral irregularities. One of such methods was the use of smart card readers for accreditation of voters and the voting proper.

The election was postponed from February 14, 2015 for Presidential and National Assembly elections and February 28, 2015 for State Governorship elections to March 23, 2015 for Presidential and National Assembly elections and April 7, 2015 for State Governorship election on the ground of tackling the insecurity menace to enable for election in the Boko Haram devastated areas.

The result of the Presidential Election disclosed a closer contest unlike the previous ones where the ruling PDP secured the largest votes. There were other political parties that participated in the Presidential Election. However, the ruling PDP and APC slugged it out in the race very tightly as shown below.




Table 5.13

2015 Presidential Elections Results in Nigeria

Candidate	Party	Votes	Percentage
Muhammadu Buhari	APC	15, 424, 921	53.96 %
Goodluck Ebele Jonathan	PDP	12, 853, 162	44.96%
Adebayo Ayeni	APA	53,537	0.19%
Ganiyu Galadima	ACPN	40, 311	0.14%
Sam Eke	CPP	36, 300	0.13%
Rufus Salau	AD	30, 637	0.11%
Mani Ahmad	ADC	29, 665	0.10. %
Allagoa Chinedu	PPN	24, 475	0.09%
Martin Onovo	NCP	24, 455	0.09%
Tunde Anifowose Kilani	AA	22, 125	0.08%
Chekwas Okorie	UPP	18, 220	0.06%
Comfort Sonaiya	KP	13, 037	0.05%
Godson Okoye	UDP	9, 208	0.03%
Ambrose Albert Owuru	HP	7, 435	0.03%
Invalid votes	All Parties	844, 519	-

Total	14 Parties	29, 432, 849	100%
Registered voters		67, 422, 005	100 %

Source: INEC 2015(Computation into percentage was made by the Researcher).

The 2015 Presidential Election disclosed a low voter turnout of less than 50 % despite all the high anticipation from the electorates of a free and fair election. The final results disclosed that, Muhammadu Buhari of APC won the election in an unprecedented electoral victory making a history as the first opposition party to win the Presidency and dislodged the incumbent party from power. The 2015 General Election also showed that the tradition of PDP winning majority of the seats in the Governorship election and National Assembly was upturned as the opposition APC went ahead to win most of the seats. The results of the Governorship elections are presented below (see table 5.14).

Table 5.14

2015 Governorship Elections Results

Party	Seats	Percentage
APC	19	61.29%
PDP	12	38.71%
Total	31	100%

Source: INEC 2015 (Computation into percentage was made by the Researcher).

The above results indicated that state Governorship election took place in 31 of the 36 states in the country as the calendar for election in other states differed. The newly ruling party APC won 19 out of 31 making a total of 61.29 % of the states while the newly opposition PDP won 12 or 38.71 % of the seats. There was already a state controlled by APGA Anambra and Osun controlled by APC, Ondo Labour Party, Edo APC and Bayelsa PDP which made a total of 36 states if added together. In total, APC controlled 21 states (58.33%), PDP have 13 seats (36.11%) with APGA and Labour Party each controlling 1 state (2.78%).

Thus, APC set the record of capturing power at all levels within less than three years of its formation from 2013. Such feat was obtainable also in the National Assembly (see table 5.15 below).

Table 5.15

2015 National Assembly Election (Senate and House of Representatives)

Party	Seats (Senate)	Percentage
APC	60	55.05%
PDP	49	44.95%
Total	109	100%

Party	Seats (House of Reps)	Percentage
APC	225	62.5%
PDP	125	34.72%
Other parties	10	2.78%
Total	360	100%

Source: INEC 2015 (Computation into percentage was made by the Researcher).

One of the distinguishing features of the 2015 General Election is; it is regarded as the most credible of all the previous elections in the Fourth Republic. There are many writings, reports and observers that took that position (Nwachukwu, 2015, Ayanda & Odunayo, 2015, Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room, 2015). Such position is also agreed upon by many of the informants in this research that were consulted during the field work that the 2015 General Election is the most credible in the Fourth Republic. And this position has been agreed upon by both the ruling and opposition parties after the election.

5.6 2015 General Election Success and Credibility Issue: Thematic Discussions and Interpretations of the Informants Views

Apart from the above documented sources analysed on the outcome and pattern of the 2015 General Election, there are views and information provided by the informants consulted in the research and are presented in this section coded into themes, discussed and analysed. The views were supplemented with the existing literature and theoretical expositions to ensure the validity of the arguments presented. The thematic issues and views were presented here according to the points of convergence and divergence of the informants in their responses.

The informants were selected according to their relevance and possession of vital information that were germane in this analysis. Accordingly, the informants were coded into six major groups (see table 1.1) A, B, C, D, E and F. group A represents politicians that were interviewed during the field survey; group B consists of Party stakeholders; group C INEC senior officials; group D EFCC senior officials; Group E academicians and group F focus group discussion with Civil Societies and members of the general public. The designation of the informants and the criteria that was used for their selection was presented in chapter one (see 1.7.4 and 1.7.5 and also see Appendix I).

With the exception of group D (EFCC officials) who narrated that they were not involved in the process of the conduct of election or monitoring of the election and as such; their views were not presented here since they have little to contribute, the views of the five other groups were synthesised and presented thematically according to their consensus and disagreement in the below discussion.

5.6.1 Campaign Issues

It is a fact that, in any sound democracy with a healthy election, issue-based campaigns are the dominant means of winning votes from the electorates including ideological persuasion. Contestants secured votes and victories through constructive criticisms of the incumbent and plausible promises that win the hearts of voters in voting for them during elections times. It has been previously observed (Daniel 2014 and Mudasiru 2015) that in Nigerian context, campaigns for elections since the commencement of the Fourth Republic were conducted on religious sentiments; ethnic nepotism and regional allegiance instead of issues of policy and ideology. However, this work discovered how the 2015 General Election differed with the previous ones in this perspective.

According to the views of the informants with 4 out of the 6 in category A (politicians), 3 out of 4 in category B (party stakeholders), 3 out of the 3 informants of category C (INEC officials), 2 out of the 3 in category in category E (academicians) and 4 out of 6 in category F (focus group discussion) which represents a sum of 16 out of 21 agreed that the 2015 General Election campaigns took place based on issues of performance and prevailing socioeconomic and political situation in the country instead of the usual business of ethno-religious and regional sentiments. According to an informant:

“The 2015 General Election campaigns were undertaken under a mood of tension of national burning issues that portrayed the frustration of the electorates. Politicians that were able to convince the electorates on certain issues of importance such as the state of the economy, insecurity, corruption, poverty, unemployment and other relevant issues won the votes of the electorates across the country” (Personal interview with an informant category A 5,02nd May, 2017).

In a contrary view, despite the majority view above of the informants, one of them in category B (party stakeholders) stressed that campaign in the 2015 General Election were dominated with hate speech and the usual sentimental manipulation of voters according to ethno-religious platform. In the words of one of them in this position:

“The use of propaganda through the negative use of some media houses to destabilise deregionalise and ethnicise entire campaign process was so overwhelming. But unfortunately for them and fortunately for us, we were able to come out clean and clear (Personal interview with an informant category B 3, 13th June 2017).

Thus, it can be conclude from the above two views of the informants that the 2015 General Election was conducted based on issue-based campaign even though there may be a little semblance of the use of campaign of calumny and ethno-religious politics in the process. The two positions above were corroborated with the existing views of scholars that investigated the election. For instance, CPPA 2015, Africa Centre for Security and Strategic Studies 2015, Ewi 2015, Orji 2015, Ayanda & Odunayo 2015 and Chukwudi 2015 all concluded that the campaigns were issue-based and ethically conducted based on constructive criticism while Nwofe 2015 and Chukwudi 2015 hold a contradictory opinion citing many cases of hate speeches and campaign of blasphemy as evident in the build up to the election. This clearly disclosed that the views of the informants and the existing literature supported this assertion. The Rational Choice Theory of election too supported the same conclusion in this case where the politicians and the electorates in the 2015 General Election used the rationality of approaching the election campaign based on preferable choice of anticipated performance and not sentiment unlike the previous elections.

The Rational Choice theory of Election is expressed in these views of the informants where they subscribed to the ideas of campaign promises and the burning national issues that are the major concern of the electorates such as unemployment, poverty, insecurity, infrastructure and other services of life instead of what used to dominate the campaign process in Nigeria before which are ethnicity, religion and region. In the real sense of the theory, just the way a consumer listens to various manufacturers and their products and then decide which one will provide him with a rational choice, so also according to the above views in congruent with the theory here that, voters in the 2015 General Election gave preference to major campaign issues that will benefit them in return for offering their votes to the candidates.

5.6.2 Money Politics

Money is an important influential decisive factor in any election in this world irrespective of the nature and system of the government that is operated, the electoral regulations, the democratic level and the level of political culture of the electorates. It is believed that the growing concern by scholars and policy makers in regulating campaign expenditure emerged out of the political corruption that is taking place in political party financing. In Nigeria, money politics is relevant in determining who gets access to power because of the combining forces of interplay of power and the relationship between the electorates and the political office holders. In the previous elections in the Fourth Republic, money played a decisive role in determining the winner. It is alleged that the 2015 General Election witnessed the highest flow of money politics during the campaign process. However, whether the use of money influences the outcome or affects the credibility of the elections or not, is the major concern here.

In an interview with the category A, B, C, E and F of the informants (see 5.6 above for the explanations of their groupings), the informants in their totality agreed that, huge sum of money was used in the electoral process and campaign activities of the ruling PDP and opposition APC during the 2015 General Election. They also believed that, although; APC too has spent above limit, it has not spent near a quarter of what the PDP spent during the 2015 electoral campaign. The view of one of them is summed up as follows:

“The 2015 General Election was an investment beyond imagination in terms of campaign spending and elections’ expenditure. It was a crazy spending of money by the desperate politicians who strived to win at all cost to continue to exploit our resources for their personal aggrandisement. Money was spent unprecedented in the history of the country and the money was directly looted from the public treasury for campaign funding” (Personal interview with an informant in category B1, 30th June 2017).

However, while there was no disagreement on the massive deployment of money during the 2015 General Election among the informants, there was a disagreement on the impact of money on the outcome of the election. Some of the informants perceived that despite the spending of money worth trillions of naira equivalent to billions of USD by the ruling PDP, the money spending did not sway the election in their favour since they were defeated, on the other hand, some informants believed that but, for the massive use of money by the opposition APC too, they would not have been able to dislodge the PDP from power. This assertion was supported with the decamping of the top PDP stalwarts to APC at the helm of the General Election which boosted the financial strength of APC in campaign spending. In one of the views that supported

the notion that the money politics did not influence the outcome of the elections in favour of the ruling PDP, he asserted that:

“Both the PDP and the APC used money massively during the elections but that of the APC spending was no near a quarter of what the PDP has spent. Money was crazily and desperately shared to all who care to accept in a bid to win the election, but, the masses are now wiser they collected their money and vote for another party. The money they spent did not assist them in getting back to power. Unfortunately, both the APC and PDP used public resources in the process which is an act of corruption” (Personal interview with an informant in category B 3, on 13th June 2017).

In a contrary view from the above, another informant who also agreed that money was massively used in the campaign process by both the parties opined that:

“But for the use of money in huge quantity, the APC would not be able to wrestle power from the ruling PDP and you know that the decamped PDP members who defected to APC used their money in sponsoring Muhammadu Buhari’s Presidency and he will not deny it. How many times was he contesting? He contested in 2003, 2007 and 2011 but he keeps on losing to the PDP due to poor cash back up. This time around, the financial muscle of the decampees assisted tremendously in arresting his campaign expenditure conveniently (Personal interview with an informant in category B 1, 30th June 2017).

In the support of the above views, there were many works which supplemented the notion that money was massively used unprecedented in the history of Nigeria during the 2015 General Election. For instance, Ahar (2015) reiterates that the 2015 General Election was the most expensive in the history of Nigeria and Africa indeed in terms of spending for both the electoral body and the politicians in their campaign. Similarly,

other scholars (Ukase 2015, Transparency International 2015, Innocent & Nkechi 2014, Olorunmola 2015, USAID/UKAID 2015, Omilusi 2015 and Adibe 2015) supported the above position that campaign expenditure by both the APC and the PDP in the 2015 was never witnessed in the history of the country.

The scholars also supported the assertion that both parties used money to secure victory. In this regard, this work concludes here that but, for the massive cash back up to the opposition APC, it may not win the election while at the same time the influence of money in election has been drastically minimised in the elections because the highest bidder spent in multiple of the lower bidder and yet, lost. This means money played both positive and negative effects in the election. In addition, the theory of Clientalism which explains buy off in the electoral process clearly explains this phenomenon in this context of study because the patron-client relationship of distribution of money and sponsorship of election of some selected politicians by godfathers in return for favour took place.

In addition, the Rational Theory of Election is applicable here when one considers how much money was spent by the two major contenders; the APC and PDP with the PDP believed by most or almost all the informants to have spent higher than APC yet, the APC won in a landslide victory. It means the voters and various political groups became rational in their choice by collecting money from the ruling PDP and voting for APC instead. This displays the extent in which the electorates became wiser and determine in their choice.

All the above explanations of the nature and influence of money politics are clearly explained in an adopted model below (see figure 5.2 below) by Walecki, Carlson &

Jeffrey (2006) in their tripartite illustrations of the influences of money flow in politics and its nature in our modern democratic societies. It can explain the above explanations in particular in Nigerian context. While the model was adopted from the work of Walecki et. al (2006), this researcher observed some missing links in the model and as part of his contribution to knowledge in the area, identified them and filled them with red inks in the boxes and were emboldened.






Figure 5.2 How money can Influence politics in Nigeria

Source: Walecki, Carlson and Jeffrey 2006.

The above figure or model displays how money influences politics in different societies but for the sake of this study, it was adopted and moderated for applicability within Nigerian context. It is divided into three main groups: sources of political party financing before the commencement of campaign, expenditure during campaign and payback after election and assumption of political offices.

In the pre-election period where political party financing sources are derived, the model was improved in Nigerian context by the researcher to have included godfatherism which is one of the major sources of financing of political campaign and grants from parties which were hitherto absent in the original model but, it remove or suspend the public funding which was there in the original model but it is not obtainable in Nigerian context since the 2010 Electoral Act forbids public sponsorship of political parties.

In the second stage, the expenditure during campaign for election, the model omitted some items such as social media which perhaps was not strong during the period of the initiation of the model like today and thus, looking at how the social media played a vital role in the 2015 General Election in Nigeria, it is incorporated in addition to the use of pamphlets which was not mentioned in the model. In the other side of the expenditure during campaign, the illegal activities mentioned omitted bribing electoral officials as it occurred in the 2015 General Election in Nigeria and since its applicability is within this realm, it was adopted or added.

In the third stage which is payback after election, there is a vital issue that this research discovered and added which is in the legal aspect of payback contract award to

godfathers and financiers of the election or supporters as a favour in return for their support towards electoral victory. In the other side which is the illegal payback, cash payment and nepotism are included which is omitted in the case of the original model probably not obtainable in the societies studied by the authors or did not take into full cognisance diverse cultures in the world like that of Nigeria where such an act is obtainable.

5.6.3 Electoral Reforms

Electoral Reforms were introduced twice in the Fourth Republic in Nigeria. The first one was in 2006 where separate legal documents of electoral regulations were designed and approved by the National Assembly in addition to the existing Constitutional regulations. The second Reform was introduced in 2010 which provided for many positive changes that improved the independence and performance of the electoral body (INEC). Under the provision of the 2010 Electoral Act, the use of electronic card reader was introduced in the 2015 General Election where accreditation and voting exercise was conducted electronically to checkmate rigging and alteration of results. All the informants interviewed pointed emphatically to the role of these reforms especially the card reader in the credibility and reliability of the conduct of 2015 General Election. The views of the informants were summarised as follows:

“The 2010 Electoral Act and the various reforms introduced by the Jega-led INEC were instrumental in the success and credibility of the 2015 General Election most especially the card reader which succeeded in drastically curbing election rigging and other malpractices. It has stopped the PDP from its usual style of rigging that gave the party an advantage of winning always (Personal interview with an informant in category A3 on 7th June 2017).

Furthermore, another informant revealed that the introduction of card reader and other reforms led to the success of the election with a remarkable improvement than the previous ones where he said:

“The introduction of many reforms significantly helped improved the election in the 2015 General Election, particularly the use of card reader, accreditation exercise, scrutiny of the voting procedure and collation by the electorates and display of information at all stages of the election” (Personal interview with informant category E1 29th June 2017).

In addition to the above primary information by the informants, there are many existing literature that support the position that electoral reforms and the introduction of card readers made the 2015 General Election credible and acceptable with minimal malpractices as compared to the previous ones and these studies include: Jega 2014, IRI 2015, CPPA 2015, Africa Centre for Security and Strategic Studies 2015, Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room 2015 and Orji 2015. Drawing from the above, thus; it is pertinent to conclude this theme with the assertion that the electoral reforms and card readers supported positively the process of managing a credible election in Nigeria. The only contradictory opinion towards the positive impact of electoral reform and the use of card reader in the conduct of the election was former President Jonathan himself in an interview where he stated:

“The INEC Chairman Professor Attahiru Muhammed Jega connived with the opposition party in dislodging me from power with his body language which disclosed to me that he has favoured the opposition. He was biased, sentimental and sided with the opposition during the election. He was assisted by the United States of America with protection to ensure that I was defeated” (Adeniyi, 2017).

If the above view of President Jonathan is taken into account that really the Western powers used their power against him in ousting him from the Presidency in 2015, then the theory of Clientalism is applicable here because it means that there are godfathers externally who used their resources indirectly in supporting some candidates to emerge into power in Nigeria in which definitely in return there must be some agreed mutual benefit and a symbiosis relationship as assumed by clientalist theorist. It can be probably in policy making or international trade or other economic and political gain from the part of the external sponsors and domestic power control by the sponsored local politicians.

5.6.4 Electoral Management

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is the Commission that is saddled with the responsibility of overall electoral affairs including voters' registration, delineation of polling units, registration of political parties and regulating them, managing the conduct of election from beginning to the end and other adhoc constitutional electoral duties as assigned to it. The INEC was always accused of malpractices, connivance with the ruling elite, complicity in electoral malpractices and inefficiency in the management of electoral affairs.

However, in the 2015 General Election, the INEC was applauded by both the ruling party, opposition, voters, observers, analysts and international community for a credible handling and management of the election successfully which averted the country of a political disaster should it failed to succeed. In this regard, all the categories of the informants from both the APC and PDP and other groups particularly the INEC officials agreed in their responses that the INEC did a credible job of

handling Nigerians a reliable election and restoring confidence in the country's electoral system. According to one of the informant:

“INEC has recorded an outstanding achievement in the 2015 General Election honestly in terms of election management better than the previous election. The leadership is credible and responsible. Even if INEC suffered some setback on many aspects, it still gets an improve procedure that will make election better in the future” (Personal interview with an informant category E3 6th June 2017).

In another view, another informant revealed that:

“The procedure for the management of the election in 2015 satisfied both the ruling and opposition parties the way the result was accepted readily without any protest and this has been attributed to the manner in which the electoral body restructure itself with a good preparation and a different approach towards the exercise in general” (Personal interview with an informant in category A1 2nd June 2017).

In addition, another informant agreed that:

“The 2015 General Election is a decisive victory for democracy not only in Nigeria but, in Africa at large because the electoral body work day and night to offer Nigeria and Nigerians what will restore their confidence in the electoral system and the INEC exactly achieved that successfully” (Personal interview with an informant in category C2 3rd May 2017).

As observed in theme 3 above, only President Jonathan debunked the proper handling and management of the conduct of the 2015 General Election in the interview that was conducted with him by the editor of “This Day Newspaper” which was later published as a book. It should be noted that, the same President Jonathan according to Adeniyi (2017) showered praises on INEC and the management of election in the 2011

Presidential Election when he won. President Jonathan's view here seems the only contradictory view among all the information gathered from the informants and the existing literatures.

Many scholars (Nwachukwu 2015, Ayanda & Odunayo 2015, Adibe 2015 and IRI 2015 all supported the fact that, the electoral body (INEC) deserves credit and a big applause for an improved management of the election which ushered in an election that is currently referred to as the most credit and fair in the history of Nigeria's Fourth Republic. The use of smart card reader made rigging very difficult while the involvement of civil societies and international observer agencies all helped in strengthening the INEC with technicalities and training of election management. This was instrumental in the credibility of the election as observed above.

5.6.5 Civil Societies

Civil societies are organisations that serve as political and societal watchdog different from the opposition political parties in their operation and activities. In Nigeria, the resurgence of the waves of democratisation globally in the 1990s led to the emergence of many civil societies which pressurised the military government for return to democratic rule and after achieving that; became a watchdog towards the political activities of politicians, political parties, policy making and particularly election and electoral process (Mohammed, 2015: 243). In the interview conducted with the informants from category C (INEC officials), category E (academicians) and category F (Civil Societies and general public), it is observed that, civil societies played a significant role in the entire process of the 2015 General Election starting from the voters' registration, parties' activities, civic voter education, collaboration with INEC

in awareness and also collaboration with international observers and international donor agencies. One of the interviewers in the category of C (INEC) stated that:

“We have worked with civil societies in the 2011 and 2015 General Elections closely because we have provided a means of registering their activities with the Commission and we have offered them access to many information and activities of the Commission in terms of preparations and the conduct of the elections. We have on many occasion organised series of seminars and workshops for many groups including the parties, electorates, groups and public officials on the process of the elections” (Personal with an informant in category C1, 11th June 2017).

This statement above has also been supported by an interview with an informant in category E (academicians) who has been working with the INEC and civil societies since 2010. He mentioned that:

“The civil societies are instrumental in the 2015 General Election. We have what we called Civil Society Situation Room where the electoral body (INEC) registered them and is working hand in hand with them in terms of the entire process of election conduct, public awareness campaign, training of INEC staff and monitoring of the entire elections critically. It made INEC to be responsive and transparent in the electoral process” (Personal interview with informant in category E1, 29th June 2017).

Also, a member of the category F (civil societies and general public) expressed the view that:

“We have succeeded in keeping INEC on guard and warding off political pressure on INEC from politicians in terms of our role in sourcing for vital information and relating with INEC closely through our collective civil society situation room in which we correlate between the INEC, voters, political groups, international observer

groups, international electoral donor agencies and the policy makers themselves all in ensuring a transparent, fair and credible election to which we have been successful (Personal with an informant in category F3, 16th June,2017).

The above views of the informants were supported by various existing works on the subject matter such as Mohammed (2015), Blanchard (2015) and Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room (2015). They have all agreed in consensus with the views above and their submissions in their works that, civil societies played an important role in the 2015 General Election and it was one of the pillars behind the credibility or success of the election. In addition, one of the informants narrated that civil societies became more independent and participative than ever before in the 2015 General Election:

“The civil societies were incorporated by INEC in the entire electoral process and that makes them more independent of the government and participative in the electoral process especially from 2010 to 2015 and that made them more strategic in their role of fostering a healthy democracy and a credible election. They situated themselves within the framework of offering an intermediary role for the INEC, electorates, government and all stakeholders involved in the process” (Personal interview with an informant in category F7 16th June 2017).

In summary, it can be inferred from the above views overall that, civil societies are a great component of the success story of the 2015 General Election and they really played a greater role in the process. Most of the studies identified above neglected this aspect and it is so paramount that it should not be forgotten.

5.6.6 Opposition Parties

Opposition politics as observed earlier in the literature review has been a mirage in African democracy in general and Nigerian politics in particular. This is because the ruling party always turned the state into an unofficial one-party system as did the ruling PDP in the Fourth Republic from 1999 to 2015. In a dramatic turn of event in 2015 General Election, a strong opposition party emerged which is the strongest in the history of the country since political independence in the 1960.

The opposition APC consists of a merger of Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), faction of All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA), Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) which was formed in 2013. The party was later joined by new PDP members. Thus, a history was made where a strongest opposition party was formed. According to many informants and scholars, the emergence of APC as a stronger opposition party was what made the election fair and also what led to the successful defeat of the PDP in the election.

In an interview with informants in category A, B, E and F, all the informants except two (one from category A politicians and the other from category B party stakeholders) agreed that the emergence of APC as a strong party helped immensely in the defeat of the ruling PDP and the credibility of the 2015 General Election. In one of the views of the informants:

“The emergence of APC in the 2015 General Election was the greatest factor that made the election credible as the ruling PDP was challenged squarely in terms of financial strength, incumbency factors, voters’ mobilisation and prevention of rigging by securing their strong

area of influence. This made the conduct of the election easier by the INEC and challenged the PDP in an equal contest” (Personal interview with an informant in category B1, 30th June 2017).

In a contrary view to the above position, two informants in categories A and B disagreed that it was the emergence of APC that led to the defeat of PDP and credibility of the elections but, rather, an internal division of PDP and compelling socioeconomic and political situation that led to the victory of PDP. In their words:

“The defeat of PDP by APC in the 2015 General Election is not about the strength of APC; yes, of course APC was financially stronger as a result of the emergence of new PDP with huge wealth in the APC, it was the failure of my party, the PDP, to adhere to the principles of zoning and the poor performance of Jonathan in terms of insecurity in the Northeast that led to our defeat” (Personal interview with an informant in category B1 30th June, 2017).

The other informant suggested that:

“The 2015 General Election was not about the power of APC or its Strength but a mass revolution; a political and social revolution against one and only one person, President Jonathan. Any contestant in any party can defeat President Jonathan in the 2015 General Election” Personal interview with an informant in category A6, 19th June 2017).

The above views of the informants are supported with many scholastic views particularly the first category that believed that the APC was a great factor in the defeat and credibility of the 2015 General Election. Works such as Paden 2015, Adibe 2015, Auge 2015, Blanchard 2015 and Omilusi 2015 all agreed without any contradiction that the merger of APC and its strength in terms of financial strength and incumbency

factor checkmated rigging successfully and challenged PDP squarely. Thus, it can be concluded that, despite a contrary opinion by few of the informants above, the APC was a decisive factor in the outcome of the 2015 General Election. The Rational Choice Theory used in this work also supported the same notion here since the voters decided to alter the rationality of their choice from the usual tradition of voting for money only or their tribal sentiments towards a better perceive candidate.

The theories used in the study can be seen practically applied in this theme. First, the Rational Choice Theory of Election is explained here in the sense that, the different political parties realised that until and unless they rationally used their chance and unite under one strong umbrella to face the ruling party, they will be defeated by the powers of incumbency and they will lack the leverage of having a strong financial and other campaign strength to tackle the challenges of unseating a ruling party. As a result, they rationally chose a merger that yielded fruit and since Rational Choice is also about a decision making in a favourable condition according to the theorist, it is practical here.

In the second instance, Clientalism occurred where the wealthy godfathers and other power brokers in the country joined force with the opposition APC to finance its campaign activities and sponsor it to secure power in order to have a payback because they felt their power tussle interest had been threatened in their stay with PDP. Thus, as observed by some of the informants above, but for the successful merger and emergence of rich individuals in the merger like the newPDP in the coalition, APC might not have win in the first instance.

5.6.7 Card Readers

In one of its reforms in the build up to the 2015 General Election, the electoral body introduced the use of card readers' computer gadgets to accredit and conduct the voting. This has been one of the widely accredited sources that made the 2015 General Election commendable and credible in terms of voters' transparency and curbing of rigging. The card readers were small computer gadgets like POS means of making payment using ATM in which the voters' cards were inserted using computer network for accreditation of valid voters to enable them to vote. The INEC insisted that all elections in the 2015 must be conducted using card readers. Informants that were interviewed in all the categories except category D (EFCC officials because they were not involved in the electoral process) admitted that, card readers were central to the success of the election in 2015. In an interview:

"The use of card readers in accreditation of voters and the conduct of election proper in the 2015 General Election made the election outstanding and credible as it made any attempt at rigging or manipulation of the election unsuccessful because the card readers prevented that" (Personal interview with an informant category E1, 29th June 2017).

However, in another interview by informants categories A, B and C, there were arguments that, there were riggings and also attempts at riggings which were resisted by both the electorates and the opposition and that was the genesis of the success of APC and the defeat of the ruling PDP as well as the credibility of the 2015 General Election. According to one of them:

"There were attempts at rigging and the attempts were to cancel the majority opposition votes in the dominant areas of their strength, but we discovered it and raised an alarm and that killed that strategy of the

ruling PDP instantly. You can only rig where you have the opportunity to do so but in the 2015 General Election, such an opportunity was blocked and that prevented the riggings not that the parties were not inclined not to rig. The opposition played an important role in blocking the ruling PDP and resisting their efforts at rigging. Of course, there were little irregularities and rigging by both the APC and the PDP in their areas of dominance, but it was to a minimal level as compared to what was obtainable in the previous elections in the Fourth Republic” (Personal interview with an informant In Category B3, 13th June 2017).

Additionally, another informant described how the use of card readers ushered in an acceptable election where he said:

“The procurement of card readers by the INEC enabled for conducting a successful election better than the past ones without much dispute or hitches and that allowed for a less malpractices and other forms of rigging that the ruling party usually used to manipulate the electoral process. Am not saying that there were no irregularities or attempt to manipulate the card readers themselves indeed, in some places they were discarded for a manual election yet, the majority areas used it successfully” (Personal interview with an informant in category C1 11th June 2017).

The above views were not directly contradiction of the earlier views of the first category of informants. The first group too believed that there were attempts at rigging the election but the card readers prevented that while the second group agreed that of course, the card readers prevented the riggings even though there were still some level of the rigging by both APC and PDP in their stronghold areas but, the level of the rigging was minimised and checkmated as compared to the previous elections and this explains the reason for judging the election as credible by the informants. The same

views were held by scholars also in their works including Orji 2015, Chukwudi 2015, Ayanda & Odunayo 2015 and Adibe 2015).

In the above scenario, the Rational Choice Theory featured in from the informants' views where the electoral body (INEC) felt that, a good decision of using card reader will lead to an improved election or possibly a credible one. Also, the voters welcomed the process overwhelmingly seeing it as a rational policy that will prevent rigging and give them the opportunity to elect the leaders that they wish without any manipulation as it happened in the 2015 General Election.

5.6.8 Electoral Umpire

The Electoral body in Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was constitutionally established in 1999 to cater for the conduct of election in the Fourth Republic as an independent body with transparency and freedom of the conduct of election without political intervention, at least, according to the law that established it. The previous elections conducted in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 were accused of irregularities in terms of alleged malpractices and riggings. The INEC developed the determination after the 2011 General Election to deliver a transparent and credible election in the next coming election in 2015. Many informants that were interviewed and scholars that investigated the 2015 General Election believed that the INEC became more credible and transparent in its conduct and the electoral administration of the 2015 General Election which made it successful and credible. According to an informant:

“The INEC was more determined, better organised, the staff were trained adequately in preparation for the 2015 General Election, the INEC leadership was more credible than before and the leadership of

the electoral umpire restored confidence on many voters especially with the introduction of card readers and other measures of making the elections transparent such as display of voters' list, accreditation of voters using card readers and collaboration with civil societies in civic voter education prior to the election as well as unrestricted access to the election venues for international and local observers monitoring groups”(Personal interview with an informant in category C2, 3rd May, 2017).

The above summarised interview or opinions of the informants in the categories listed represented their consensus on the subject without any of them disagreeing on the position raised above. However, there was an interview conducted by a journalist Adeniyi (2017) with former President Jonathan which was later published in form of a book titled “Against the Run of Play: How the Incumbent President Lost the Election in 2015” in which President Jonathan lamented that

”I lost the 2015 Presidential Election because the Jega led-INEC compromised and collaborated with the APC to rig the election in their favour against me. The US supported Jega and assured him of their protection in his support for my defeat” (Adeniyi, 2017: 223).

The above view of President Jonathan cannot be taken to have contradicted all the views presented by more than 20 of the informants from different organisations and agencies that were directly related to the 2015 General Election because of the issue of objectivity since he might have emotional attachment and biasness in presenting his views. Furthermore, the works that were conducted on the 2015 General Election by many scholars and organisations (Nigerian Civil Society Situation Room 2015, Adibe 2015 and Orji 2015) disclosed that the elections were credible and the electoral umpire

was more credible and better organised in its administration of the election than the previous ones in the Fourth Republic.

5.6.9 International Observer Monitoring Groups

The international observer monitoring groups were present in Nigerian territory for election monitoring since 2003 and were part of the electoral process as they conducted pre-elections and post-elections assessment and reports of the situation in order to identify the challenges that were faced and how to avoid them in future and also to suggest ways of improving the elections in future. It was as a result of their field firsthand experience information of the nature of elections previously and all the irregularities involved in it that made them to advise INEC on the positive ways of improving the elections including the introduction of card readers. The informants consulted in all the categories except the category D almost unanimously agreed that international monitors played an important role in making the 2015 General Election credible and transparent. One of the views below narrated:

“The international observer monitoring group played a very vital role in the pre and during the election’s period in the 2015 General Election with the provision of information, useful advices training to INEC, public enlightenment campaign and mediating among the parties and between the parties and INEC at one hand and INEC and the policy makers on the other hand. They reported cases of electoral malpractices and serious challenges that might hinder the success of the election” (Personal interview with an informant in Category F1, 16th June 2017).

The above views of the informants also were supported directly by the existing knowledge on the subject matter as many works indicated the positive role of

international observer monitoring groups in the success of the 2015 General Election including the works of Blanchard (2015) and INEC (2015).

5.6.10 Role of Social Media

Social media has been playing an important role in virtually every aspect of our life today globally and in Nigeria in particular. The elections in Nigeria came to witness the role of social media from 2011 but most importantly during the 2015 General Election. Many users of these media including Facebook; Whatsapp; Twitter and other social media were used in the build up to the 2015 General Election. One of the research organisations Betelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) and ANAP FOUNDATION NOI Polls conducted a pre-election study in Nigeria in 2015 using social media to sample the views and opinions of the electorates towards their favourable candidates. The informants that were consulted in the interview identified social media as one of the most vital tools that were used in making the 2015 General Election credible and fair. One of them mentioned that:

“The social media was quiet instrumental in determining the direction and the success of the 2015 General Election in terms of the information that were revealed on the level of preparation of the INEC, the politics, parties’ activities, the candidates and their campaign activities as well as the disabuse of the minds of the electorates from the politics of ethno-religious and tribal sentiments towards the issue-based politics based on the performance of the contestants and the anticipated benefits of their leadership. A great success was recorded in this regard as many electorates were persuaded to vote in favour or against a particular candidate courtesy of the role of the social media (Personal interview with an informant in category F2, 16th June 2017).

In another version from the interview, an informant narrated that:

“At a point in time, the 2015 General Election campaign had been transferred into the arena of social media where various parties, groups, sub-groups, supporters, individuals and candidates themselves engaged in electioneering campaign through all the available social media. Indeed, but, for social media, some places or votes cannot be secured by some candidates” (Personal interview with an informant in category E2 27th May 2017).

In addition, the 2015 General Election has been tagged as a social media election where one of the informants said:

“The 2015 General Election is a social media election where most of the campaign and politicking took place more than physical political activities (Personal interview with an informant in category F8 16th June 2017).

In addition, scholars (Nwofe 2015, Chukwudi 2015 and Bartlett et al. 2015) all presented an argument in favour of the role of social media in the success and credibility of the 2015 General Election in agreement with the above informants' views. There was no contradictory view or disagreed position from any of the categories of the consulted informants above on the positive role of social media in the electoral process in 2015.

Here, the two theories are applicable both within this context. In the first instance, the parties, contestants, voters and INEC as well as civil societies utilised rationally the platform of social media to advertise their parties and supporters and also to display their manifestoes which reached people in all nook and crannies easily than before where the relevance of social media was less influential. It succeeded in convincing

many voters who were before undecided to choose in favour of certain candidates as a result of information and enlightenment in the sphere of social media.

In the second instance, Clientalism is also applicable because many wealthy individuals and godfathers sponsored many intellectuals with money and promise of appointments or contracts after winning the election to advertise them and to promote their political ambition. This is a patron-client business in the social media.

5.6.11 Fair Play in Campaign Process

One of the principles of liberal democracy is the provision of the fair play ground for both the ruling and opposition parties in the campaign process without any intimidation or state use of force to deny any party from media and other means of conveying their ideology. In African democracies and politics, opposition was strangled and denied such privilege for many decades. However, the recent globalised system of democracy and pressure from international communities and organisations compelled many countries in Africa including Nigeria to allow for opposition politics to flourish. In the build up to the 2015 General Election, one of the credits given to the ruling PDP was that it allowed for opposition to play their politics without much intimidation and also they were allowed access to media and other means of campaign with less intimidation. Many of the informants here agreed that, such a scenario led to the credibility and success of the 2015 General Election. The views of the majority agreed on that. One of the relevant views suggested that:

“The 2015 General Election was entirely different and most credible compared to the previous ones in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 because the opposition APC and other parties were given equal opportunity in terms of accessibility to media campaign, physical campaign, political

activities and other related issues that led to the conduct of the elections” (personal interview with an informant in category B4, 23rd May, 2017).

Despite the majority opinion of the role of fair play in the electoral process in 2015, two of the informants (one in category A and the other in category B) have a contrary view to the notion that, a fair play ground was provided in the campaign process of the 2015 General Election. They perceived that

“There were threats, attempts at assassination, campaign of calumny and a brazen denial of the opposition from accessing the state-owned media and even some private ones for free campaign by the opposition as a result of a strangulation from the ruling PDP. However, there were some level of improvement in terms of the fair play than the previous elections and that propelled APC to success” (Personal interview with informants in categories A3, 7th June 2017 and B3, 13th June 2017).

Despite the above contrary view of the informants, evidences exist from some scholars that there was a significant improvement in the level of accessibility and fair play in the conduct of the 2015 General Election such as Chukwudi (2015), IRI (2015), Africa Centre for Strategic Studies 2015 and Omilusi 2015. It simply means that, there was an improvement in the fair play and free opposition politics in Nigeria and that made the 2015 General Election credible than the previous ones.

5.6.12 Socioeconomic Settings

Prior to the 2015 General Election, Nigeria faced the most critical condition in its history of socioeconomic challenges in terms of insecurity, corruption, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, disease, ethno-religious crises and deep social division among the major ethnic and religious groups in the country. These issues led to the

campaign and the conduct of the 2015 General Election to be the most challenging and different one from the past. Many electorates from all parts of the country decided to oust out PDP irrespective of their candidates because of the high level of the critical situation. Indeed, the socioeconomic situation in the country made the elections keenly contestable and credible because the voters became more rational in their choice and determined at all cost to ensure that they have voted and guard their votes against manipulation so as to have a change of government.

Majority of the informants or almost all of them from all the six categories (A, B, C, D, E and F) agreed without any contradiction that the critical socioeconomic situation in the country before the election made the electorates to vote the way they did. In an interview, one of the informants narrated that:

“There is no doubt that the daunting socioeconomic and political situation in Nigeria during the 2015 General Election unite and made the electorates determinant in their votes as against the usual ethno-religious politics of sentiments and voted for the perceived credible leaders irrespective of the candidates and their parties. The voters were wiser and united by hunger, poverty, unbearable corruption level, persistent threat of insecurity of lives and properties and many other socioeconomic challenges” (Personal interview with an informant in category B313th June 2017).

In another similar view, one of the informants revealed that:

“The socioeconomic settings in the country made it so unbearable for the common man and the voters felt that they can no longer continue under the ruling PDP and this made the choice to be more decisive and unique” (Personal interview with an informant in category E3 6th June 2017).

In addition to the above information, many works were conducted before and immediately after the election on the credibility and success of the election that attributed the socioeconomic and political situation in the country as one of the major determinants of the prediction of the outcome of the election and the results outcome proper. Such works include: Paden (2015), Auge (2015), House of Commons Report (2015), Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (2015) and Orji (2015). Thus, the literatures and the information of the interviewers supported each other and made the assertion stronger that the compelling socioeconomic situation in the country led to the changes in the country during the election.

Furthermore, one of the theories used (the Rational Choice Theory of Election) also explained clearly the situation as the socioeconomic and political conditions made the voters more rational in choice and behaviourally wiser in making choice along a different line in comparison with the usual tradition that was obtainable in the previous elections in the Fourth Republic.

The above views of the informants and scholars revealed how practical the Rational Choice Theory of Election in this context. For instance, the electorates felt that, in the market sphere of political competition, the opposition party will offer them a better satisfying service than the ruling party and best on that, made a rational decision of actualising it practically.

5.6.13 Voters' Determination

The voters in the 2015 General Election in Nigeria displayed a great zeal for making their votes count and also for choosing leaders or parties that they feel will rescue them

from the malaise of socioeconomic underdevelopment. This is one of the arguments of the informants that made the election credible and fair. It is argued below that:

“The electorates became more determined like ever before in the history of the country in terms of voting and ensuring that their votes count accordingly. This helped the electoral body in checking of rigging and other malpractices. While monies were shared and votes were bought, still the voters chose their leaders carefully against the high money spenders” (Personal interview with an informant in category B3, 13th June, 2017).

In another similar view above, another informant disclosed that:

“The PDP made a spending that is equitable with investment yet, they lost massively which means the people are determined to change the party at all levels due to their poor performance in office for 16 years” (Personal interview with an informant in category A5 02nd May 2017).

Also, another informant mentioned that:

“The politicians became so desperate to win the 2015 Election most especially the ruling PDP to the extent that they were willing to empty the Nigerian treasury without any regret yet, they lost which signifies a recommendable progress in our political culture and democracy in general” (Personal interview with an informant in category F3 16th June 2017).

The IRI Report (2015) and Animashaun (2015) expressed the view that, one of the key factors that led to the success of the 2015 General Election and the defeat of the incumbent by the opposition has to do with the way in which the electorates became self-determine in the voting and their will to ensure that they have vote according to the promises of the politicians during campaign and not money distributed to them or

their ethno-religious candidates and other sentimental issues. Such explanation supported the views above presented of the informants.

Again, the above views and propositions of the informants and scholars support the Rational Choice Theory of Election in the sense that, it shows how wiser and rational the voters became where despite the crazy spending alleged in billions or trillions by the ruling party higher than the opposition, yet, they chose the opposition instead of the ruling party because of their determination for change.

5.6.14 Desire for Change

One of the slogans of campaign in the 2015 General Election is change. The opposition APC used change to attract voters and to secure victory against the ruling PDP. People were sincerely tired of the PDP style of ruling and were looking for a change to have a better political and socioeconomic environment. This really attracted many votes for the opposition. The informants consulted all in the six categories believed that, the word “change” was instrumental in the APC ride to power in the 2015 General Election. In their views:

“The APC slogan of change attracted many votes from all parts of the country especially considering the economic hardship and insecurity which threatened the existence of a man in the country. The desire and hope for a positive change credible leadership that will foster economic development in the country made the voters to elect APC in the 2015 General Election” (Personal interview with an informant in category A5, 02nd May, 2017).

It is not only the informants that believed in the change slogan as the influencing factor in the outcome and credibility of the 2015 General Election. There are writings by IRI

(2015), Paden (2015), CPPA (2015) and Isma'ila & Yusuf (2016) that supported such view on the burning desire by Nigerians to replace the ruling PDP with a better leadership because of corruption and poor socioeconomic policies that made the life of a common man wretched and miserable for sixteen years.

In this context, Rational Choice Theory of Election is derived from the views above since the desire for change from the voters led to a different pattern in the election's outcome and it also shows how the electorates became more rational in their voting behaviour.

5.6.15 Politics of Decamping

Politics of decamping is one of the major attributes of Nigerian democracy since the inception of the Fourth Republic in 1999. Many top politicians from all the political parties across decamped from one party to another and some even re-decamped after the decamping all to secure power at all cost using any available platform. The 2015 General Election witnessed the zenith of decamping in Nigerian politics where five serving State Governors, former President, ten serving Senators, 22 serving members Federal House of Representatives decamped from the ruling PDP to the APC between 2013 and 2015 in addition to many prominent politicians in all parts of the country (Jiddere, 2015). Many of the informants agreed that it was the decamping of these top serving ad retired politicians that handed APC its victory in the 2015 General Election. One of the informants suggested that:

“The mass exodus of decampees from the ruling PDP to the opposition APC including top serving political office holders was a dangerous omen to PDP and failure to address that scenario strengthened the opposition APC with powers of money to spend, incumbent political

officers including the Speaker Federal House of Representatives. Indeed, the very day that such massive decamping took place it was the day of the funeral of PDP from power right before the election took place in 2015” (Personal interview with an informant in category B1, 30th June 2017).

While the above view represents the majority of the informants in their opinion that it was the decamping of top politicians from PDP that made APC victorious, one of the informants in category B rejected the idea and concluded that:

“I did not believe that it was the decampees or the alliance that made President Muhammadu Buhari and indeed APC victorious in the 2015 General Election. Recall that, the same Buhari was constantly getting more than 12 million votes in the North from the third consecutive Presidential Election and he got only 15 million votes to emerge as the winner in 2015. That means, the entire merger and decampees and other regions contributed less than 2 million votes in his success. It is unfair to attribute Buhari’s win to any region or person or group but, rather a masses effort that went out and voted for him overwhelmingly” (Personal interview with an informant in category B3 on 13th June 2017).

The above is a contradictory view of the majority views. However, there might be a mistake in the perception of the interviewer above of his statement that Buhari was constantly getting 12 million votes in 2003, 2007 and 2011. In the 2007 Presidential Election, Buhari secured 7.6 million votes. Furthermore, the emergence of the decampees prevented rigging or manipulation of the election’s results by the ruling PDP and also gave APC the impetus of cash for campaign conveniently across all parts of the country. This position has been stated by scholars (Jiddere 2015, Paden 2015, Omilusi & Adu 2016, Olorunmola 2016, Lucky 2017 and Adeniyi 2017) that the

decamping has helped immeasurably to the success of APC in the 2015 General Election.

A theory of Clientalism was depicted in the above picture where the decampees from the ruling PDP to APC emerged as political party financiers of APC in order to remain within the corridors of power for their economic and business interest as well as political interest.

5.6.16 Minimised Rigging

Elections in Nigeria are mostly controversial and full of alleged riggings especially in 2003, 2007 and 2011 and it remains the subject of controversy that all the previous elections were accompanied with series of litigations and elections' tribunal with many contestants disputing the results of the elections. The 2015 General Election was given credibility for the ability of the electoral body to employ measures that prevented rigging using card readers, the determination of the voters to protect their votes and the powers of the opposition APC in checkmating rigging. Most or almost all the informants agreed that the 2015 General Election witnessed low level of rigging. One of the views presented below narrated that:

“The ability of the electoral body (INEC) to use card readers prevented rigging of the election and also the emergence of APC as a strong opposition gave them the leverage to minimised or protect their votes most especially in their areas of stronghold and also the voters were able to vote and follow up their votes to its logical conclusion thereby preventing the usual business of rigging” (Personal interview with an informants in category C3, 16th June, 2017).

It was also agreed by many scholars (Isma'ila & Othman 2015, IRI 2015, CPPA 2015 and Blanchard 2015) that the ability of the INEC, APC and voters to prevent rigging minimised the chances of manipulation of the electoral results and that gave the APC an upper hand in securing victory during the 2015 General Election.

5..7 2015 General Election and Credibility Question: A Model

Thus, it can be inferred from the above dispositions and diverse views of the informants in addition to the already existing literature cited above that, the 2015 General Election is more credible than the previous four (4) elections conducted so far in the Fourth Republic. The views and responses are summarised diagrammatically below in an illustration to show the major factors that led to the success of opposition in dislodging the ruling party and also to indicate the level of credibility of the election. The above views were developed into a model by the researcher in explaining the nature and the success or credibility of the 2015 General Election clearly indicating or illustrating the major themes with their explanations below for a better and a clear perception of the findings from the field and how it relates to the existing works and the current work at hand.




Figure 5.3 Model Illustrating the Major Factors That Determines the Credibility Of 2015 General Election

Source: Developed by the Researcher 2017

The model above is depicting an illustration of the major forces that played a vital role in the determination of the credibility of the 2015 General Election. The degree and frequencies of the determinants differ going by the responses of the informants for instances, the informants interviewed above from all the categories believed that card reader and merger of major opposition parties are the highest with 90 % agreement that made the election credible, free and fair.

The second grades of the factors that determined or made the 2015 General Election credible are the credibility of the electoral umpire and active participation of civil societies in the process. The informants across all the categories selected believed in 80 % frequency that the INEC was improved, better and more organised in the 2015 General Election with reliability. One of the categories, the E category (Academicians) all of them in almost a total of 90 % agreed that civil societies helped immensely in the credibility of the 2015 General Election as they are instrumental in linking the public with political parties and policy makers as watchdogs that are neutral to some extent.

Voters determination and desire for change alone are other major factors that led to the success of the election in the 2015 as most of the informants from all categories believed that, many voters across the regions this time around voted against sentiments and regional candidates for a candidate that they feel will improve their lives and foster socioeconomic development in the country. About 70 % of all the informants see it this way.

Other factors including decamping of major opposition particularly newPDP with five Governors, ten Senators, 22 Members House of Representatives and top party members all joined APC with incumbent powers at various levels and huge money in addition to measures that curbed rigging drastically made the election credible. Of course, minimised rigging and malpractices are the current principles that will make any election fair and acceptable. This is what the previous elections lack and this one got which made it better and improved. More than 70 % of the total informants from all the categories above agreed on that.

Other factors that played crucial role as identified from the views of the informants include the role of international observers and fair playing ground. International observers were allowed to participate in the pre-election, during the election and report their findings after the election. They reported a peaceful and fair level ground for all the parties and contestants and the election took place without the usual violence and ballot snatching although, there were cases of vote buying and bribes. This, most of the people interviewed in majority of about 70 % agreed on that.

The above determinants have been followed by the role of social media and socioeconomic situation in the country. Most of the informants agreed that social media served as a watchdog that prevented the manipulation of the election and made it free, fair and credible as all suspicious efforts were quickly reported. The socioeconomic situation in the country also made the electorates to be rational in making their choice including the unbearable level of poverty, corruption, unemployment, inflation, falling standards of education and poor healthcare services delivery.

It has been observed also that, the 2015 General Election is credible on the ground of the issue-based campaign and influence of the money politics. Unlike the previous elections that the politicians banked on ethnic, religious and regional sentiments to secure votes, major issues of national concern such as increasing corruption, insecurity, poverty and other socioeconomic indicators. In addition, there was unprecedented use of money speculated into billions or even trillions of Naira but that did not alter or influence the result in favour of the incumbents. In the previous elections, money used to influence the outcome but this time around with the

unprecedented corrupt practices and rapidly declining standard of living and insecurity, the electorates were determined against all odds to change the status quo.

The other major factors that contributed in the credibility of the 2015 General Election are electoral reform and credible electoral umpire management as described by informants in category C which are INEC staff where all the three of them in an almost 90 % frequency agreed that the improvement and reorganisation of the electoral acts and the credible management of the electoral process led to the credible election and its success in the 2015.

The 2015 General Election was a success according to the above reforms and factors. comparatively, it was an improvement and better in terms of credibility than the previously examined elections in the Fourth Republic. For instance, while in the 2015 General Election there was minimal level of rigging as identified by all the scholars above and the informants in the interview, the 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 were labeled as rigged elections. Yagboyaju (2011) stressed that the 2003, 2007 and 2011 General Elections were rigged, and candidates were imposed against the wishes of the electorates. The Observer Book of Scandal (2010) declared the Nigerian 2007 General Election as the third most scandalous election in the history of the world. The same case was reported by the Human Right Watch in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 General Elections.

In addition, the 2015 General Election was seen as a success and credible in comparison with the previous elections because of its recordings of peaceful occurrence despite the heavy challenge of insecurity. The previous elections especially

in 2003, 2007 and 2011 were marred with violence as reported by Human Rights Watch in 2003, 2007 and 2011 and many other international observers. The 2015 General Election was to some extent violent free even with the threat of Boko Haram insurgency. This made the Election outstanding comparatively with the previous ones.


Furthermore, the 2015 General Election was successful because of reforms and factors such as a strong opposition party, the APC which successfully challenged the ruling PDP squarely. This was not obtainable before in the previous elections because the opposition used to be weak. The electoral administration itself was an improvement with the introduction of the card reader which minimised rigging and a strong civil society that was stronger than the previous elections which monitored the election. The management of the electoral body too by a man of integrity Professor Attahiru Muhammed Jega gave confidence and reliability on the electoral conduct. All these factors were not obtainable in the previous election and this is the main reason why the election was seen as an improvement, a success and credible by this work and the other works in the field of study.

5.8 Summary

The chapter above presented a link between the establishment of civilian rule in Nigeria from 1999 with specific reference to the various elections that took place and displayed the dominance of the ruling PDP for straight 16 years at all levels in the country. The chapter also indicates how the dominant trend was changed and the necessary factors that led to that. This answered the question why the 2015 General Election is different from the previous ones and the issue of its credibility in comparison with the previous elections in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011.

The study is a case study which examined the 2015 General Election. As a result, the chapter explored from the views of informants and scholars' submission, the level and extent of credibility of the election using some parameters that indicated an improvement and radical changes in the electoral process and its outcome. This will lead the research to the next issue which is the examination of the impact of political party financing in the outcome and the integrity of the election.

The theories used in the work were applied within the context of the findings or views of the informants in addition to the literature contribution in the model designed by the researcher on determinants of the success of the 2015 General Election and another model designed on the organisational structure of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other issues identified from the informants' views.



CHAPTER SIX

IMPACT OF POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING ON THE SUCCESS OF THE 2015 GENERAL ELECTION

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, a linkage was made with the previous chapters having examined the regulations on political party financing, sources of political party financing and the conduct of the election and its outcome in the 2015, this section provided an examination of how the process of political party financing affected the outcome and the overall integrity and credibility of the election.

In doing so, the chapter examined the major impacts which are corruption in the electoral process and violation of electoral rules and regulations, therefore, the chapter examined briefly what electoral corruption is, causes of electoral corruption, manifestations of electoral corruption, impacts of electoral corruption and the section used informants' views in the end to analyse how the impacts of political party financing affect the integrity of the 2015 General Election. The chapter made contributions in the literature and theoretical framework as presented in the thematic and analytical interpretations in the various sections discussed.

6.2 Concept of Corruption

The issue of corruption in Nigeria has been given utmost attention by scholars owing to its role in the notorious reputation that Nigeria acquired internationally. It is seen as the bane of transparency, good governance, accountability, political stability, socioeconomic development and overall national development by many scholars (Ackerman 2001, Ackerman 1999, Nield 2002, Hoffmann 2002, Balboa & Medalla 2006 and Bailey 2006). Political corruption in Nigeria is a deliberate fraud perpetrated by policy makers to enrich themselves.

Political corruption is the examination of the way democratic rule in a country like Nigeria contradicts the expectation that democratic governance enhances accountability and responsibility. Not only that Nigeria is a democratic state today, but, also the electoral systems of the so called advanced democracies are themselves a fraud and full of malpractices that corrupt the systems in the long run (Balboa and Medalla 2006, Asobie 2012, Saliu 2012 and Fatai 2012).

Political corruption is the backlash of weak political institutions, organised state crime and the use of public treasury for private gain (Nield 2002, Hoffman 2002 & Amundsen, 1999). A careful analysis of the various regimes in Nigeria reveals that leadership and corruption in Nigeria are positively correlated (Ogbeidi, 2012: 10). A study on political corruption in Nigeria identifies three basic explanations behind the endemic nature of political corruption and corrupt practices in Nigeria as;” Clientalism, prebendalism and patrimonialism”. Clientalism is the condition of the milito-bureaucratic and political elite constituting a socio-political cult, gang or group

with distinct character in Nigeria. The politico-bureaucratic public has elitist character with unlimited access to the state wealth. They are found in every sector and constituting all the ethnic groups that made up the Nigerian state. The ideology of these political gangsters can thus be simply stated, “Wherever you see wealth, steal it” (Ogundiya, 2009: 283, Ogundiya 2010, Ogundiya 2012, Ojukwu & Shopeiju 2010 Mahmood 2014, Ake 1996 and Girei 1999).

Political corruption has led to the institutionalisation of corruption in the entire political, administrative and bureaucratic systems of Nigeria (Aluko 2002 & Akindele 2005). Political corruption is the major impediments behind a free and fair election and democratic stability in Nigeria as examined by Ogundiya (2010) and Olarinmoye (2008). Corruption in Nigeria is interpreted as nothing beyond brazen squander and looting of public funds by political office holders leading to the emergence of a colossal collection of impoverished masses with 70% of the total population living in poverty, moribund infrastructure, mono economy, all resulting from governments that have looted the resources of the state (Agbiboa 2011, Luqman, 2012:413, Ajayi, 2012). Political corruption in Nigeria has been taken to be mostly bureaucratic in terms of the way and nature in its occurring (Aina 1986, Jain 2001 and Oladele 2014).

Ajayi (2012) concluded that, socially, the huge salaries paid to elected officials are unjust and immoral. There are other studies related to this one by scholars such as Bello (2007), Peter and Yusuf (2007), Iganiga and Obafemi (2007), Baba (2007) and Lafenwa and Daniel (2007).

6.2.1 Electoral Corruption

Corruption has different types as observed above but the most interesting one in this area of study is the electoral corruption which involves all the illegal and criminal activities that take place in the electoral process from the process of registration of voters to campaign financing and campaign activities as well as the election conduct proper. The informants that were interviewed in all the categories agreed unanimously that there was electoral corruption in Nigeria's Fourth Republic most especially in the 2015 General Election and these electoral corrupt practices involve according to their views:

“Multiple register of voters, underage voting, vote buying, bribing of electoral officials and other stakeholders in the electoral process, refusal to use card readers for accreditation of voters and voting proper, cancellation of results in some places unnecessarily, manufacturing of election results in some areas, excessive use of money in campaign process, godfatherism, patron-client relationship and Violation of electoral acts on many instances during the course of electioneering campaign” (Personal interview with an informant in category E2, 27th May, 2017).

In addition, the electoral corruption is perceived by scholars as a process of subverting the legal and ethical procedures of the conduct of election. For instance, Olarinmoye (2008) and Ogundiya (2009) identified political corruption as undemocratic activities that take place during elections and other political processes. It is also seen as godfatherism where some power brokers sponsored politicians for an elective office (Olarinmoye 2008 and Kura 2014) and a means of getting power at all cost using prebendel and patrimonial clientalism (Ogundiya, 2010). These interpretations explained the above views and supported them clearly.

The corruption within the broader political system includes the demand of electoral politics, the extensive use of patronage in political appointments, and the use of dubious transactions. In another view, an informant disclosed that electoral corruption is:

“Many electoral body officials were bribed, religious clerics, royal fathers, opposition political parties, security agencies etc. corruption is there and if not because of the massive use of money, PDP will not obtain half of its votes from the elections while the APC will not emerge as the winner” (Personal interview with an informant in category A2, 7th May 2017).

In another view, another informant revealed that:

“Corruption occurred in the process because the money itself was sourced through looting of public treasury and was redistributed to the different groups of public opinion makers and important players” (Personal interview with an informant in category A4, 3rd June 2017).

Furthermore, electoral corruption has been observed by one of the informants to have been:

“I can tell you that the parties spent billions in every state of Nigeria dazzling money around in buying votes, bribing INEC officials and all sorts of dubious acts” (Personal interview with an informant in category A6, 19th June 2017).

In another view:

“INEC was compromised through its greedy staff that collected billions of Naira from the PDP and many other groups. But, for God’s intervention, the PDP was ready to spend all Nigerian resources to maintain its hold onto power. Other parties too spent particularly the APC billions in the same act above to a lesser scale than that of the PDP. Also, other parties like mine spent billions and were given

billions too from the PDP. Indeed, the only group that is not bribed by the PDP in the 2015 is infants in my view” (Personal interview with an informant in category B3, 13th June 2017 and informant category F4, 16th June 2017).

Furthermore, another informant saw electoral corruption in the 2015 General Election to be:

“If the billions of dollars that they used to bribe people during the elections instead of buying of weapons to fight Boko Haram are taken into consideration. Then this election is the most corrupt one. Even the APC is not a saint they used money immensely otherwise they will not win. All of them spent billions but PDP might even spend trillions who knows” (Personal interview with an informant in category F6, 16th June 2017, informant category F3, 16th June 2017 and category F4, 16th June 2017).

From the above diverse views of the informants, it can be deduced that electoral corruption is basically three major issues or activities. First, is the looting or stealing of public treasury by the political office holders for election and personal selfish purpose. The second issue is the massive illegal use of money for political party financing beyond the stipulated law as exhibited in the above views in the 2015 General Election. Third, is the illegal acts that are considered as corrupt practices such as vote buying, bribery and connivance with electoral officials for manipulating the electoral result in favour of the politicians that offered the bribe.

In addition, the nature and dimension of electoral corruption as presented above by both the informants and the scholars reviewed indicated how practical the theory of Clientalism is in terms of the subject matter of study. The relationship among the

patron, broker and client is what led to massive looting, bribery and corrupt practices in the electoral process. Some were offered instant material benefit like money for their votes while others are promised a deferred appointment or contract on assuming office after election. It is a clear indication that cliental activities took place practically thereby, justifying not only the adoption of this theory for this research but, also its applicability practically.

In the second instance, the other theory of Rational Choice Theory of Election is also applicable within the context of the above views and information in this way. The parties and their candidates felt that no matter the amount of money they will use and irrespective of violation of the political party financing and other dubious means, it is justified in their personal ambition as far as it will lead them to victory. This is rational in their perspective. The voters, INEC officials and stakeholders on the other hand felt that, it is rational to collect money and other material benefit from the parties and contestant for their personal benefit in order to vote for them or not to vote for those who could not pay them because they believed after the election, it will be business as usual of the political office holders serving their interest as against the public common good.

6.3 Causes of Electoral Corruption in Nigeria

There are various explanations advanced by scholars on the major causes of electoral corruption in Nigeria including; poverty and poor condition of work (Asobie, 2012), economic bargains and activities of multinational corporations (Ackerman 2000 & Knuckles 2006), rent and rent seeking (Mauro, 1998), weak political institutions and

low human development indicators (Mbaku 2010 & Obazee 2014), social and political factors (Dike 2002 & Ikubaje 2014), and prolong military rule (Shehu, 2006).

Poverty is a contributing factor in causing corruption and low wages and salaries paid to civil servants and bureaucrats (Asobie, 2012). There are other works on electoral corruption in Nigeria (Mbaku 2010, Dike 2002 & Obazee 2014) that identified weak political institutions as the major cause of corruption in the country and great inequality in distribution of wealth, political office as the primary means of getting access to wealth, the weakness of social and governmental mechanisms and the absence of a strong sense of national unity.

There are other reasons identified by informants as the major cause of electoral corruption in Nigeria as expressed in the following discussion. One of the informants narrated that:

“Corruption in the electoral process was caused as a result of the nature of Nigerian politics where only he who pays much get voted irrespective of his performance in office or character and integrity”
(Personal interview with an informant in category A1 02nd June 2017).

Another view sees the causes of electoral corruption as:

“The desperate tendency to win power at all cost by politicians in order to have access to public resources for private accumulation of wealth”
(Personal interview with an informant in category A5 02nd May 2017).

Furthermore, another informant perceives the causes of electoral corruption as:

“The extreme level of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and other social problems are the major causes of corruption during election in Nigerian state and until these issues are properly addressed, such

phenomenon may likely continue” (Personal interview with an informant in category B219th June 2017).

In addition, another informant sees the causes of electoral corruption as:

“The perceived fear of losing power or defeat and the desire to hold onto power continuously made many politicians to device every means possible to win the election at all cost and in this regard, they resort to bribing all stakeholders, buying votes and doing everything possible to win”(Personal interview with an informant in category B130th June 2017 and informant category C111th June 2017).

Furthermore, still many different views were observed from the informants’ views on the causes of electoral corruption as indicated below:

“There are many reasons why corruption is existing in the electoral process and some of these reasons include lack of political will, inability of INEC to have the independence of taming dubious acts of politicians, poverty, hunger, low level of political awareness and the politics of “Do or Die” in Nigerian context (zero sum game)” (Personal interview with an informant in category C324th June 2017).

In another different view from the above, other informants see the reason why electoral corruption took place as follows:

“All these illegal spending and corrupt practices took place in the 2015 General Election because our Commission was not involved in the process of screening of the contestants and scrutiny of their ill-gotten wealth otherwise it might have been stopped or minimised” (Personal interview with an informant in category D227th June 2017).

Additionally, another informant has a different view as follows:

“Lack of proper enforcement and sanctioning of the offenders is the major reason why corruption continues to take place during election in

Nigeria. If all the evidences and witnesses gathered in the previous elections were used to punish those who break the law accordingly, by now many will be afraid of doing it. But, because they do it with impunity they continue doing it from both the side of the politicians and the voters alike I mean” (Personal interview with an informant in category D322nd June 2017).

In the same category, another informant has a different perception as narrated below:

“There is no any means of measurement or identifying the sources of illegal money or nocturnal financial activities of the candidates and that led to massive corruption. Even the physical corrupt activities that occurred in the polling units lack real enforcement force so there is no reason why corruption cannot occur by politicians who found every slim chance of winning as an advantage” (Personal interview with an informant in category D514th June 2017).

In continuation of the examination of the major causes of electoral corruption during the 2015 General Election, other informants in other categories came up with other views different from the above as discussed below. One of them emphasised that:

“The political culture of Nigeria is the major cause of electoral corruption because our electorates tend to misperceive collection of money for voting as part of democracy while the politicians became relax in office for their poor performance since they know that during election they can comfortably buy their way out” (Personal interview with an informant in category E129th June 2017).

Also, another informant in this category stressed that:

“Electoral corruption is caused by the political and socioeconomic condition in the country. Politicians deliberately impoverished masses to continue perpetuating themselves in power by accumulating wealth from the public treasury and giving some token to the voters on election

day while bribing stakeholders to buy their way into power” (Personal interview with an informant in category E36th June 2017, informant category F316th June 2017 and category F616th June 2017).

In another different but related views from different informants in category F, causes of electoral corruption are perceived as:

“It is the poor level of education and awareness that led to electoral corruption because people do not know that electing those who will lead them is a constitutional obligation” (Personal interview with an informant in category F116th June 2017).

From the above diverse views of the informants, it is summarised below in tabular form for easy perception, clarification and analysis the causes of electoral corruption during the 2015 General Election.

Table 6.1

Summary of the Causes of Electoral Corruption during the 2015 General Election According to the Informants

Category	Informant	Response
A(Politicians)	A1	Nature of Nigerian Politics.
	A5	Desperateness to win at all cost.
B(Party Stakeholders)	B1	Fear of losing power or defeat in the polls.
	B2	Extreme level of poverty, unemployment and Illiteracy.
C (INEC Officials)	C1	Dubious nature of elite.

	C3	Lack of political will and compromised electoral body
D (EFCC Officials)	D2	Lack of involvement of anti-graft agency.
	D3	Lack of proper enforcement and sanction.
	D5	Sometimes loopholes and ambiguity in the law.
E (Academicians)	E1	Political culture.
	E3	Political and socioeconomic condition in the country.
F (FGD)	F1	Low level of awareness.
	F3	Extreme scorch of poverty.
	F6	Selfishness, corrupt parties, electoral body and voters.

Source: Field work 2017.

Going by the above cause, one can visibly see the impact of the theoretical framework from the findings of the field work by the informants' views. In the first instance is the case of Rational Choice Theory where the electorates, candidates, electoral officials, party stakeholders and various groups are found all to have been involved in causing the electoral corruption during the 2015 General Election because of the anticipated

benefit which they decided in their own rationale to gain from voting for a particular party or candidate. Yet, as observed by some of the informants, some electorates even thought in their own faculty of reasoning that, collecting money or other material benefit to vote for a particular candidate is part of democracy and election and as a result, the politicians used the opportunity rationally to corrupt the system and get voted using their resources.

In the second instance, Clientalism occurred in all the informants' responses in one way or the other ranging from using money excessively to secure victory for personal gain by parties and candidates, looting of public treasury for buying influence by the patrons from their clients using brokers as their agents during elections and corrupting the system with buyout and payback in the competition for power struggles.

6.4 Manifestations of Electoral Corruption in Nigeria

It will be very difficult to establish that electoral corruption is existing in Nigeria without examining its manifestations within the context of Nigerian environment. Since the above discussions presumably implied that electoral corruption exists in Nigeria. There are many studies on that (Micheal 2013, Odinkalu 2010: 20, Abdulganiyyu 2014, TMG 2004, TMG 2007, Idowu 2010, Eke 2016, Asaju 2014 and Mercy 2015).

A study conducted by Transparency International in 2014 displayed that corruption exists everywhere in the world and is a source of worry for all nations. This is because of its manifestations in various degrees among the countries studied or reported. According to the report, corruption is a problem for all countries. A poor score is likely

a sign of widespread bribery, lack of punishment for corruption and public institutions that doesn't respond to citizens' needs. Countries at the top of the index also need to act. Leading financial centres in the EU and US need to join with fast growing economies to stop the corrupt from getting away with it. The G-20 needs to prove its global leadership role and prevent money laundering and stop private companies from masking corruption. Ironically, the Report suggests that most corrupt countries should liaise with the fast-growing economies to stop the corrupt from their acts; the same Report also counseled that these fast-growing economies should restrict their corrupt practices and should not import them to these vulnerable corrupt countries.

The study by Transparency International further revealed the level of corruption perception and manifestations in Nigeria as indicated in the table below.

Table 6.2

Corruption Perception Index of Nigeria 1996-2017

Year	Perception Index	No. of Countries Selected	Rating
1996	1.2	54	54
1997	1.3	52	52
1998	1.9	85	81
1999	1.9	99	98
2000	1.9	90	90
2001	1.6	102	100
2002	1.7	91	90
2003	1.4	133	132
2004	1.6	145	144

2005	1.9	158	154
2006	2.2	160	142
2007	2.2	183	127
2008	2.2	183	127
2009	2.7	180	130
2010	2.7	174	134
2011	2.4	183	143
2012	2.7	174	139
2013	2.5	175	144
2014	2.7	176	136
2015	2.6	167	136
2016	2.1	176	136
2017	2.7	180	148

Source: Transparency International, (2017).

From the table above, the Nigeria's corruption profile keeps on rising during the democratic regime as against the expected tradition in military rule. While the ranking shows that Nigeria performed as the most corrupt country between 1996 and 1997 during military rule, the ranking discloses that Nigeria improved during civilian regime but ironically, the scores did not show much significant difference with the country performing very low below the neighbouring Sub-Saharan African countries that are poorer than Nigeria. A comparative analysis indicates that corruption in Nigeria is unique and peculiar as compared to other neighbouring states as shown in the table below.

Table 6.3

Comparative ranking of Corruption Perception Index of Nigeria and other Sub-Saharan African Countries

RANKING	COUNTRY	2014	2013	2012
		SCORE	SCORE	SCORE
126	Togo	29	29	30
126	Gambia	29	28	34
119	Sierra Leone	31	30	31
136	Nigeria	27	25	27
115	Mali	32	28	34
115	Ivory Coast	32	27	29
103	Niger	35	34	33

Source: Transparency International, (2014).

The above table compares the Corruption Perception Index of Nigeria with lower countries of Sub-Saharan Africa who are neighbouring countries to Nigeria. The comparison indicates that, despite the existence of numerous studies (Oladele 2014, Mahmood 2014 and Bankole & Olaniyi 2014) which indicate that; Sub-Saharan African countries are the most corrupt; Nigeria emerged comparatively as the most corrupt. Perhaps, the most critical factor is the existence of oil but, even the existence of oil could not be used to justify the claim since other Sub-Saharan African countries also produced oil like Niger and Ivory Coast. This shows the level of perception of higher incidence of corruption in Nigeria according to Transparency International in 2014.

There are many studies conducted on the manifestations of electoral corruption in Nigeria (Asobie 2012, Subair 2012, Tanzi 1999, Knuckles 2006, Mohammed 2013 & Bakare 2011, Transparency International, Mohammed 2013, Isaiah, 2004:71, TMG, 2013, Segun & Samuel, 2011, Bankole and Olaniyi, 2014, Global Integrity Report 2010 and Global Corruption Barometer, 2013). All the above various studies identified that corruption occurred in the Presidency like Isaiah, (2004:71), in the National Assembly (Segun & Samuel, 2011) and in the entire electoral system in the country and in every sector at large and by extension.

Electoral corruption manifested in the 2015 General Election in many ways. The informants in all the categories discussed their perception of the manifestations of corruption in the 2015 General Election in different languages but in the same way or theme which made the researcher to summarise their views and present it below:

“Electoral corruption manifested at all levels in all the processes of the 2015 General Election from campaigns to the election proper. Monies were distributed in billions and INEC officials were bribed while all the stakeholders in electoral process were given millions and billions of dollars to buy their support especially for the ruling PDP. The Dasuki scandal of the diverted \$2.1 billion meant for procurement of arms to fight Boko Haram insurgency and the unremitted NNPC oil revenue that was later used to bribe the INEC officials across the country all revealed how electoral corruption manifested in the election process. These monies were used in vote buying, securing of support and excessive adverts and other campaign spending” (Personal interview with informants in category E1 and E2 on 29th June, 2017 and 27th June, 2017, informant category A5, 02nd May, 2017, informant in category A2, 7th May 2017, informant category B2, 19th June 2017 and informant B3, 13th June 2017).

The above informant also added that:

“If we assume that PDP only spent that amount alone without any addition, where is the issue of financial regulations of N1 billion maximum spending, where is the issue of transparency, how could a public official obtain such outrageous amount and where will he spend such amount on this earth? Of course, from the public treasury and it was spent in corrupting all segments and facets of the Nigerian state. But, let me tell you, the PDP spent far beyond that using many other sources apart from the arms money” (Personal interview with an informant in category A5, 02nd May, 2017).

Furthermore, another view suggests that:

” Both the APC and PDP are corrupt and spent much beyond your imagination in the 2015 General Election, but I know even though I belong to PDP that APC did not spend up to quarter of what my party spent. This election in terms of spending consume money worth trillions and corruption occurred in the process because the money itself was sourced through looting of public treasury and was redistributed to the different groups of public opinion makers and important players. Both the APC and PDP achieved in getting desirable results in many places but, who wins is what matters and in this regard the APC laughs last” (Personal interview with an informant in category A4, 3rd June 2017).

In the same vein, another informant revealed the following:

” Both the APC and the PDP spent billions of Naira most especially that of PDP can be up to trillion or trillions and spending above limit is also a form of corruption so in this regard both are corrupt. However, in terms of revelations from arms scandal and bribing electoral officials and other politicians caught in the act of hiding millions of Dollars and Pound and billions of Naira are members of the PDP since there is no any record of any APC member so far involved.

They have destroyed the country and they have plundered national resources. They turned election in Nigeria into a bazaar of squandering public trust and resources” (Personal interview with an informant in category A3, 7th June 2017).

In a contrary opinion to the above, another informant disclosed that:

I can tell you that the parties both APC and PDP alike spent billions in every state of Nigeria dazzling money around in buying votes, bribing INEC officials and all sorts of dubious acts” (Personal interview with an informant in category A6, 21st June 2017).

In a statement which seems to synthesise the above two different views, another informant believes that:

” Nobody can quantify what the two major political parties spent in the 2015 General Election, but one thing is sure that billions or even trillions were spent in an election that should not witness more than N30 billion at large going by the Electoral Act. But, because the INEC has no capacity to monitor or the laws are deficient in the sourcing of funds and spending them as well as nocturnal affairs of money sharing that nobody can detect, I know that PDP spent more than N30 billion in Lagos alone and in every state, billions were shared. They wanted to win at all cost (Personal interview with an informant in category B1, 30th June 2017).

The same informant added that:

But, the APC was financially strengthened by the defection of the newPDP with huge cash and that made APC too a force to reckon with financially. Although, even if PDP can release the entire money in the Central Bank of Nigeria, they will never win in Northern states which are the stronghold of President Buhari but, the emergence of newPDP and public office holders from APC financed the election with billions

too in all parts of the country. Trillions were spent, and money was shared across all groups and prominent individuals in the country”
(Personal interview with an informant in category B1, 30th June 2017).

Furthermore, it is not only the politicians or the parties that manifested corrupt practices during the 2015 General Election. Other stakeholders too exhibited corrupt scandals and allegations as in the case of the INEC officials. The informants in a certain category also testified to the existence of corruption in the electoral process of the 2015 General Election. Their views in the words of one of the informants:

” Many of our staff were involved in corruption during the 2015 General Election as our attention was drawn by EFCC to that effect in various states and geo-political zones of the country involving millions and billions of Naira. Investigation is currently ongoing on the matter and some of them were already deliberated on. We dismissed some of them while others were placed on half payment until the investigation is concluded” (Personal interview with an informant in category C1, 11th June 2017).

The same was submitted by another informant in the same above category:

“Massive corruption occurred of course. The politicians bribed anybody that cares to compromise in order to win at all cost. Corruption is evident in the 2015 General Election surely in many organisations particularly the agencies that are directly related to the conduct of the election” (Personal interview with an informant in category C2, 3rd May 2017)

Another informant in the above category also revealed some vital information as follows:

We received numerous petitions on some of our staff involving themselves in corruption scandals worth billions of Naira and other

party members. We shall treat them accordingly. Some of them are already under EFCC investigation while others are in courts. Corruption in the electoral process in Nigeria is normalised even the government that should enforce regulations is found spending in multi-billions of Naira campaign projects so who is exempted? Bribes were given and taken even our staff are involved in collecting billions of Naira to allow some unscrupulous elements to manipulate the election” (Personal interview with an informant in category C3, 24th June 2017).

In addition, the informants from the category of anti-graft agency also have their own side of the revelation as follows:

” We have received petitions and witnesses on embezzlement of billions of Naira by politicians and corruption allegations against top security agencies, INEC officials, traditional rulers, religious clerics and many prominent Nigerians collecting millions and billions in foreign and local currencies for the elections purpose. We have investigated, we are investigating, and we shall investigate More” (Personal interview with an informant in category D3, 22nd May 2017).

Also, in the above group, another informant narrated that:

For now, as we are discussing, we have cases running in hundreds of such nature worth billions of Naira. There is corruption in the electoral process. There are corruption allegations some were investigated and confirmed while others are still undergoing interrogation by our organisations. Many groups were involved but, the ones we are saddled with in this zone (Northeast) are two groups mainly; politicians and INEC officials. The case is worth billions of Naira. Other cases are still coming” (Personal interview with an informant in category D1, 17th May 2017).

In addition to the above, another informant in the same group also exposed that:

“We are still receiving petitions almost weekly on the matter. Corruption scandals abound in almost every geo-political zone in the

country running into billions of Naira. It has been investigated and taken to courts in some regions like Southwest and Southeast while in other areas like Northeast and North central we are compiling facts, witnesses and other requirements to take the cases into courts of law for judgement” (Personal interview with an informant in category D2, 27th June 2017).

Apart from all the above views, the experts that were consulted in the field also believed that corruption manifested in the 2015 General Election beyond reasonable doubt. According to one of them:

” It is unfortunate that EFCCC has never come across such numerous petitions and allegations of corruption in its history like that of the 2015 General Election. From all angles, petitions of squander of billions of Naira and sometimes millions of Dollars and Pounds are coming in. They have been investigating since 2015 to date. The politicians are not cooperating. The one that involves INEC officials is better since the electoral body is working in cooperation with the Commission to address the issue. It just looks like a jungle justice. People unnecessarily and shamelessly helped themselves in amassing wealth from our public treasury under the pretext of election” (Personal interview with an informant in category E1, 29th June 2017).

Additionally, other informants in another category too subscribed to the view that corruption manifested in the 2015 General Election where one of the informants said:

“If the billions of dollars that they used to bribe people during the election instead of buying of weapons to fight Boko Haram are taken into consideration, then this election is the most corrupt one. Even the APC is not a saint they used money immensely otherwise they will not win. All of them spent billions but PDP might even spend trillions who knows” (Personal interview with an informant in category F6, 16th June 2017).

Another informant in the same group mentioned that:

“Vote buying was a normal practice in the election while we are now learning how our national treasury was bamboozled by very few selfish greedy politicians because they are desperate to retain power at all cost. The PDP became an ATM machine in 2015 for all and sundry in the country they squandered trillions of Naira bribing all (Personal interview with an informant in category F3, 16th June 2017).

Again, another informant in this category narrated that:

“If one says there is bribery and corruption in the process of the 2015 General Election then we are underrating what really transpired. There is crazy sharing of billions of Naira by both the APC and the PDP across all sectors of the country and all groups in various ramifications. This involved even religious clerics; a shameful abomination. It is a sheer madness and inhumane act that occurred in the elections. I will prefer military rule than that sheer lunacy” (Personal interview with an informant in category F4, 16th June 2017).

Still on the same subject matter and in the same group, another informant lamented that:

“They stole billions and trillions of oil money from our national resources and decamped from PDP to APC or APC to PDP depending on the area of strength in order to win. They spoilt the entire electoral process with corruption and sharing of looted money. Today as we are talking, the money is still recovered from overhead tanks, in their farms, in soak ways, in reservoirs and in every unimaginable places because they have shared beyond what they can use and now nowhere to hide it” (Personal interview with an informant in category F2, 16th June 2017).

In addition to the above, another informant stressed the fact that:

“The amount of money spent in this election through bribery and other corrupt practices I believed is more than the total annual budget of the country. Arms scandal and NNPC scandal are two cases of the use of public offices to source for huge money by the ruling PDP to campaign for the election. They squandered national resources and ran the country’s treasury dry therefore, we are now facing untold hardship unprecedented in our history. They must be arraign and punish because they toiled with our future out of their selfish ambition” (Personal interview with an informant in category F4, 16th June 2017).

Thus, it is evidently clear that not only the existing previous works like USAID/UKAID 2015, INEC 2017, EFCC 2017 and Olorunmola 2016 that identified the manifestations of electoral corruption in the 2015 General Election but also the general public including the above categories of the informants who shared similar views with the cited works above.

In addition, the Clientalism occurred practically from the information supplied by the interviewers from all its ramifications. For example, the use of public treasury to acquire wealth by elective officers is a cliental activity while the use of the money to buy votes, bribe various stakeholders in the electoral process and the use of the assumed public offices to amass wealth and offer undue favour and advantages to the client by the elected officials all accrued to the applicability of the theory of Clientalism.

It is a clear fact that as assumed in the provisions of Clientalism, the relationship was asymmetrical and dyadic and voluntary. Those who are found engaged in the act of looting the public treasury to give to the electorates did not compel the electorates to

accept. Instead, they accepted on their own volition and the voters did not compel the politicians to offer bribe. They did so all of them out of a mutual agreement based on the rationality of choice that they will incur a mutual benefit from each other and this is how the second theory. The Rational Choice of Election became applicable in this context.

In proving the accuracy or otherwise of the above positions supplied by the informants, there are many writings which directly linked the 2015 General Election financing with massive corruption such as Ukase (2015) who suggests that, campaign financing in Africa and Nigeria in particular is a major source of corruption where the public office holders loot public funds and use it illegally to finance their campaign for re-elections. In the process, they spent above board.

The USAID and UKAID (2015) Report also reported that both the APC and the PDP sourced for their campaign finances from public treasury and they have spent above limit with media spending for the two parties alone costing nearly N10 billion not to talk of other activities such as charter of plane for campaign, posters, billboards and the irony is; this is inspite of the maximum financial ceiling for N1billion for the Presidential candidates. The same phenomenon can be said of other elective offices mostly.

The above views have also been supported by Innocent & Nkechi, 2014, Kura, 2014 even before the 2015 General Election using the previous ones conducted and the evidences of the emerging one. In addition, Nwagwu, 2016 and Lawal 2015 all agreed that the process of political party financing is bedeviled with massive corruption and

huge use of public funds for campaign. The spending in the 2015 General Election in their views is outrageous and undemocratic in whatever perspective.

To make matters worse, the ruling PDP lost the election and the newly ruling APC seems determine to address the issue of corruption which is seen as the bane of development in the country. Within a short period of time, shocking discoveries emerged of the outrageous spending by the PDP in the 2015 General Election and the corruption scandals involved in it. One of such revelations is the Dasukigate scandal where \$2.1 billion ((N777, 133,624,337, 580.00 billion) earmarked for the procurement of weapons to fight Boko Haram was diverted by the PDP for campaign.

Colonel Sambo Dasuki was a former National Security Adviser under the government of former President Goodluck Jonathan from 2012 to 2015. On assumption of office, the President Muhammadu Buhari led government inaugurated a committee to investigate the arms deal considering the huge sum of money allocated for procurement of weapons after a petition was file with the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. The arms procurement investigative committee was inaugurated on 31st August 2015. The committee discovered in its preliminary investigation uncovered many fraud and illicit financial dealings and contract awards where the money was diverted and distributed for campaign. The arms were not procured as expected (EFCC, 2017). The arms deal in Nigeria is seemingly a world beater.

The committee discovered that, out of the 513 contracts awarded, about 53 were failed contracts. The committee also discovered that, the office of Sambo Dasuki was used

in awarding the contracts. On realizing the enormity of the corruption scandal, President Buhari ordered the arrest of Sambo Dasuki (EFCC, 2017).

The investigations revealed that, among the beneficiaries of the arms deal who receive the proceeds of the loot are former Nigerian leaders, traditional leaders, religious leaders, former heads of states and indeed, serving and retired officers, contractors, very prominent Nigerians. The report recommended for retrieval of money from the indicted fellows and prosecution of others that are involved (EFCC, 2017).

The report identified some mentioned top security officers involving NSA Colonel Sambo Dasuki, a former Chief of Defense Staff, Air Chief Marshal Alex Badeh, two former Chiefs of Army Staff; Lt. Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika (retd.) and Lt. Gen. Kenneth Minimah (retd.), ex Chiefs of Air M.D. Umar (retd.) and Air Vice Marshal Adesola Amosu (retd.). Others indicted were Major Gen. E.O. Chioba (retd.), AVM I.M. Balogun (retd.), AVM A.G. Idowu (retd.), AVM A.M. Mamu, AVM O.T.O. Oguntoyobi, AVM T. Omenyi, AVM J.B. Adigun and AVM R.A. Ojuawo. Others indicted are AVM J.A. Kayode-Beckley, Air Commodore S.A. Yusha'u (retd), Air Commodore A.O. Ogunjobi, Air Commodore G.M. Gwani, Air Commodore S.A. Makinde, Air Commodore, S.Y. Lassa and Colonel N. Ashinze (EFCC, 2017).

The committee also indicted several contractors, former Ministers and government officials. They were prosecuted and investigated for the role they played in the disbursement of the funds. The committee discovered that not all the sum of \$2.1 billion was totally diverted. Some contracts were illegally awarded, due process was

violated, weapons procured were sub-standard and, in many cases, not supplied at all while the money vanished (EFCC, 2017).

In another version, about 241 companies were invited for the arms scandal by the office of the National Security Adviser in relation with the receipt of payments from the agency during the tenure of Sambo Dasuki a retired Colonel. Dasuki was prosecuted for allegedly distributing over \$2.1 billion meant for arms procurement to relatives, friends, political associates and campaign officials of the PDP (EFCC, 2017).

While the shared money involved many categories including religious clerics and traditional rulers, it made it very difficult to have all the details of the shared loot since the EFCC, a Commission responsible for charging corrupt acts and financial crimes investigated them in secrecy. The other categories that received the share of the loot are presented below in tabular form for easy identification.

Table 6.4

Individuals Involved in Dasuki Arms Scandal and The Amount They Have Received

S/No.	Person/Group	Amount
1.	PDP Delegates	N10 billion (\$27, 253, 336.883)
2.	Sagir Bafarawa/Dalhatu Investment	N4, 633, 000,000 (\$12, 626, 470.98)
3.	Jabbama Ada Global Nigeria Limited	N400 million (\$1, 089, 322.35)
4.	R.R. Hospital	N750 million (\$2, 042, 479.41)
5.	ACACIA Holdings Limited	N1.25 billion (\$3, 404, 132.358)
6.	Barrister I.M. Bala	N150 million (\$408,495.883)
7.	Malam Ibrahim Shekarau	N900 million (\$2, 450, 975.30)
8.	Ambassador Ibrahim Yerima Abdullahi	N100 million (\$272, 330. 589)
9.	Chief Olu Falae	N800 million (\$2, 178, 644.71)

10.	African Cable TV	N350 million (\$953, 157.060)
11.	Nigerian Defense Academy	N159 million (\$433, 005.636)
12.	B.B.	N350 million (\$953, 157.060)
13.	Abuja Electricity Distribution Company	N125, 503, 255.11 million (\$341, 783.75344)
14.	Coscharis Motors	N119 million (\$324, 073.401)
15.	Members House of Representatives	N380 (\$1, 034, 856.24)
16.	HEIRS BDC Limited	N751 million (\$2, 045, 202.72)
17.	National Security Adviser Office to PDP	N1.5 billion (\$408, 495, 883.000)
18.	DAAR Communications for Presidential Camp.	N2.120 (\$577, 340, 847.973)
19.	E-Force Inter Service Limited	\$146, 639, 019.00 (N53, 525, 366, 278.81)
20.	Tony Anenih	N260 million (\$707, 789.893)
21.	Senator Iyorchia Ayu for Jabi Mall	N345 million (\$938, 999.661)
22.	Dasuki Junior	N90 million (\$244, 956.43)
23.	PDP funds for Campaign	N600 (\$1, 633, 042.89)
24.	Duplex Apartment	N170 million (\$463, 936.353)
25.	Nduka Obaibegna	N120 million (\$327, 484.484)
26.	Bello Halliru	N300 million (\$818, 711.210)
27.	Bello Sarki	N200 million (\$546, 980.999)
28.	Mahmud Aliyu	N200 million (\$546, 980.999)
29.	Attahiru Bafarawa	N100 million (\$273, 490.499)
30.	This Day Newspaper	N550 million (\$1, 504, 197.75)
31.	Peter Odili	N100 million (\$272, 330. 589)
32.	Rashidi Ladoja	N100 million (\$272, 330. 589)
33.	Jim Nwobodo	N500 million (\$1, 376, 928.18)
34.	Ahmadu Ali	N100 million (\$272, 330. 589)
35.	Bode George	N100/\$30, 000 million (\$272, 330. 589)
36.	Tanko Yakasai	N63million (\$173, 553.02)
37.	BAM Properties	N300 million (\$818, 711.210)
38.	Iyorchia Ayu	N345 million (\$950, 409.371)

39.	Bello Matawalle	N300 million (\$818, 711.210)
40.	Bashir Yuguda	N1, 950, 000 million (\$5, 343.730)
41.	Olisa Metuh	N400 million (\$1, 089, 322.35)
42.	Femi Fani Kayode	N1.7 billion (\$4, 658, 636.354)
43.	Colonel Lawal Jaafaru Isah (retd)	N100 million (\$272, 330. 589)

Source: compiled by the researcher from EFCC websites and internet sources (all computation from Naira to Dollar was made by the researcher).

It has been earlier mentioned that, some of the investigation according to the EFCC were carried on confidentially involving billions of Naira or millions of Dollars for the traditional rulers and religious clerics. They were investigated in secrecy as such, the amount given to them from the proceeds of arms scandal was not known. Also, the 241 companies were not listed here to avoid trivialities but, the amount involving them is huge. Besides, the one that involves contract scandals for the 241 companies was valued at N13, 729, 342, 329.87 (\$37, 716, 079. 90113) while that of the fictitious contract was N2, 219, 188, 609. 50 (\$6, 101, 462.0541) and another *E*9, 905, 477.00 (N4, 634, 667, 716.58). The committee also discovered that the National Security Adviser instructed the Central Bank of Nigeria to transfer a total sum of \$132, 050, 486.97 (N48, 049, 967, 022. 13) and *E*9, 905, 473.5 (4, 631,519, 167.42) to the account of Societe D'equipmente Internationaux in West Africa, the UK, and the US with no documentation (EFCC, 2017).

There are many other beneficiaries of the scandal not yet revealed as the investigation is ongoing. Much information will surface later. It is also noted that many amounts were not disclosed as the prominent persons involved were shielded from public embarrassment. It would have given the clear picture of the total amount and how it

was expended. The most annoying and alarming issue is the way money meant for the procurement of weapons to fight insurgency, restore security and protect the lives and properties of the citizens was joked with nonchalantly. This disclosed the highest level in which corruption has reached in Nigeria. Furthermore, another part of the money was shared among the staff of the electoral body INEC and this would be analysed below.

A report indicated that the INEC declared that it is going to investigate about 200 of its staff in collaboration with alleged collection of bribe during the 2015 General Election. They were queried by INEC and the case was handed over to EFCC. A panel was set under the leadership of the National Commissioner Baba Shettima to investigate the allegations. About N23.29 billion (\$63, 822, 813.191) was allegedly disbursed to INEC officials by the then administration of Goodluck Jonathan. The money was according to investigators released by the former Minister of Petroleum Mrs. Diezani Allison Maduekwe (EFCC 2017).

The INEC Chairman confirmed that they have received allegations and reports of their staff involved in corruption scandal during the 2015 General Election. He said that his Commission investigated and discovered many of the allegations to be true. He urged the EFCC to partner with INEC and prosecute any staff that is found guilty. He further added that his Commission will cooperate with EFCC fully in ensuring that all culprits were punished accordingly. The EFCC Chairman in return revealed that, they are already prosecuting some INEC staff in Lagos, Port Harcourt, Kano and Gombe States (EFCC, 2017).

In another report, the INEC confirmed that 202 of its staff were indicted by EFCC who were accused of benefitting from the N23 billion bribery allegedly facilitated by the former Minister of Petroleum. The INEC staff that were indicted were based in 14 states of the country. Some of the affected states are Rivers, Akwa Ibom, Delta, Gombe, Lagos, Kano, Enugu, Anambra, Adamawa, Niger, Jigawa, Zamfara, Edo, Ogun, Osun, Borno, Taraba, FCT Abuja, and other states. The report further revealed that 25 staff were already found guilty in Rivers and were punished accordingly. In addition, the affected staff in the areas where their investigation was not conclusive were redeployed into other states from their former stations (INEC, 2017).

The INEC suspended the 202 staff that were indicted and placed them on half salary pending on the outcome of the investigation before the next action to be taken. Apart from the INEC staff, the court also arrested some bankers for their involvement in the allegations of the N23 billion bribery scandal and some top oil companies who were believed to have provided the money for the former Minister of Petroleum to bribe the INEC staff. The court asked them to refund the sum given to them in the process of trial while many of the INEC officials were reprimanded in prison for their involvement in the scandal (EFCC, 2017).

The above statements so far indicated the level in which the 2015 General Election was corrupted by politicians and INEC officials. The table earlier presented disclosed the involvement of top serving and retired military generals, top PDP members, oil companies, prominent personalities from other parties and groups as well as organisations. The other analysis revealed the level of corruption allegations against the electoral body staff and other politicians. Apart from the amount involved which

is terribly huge, the campaign spending did not consider any constitutional limit in the process.

Apart from the above categories, other politicians were also paraded by EFCC as involved in the corrupt practices during the 2015 General Election. Many are still uncovered by various investigations across the country. For instance, money was found worth \$50 (N18, 168, 623, 337.98 billion) in the house of Director National Intelligence Agency in Lagos in which one of the staff of the agency revealed to the EFCC that it was part of the loot for the diverted money meant for President Jonathan's campaign in the 2015 Presidential Election as reported by many national dailies in April 2017. This disclosed that apart from the arms scandal and INEC staff bribery, there are many billions of Dollars diverted from the national treasury for corruption act in the 2015 General Election.

In another separate report by EFCC in 2017, nine serving Senators were enmeshed in various cases of corruption scandals and criminal charges worth billions of Naira and that represent a total of 10% of the upper house. The affected Senators were undergoing trials in various courts of law in their respective states for their crimes. Most of them were former Governors in their respective states (EFCC, 2017). Their cases might not be directly related to the 2015 General Election corruption cases but, it is indicating the serious lapses in the legal unit of the country where about 10 % of the lawmakers are not only corrupt but also criminals. It is extremely terrible for Nigerian state. Perhaps, this has been mentioned by one of the informants in category B (Party Stakeholders that majority of the lawmakers are corrupt and criminals which

means there will never be enforcement of rules related to political financing and electoral regulations in the country.

In another report by EFCC, it was disclosed that the Commission is now hunting many top politicians in Gombe from PDP party for their alleged involvement in bribing the INEC officials to the tune of millions of Naira precisely N388 million (\$1, 069, 407.06). The Accountant Gombe State Government House Mohammed Balbaya was detained for his role in the disbursement of the funds to sway the 2015 election result in favour of the PDP in the State. In the field work, one of the serving Members House of Assembly attested to me that he has a text message evidence of the corrupt scandals and bribes given to the INEC staff and the tribunal for the judgement in the election in the State (EFCC, 2017).

The former Minister of Petroleum Diezani Allison Maduekwe was already involved in multi million Dollars and Pounds corruption scandals involving money laundering, purchasing of expensive assets and stashing of millions of Dollars and Pounds in US, UK and Italy. The governments of the three countries are now charging her with many corruption count charges together with some of her associates like Omokore and Aluko (Sahara Reporters New York, 2017). It should be recalled that, it is the same Minister that was reported under her watch of the missing USD20 billion in 2013 by the former Central Bank of Nigeria Governor Sanusi Lamido Sanusi and she also played the role of bribing INEC staff of N23 billion during the 2015 General Election on behalf of the PDP and many other allegations.

Apart from the external corruption charges, the Minister of Petroleum also faced corruption scandals at home recently as discovered by the EFCC. The EFCC traced in cash and properties a sum of N47.2 billion (USD487.5 million) found in different parts of the country most especially in largest cities like Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt. It follows a painstaking investigation by the EFCC officials to uncover such heavy corruption practices by the former Minister (EFCC, 2017). This amount is a discovery which might not be complete from just one Minister in President Jonathan's Regime. What if all other Ministers, Governors and political office holders of his time were also investigated? There will be revelations of course of trillions of Naira stolen and squandered all in preparation for winning of the 2015 General Election at all cost. In the process of looting for the election, the politicians helped themselves in diverting some of the money into their private pockets.

In another news briefing, the EFCC in the Southeast geo-political zone revealed that it recovers N553.17 million (USD1, 521, 422.01) from corrupt politicians in the zone. This was revealed by the zonal head of operation of the Commission Mr. Johnson Babalola. The zonal head of operation further explained that the recovered funds were part of the PDP campaign finances for the 2015 General Election in the zone. He said, we have recovered the sum of N300 (USD818, 711.210) million out of N400 (USD1, 089, 322.35) million in Ebonyi State, N82.5 (USD226, 522.05) million out of N450 (USD1, 235, 574.83) million in Abia State and N60 (USD164, 897.63) million in Enugu out of N450 million (USD1, 235, 574.83). "However, we are facing some challenges in Anambra and Imo, but, the Commission is working on them" said the head of operation (EFCC, 2017).

In a Conference in State House Abuja, the Chairman of the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption Itse Sagay disclosed that, fifty top government officials and private businessmen allegedly diverted about \$7.5 billion (N1.35 trillion at that time) to themselves between 2006 and 2013 at the expense of ordinary Nigerians (Sagay, 2017). This analysis excludes the period from 2014 to 2015 where unprecedented crazy looting and squander of Nigerian treasury took place courtesy of election.

Another report is that by the Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC) and Transparency International UK in 2017 which revealed that the former Nigerian army chiefs stole as much as \$15 billion (N5, 444, 183, 780, 011.50 trillion) through fraudulent arms procurement deals. The above explanation disclosed only one sector of the economy for a short period of a time possibly from 2010 to 2015 during the peak years of the war against Boko Haram and the PDP rule. If other sectors are also taken and investigated, it might reveal an unbelievable figure which can freeze one's breath. Some of the fraudulent deals might not lack relevance with the diversion of funds for arresting the 2015 General Election by the then ruling PDP. This has been established already in the arms deal above.

The Vice President of Nigeria Professor Yemi Osinbajo lamented that the PDP used public funds for the 2015 General Election during an Inter Party Advisory Council (IPAC) conference on July 25, 2016. He stressed that, political parties should refrain from diverting funds means for public services into party campaigns, disclosing that EFCC was investigating some PDP stalwarts because the party diverted money meant for public services to fund political campaigns (Osinbajo, 2016).

Despite all the shocking revelations on the involvement of PDP members, INEC officials, retired and serving military generals, oil companies and many groups in the country in the corruption allegations during the 2015 General Election, there is no yet any report so far of allegations against APC members from any person or organisation. The only source that reveals to this research that APC members too were involved in bribery and corruption during the 2015 General Election was information from some section of the informants during the field survey. Since their information is based on privilege information and experience, it can be established that, APC members too are corrupt, but the level of their bribery is very low compared to that of the PDP and there was no evidence in documented form to prove any allegations so far against them. This is the point that most of the informants used to justify the credibility of the elections considering that PDP spent crazily while APC spent less yet, PDP lost while APC won.

In taking the above statistics to conclude on the general indices and level of corruption in Nigeria not only in the electoral process, there are many reports and works that show the magnitude of the stolen funds from Nigeria for many decades. One of such reports is that by Chatham House on 17 May, 2017 which disclosed that, at least USD480 billion (N173, 915, 225, 875, 776.00 one hundred and seventy three trillion and nine hundred and fifteen billion and two hundred and twenty five million and eight hundred and seventy five thousand and seven hundred and seventy six) was stolen from Nigeria by its rulers in the period of 54 years; that is after political independence. A semblance of that report was presented earlier in 2015 by African Union indicating that about N6.87 trillion was stolen in Nigeria from the date of political independence to date. If the above amount was converted from the rate of Naira/Dollar exchange in 2015

(\$1=175) into the current rate as at 2017 (\$1=360) it will give approximately around N13 trillion. The report comes closer to that of Chatham House in this regard.

The most indicting and condemning report which goes beyond the 2015 General Election on corruption is the recent report released on August 2017 by National Bureau of Statistics in conjunction with United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the European Union which summarise in its conclusion that 95 percent of Nigerians are corrupt showing that an overwhelming percentage of Nigerians will accept a bribe when offered or pay a bribe when demanded. The report shows that only 5.3 % of Nigerians will either refuse to pay a bribe when asked to or refuse to accept when a bribe is offered to them. According to the report, a sum of N400 billion (USD1, 105, 792, 754.64 billion) was given in bribe to public officials from 2015 to 2016. According to the report, the Police is by far the most corrupt with 46.4 % followed by Judiciary with 33.6 %. Other public agencies with high prevalence of corruption are Immigration Service 30.7 %, tax/revenue agencies 27.3 % and Customs 26.5%.

The above report indicted almost all Nigerians in corruption acts which means that, all the allegations and revelations in the 2015 General Election cannot only be true but it was under estimated. Thus, the 2015 General Election is a revelation in a new direction towards the role of corruption in obliterating democratic practices and good governance.

In another version, the EFCC Chairman Ibrahim Magu in a conference on Wednesday 30th August 2017 and in an interview with BBCHausa section said that the Commission recovered over N409, 270, 686.75 billion, USD69, 501, 156.67, Euro230,

000, GBP443, 000 and 7, 500 Riyal from January 2017 to August 2017 alone. The amount was discovered from corrupt politicians and there are much, some still are undergoing investigations which is inconclusive. This indicated the extent of corruption and corrupt practices in Nigeria. If such amount can be recovered in eight months, what if the fight against corruption is sustained for many years. Trillions can be recovered. This means the above reports by Chatham House and African Union and many others that claimed billions of Dollars and trillions of Naira were stolen from Nigerian treasury is accurate.

6.5 Impact of Political Party Financing on the Integrity of the 2015 General Election

Political party financing has many implications or impacts on the entire process and the outcome of the 2015 General Election. One of these outcomes is corruption and its effects on Nigerian society. Another impact is the question of the integrity of the election which has been adjudged as credible by local observers, international observers, scholars (Chukwudi 2015, IRI 2015, NDI 2015, Commonwealth Observer Group 2015, African Union 2015, Omilusi 2016, Ewi 2015 and Nwofe 2015). If the huge amount of money spent has been taken into consideration critically by the observers and scholars in the campaign process, it will pose a serious challenge and credibility question on the election that they have believed to have been the best. Most of them attributed the credibility to the issue of the opposition winning against the incumbent party. The excessive use of money challenge the integrity of the election as observed in its manifestation above and in the impacts discussed below.

Politically, the cost of corruption is damaging. That is certainly the experience of Nigeria since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999. Since access to wealth is guaranteed by elective and appointive positions, political appointments and elections have become do or die affairs. At the economic level, the consequences of corruption, especially in a developing country like Nigeria is not palatable. Indeed, the damaging effect of corruption on administrative development and efficiency can be very extensive and variegated. Corruption has real consequences on the life of Nigerians. The Nigerian economy has been in comatose despite its enormous resources and potential for growth and development. For example, the Human Development Report in 2011 shows that about 70% of Nigerians is living below poverty line or less than \$1 per day (Ogundiya, 2012:58).

Thus, some of the informants consulted below expressed that, political party financing process in the 2015 General Election has the following impact on the election and it led to the following.

6.5.1 Vote Buying

Many informants or almost all of them in all the six categories agreed and expressed the view that vote buying took place in the 2015 General Election. According to one of the informants:

“I witnessed a situation in my constituency where the PDP was openly buying votes at the rate of N500 but when they sensed a clear defeat they raised the amount to N1000 and many electorates voted for them on this account” (Personal interview with an informant in category F1, 16th June 2017).

In another opinion from an informant, he narrated that:

“The 2015 General Election was the most expensive and the most volatile where money was crazily used in vote buying and most especially by the ruling PDP in its desperateness to win at all cost” (interview with an informant category B3 13th June 2017).

However, there is an informant who believed that both the APC and the PDP were engaged in vote buying during the 2015 General Election where he stated that:

“All the parties bought votes in the election and also all the parties attempted to rig or even rigged to a certain extent it is only that, that of the ruling PDP was terrible because they spent I can confirm to you billions or trillions of naira in the election and yet lost” (interview with an informant in category B1 30th June, 2017).

Another informant who witnessed the vote buying physically during the 2015 General Election narrated his experience below:

“I witnessed a case of politicians from both the APC and the PDP in my area that came with millions of Naira in their cars and distribute for voters on a certain agreed amount for each vote. Where will such money come from if not public account where billions of dollars were unaccounted since 2013”? (Personal interview with an informant in category F4, 16th June 2017).

This view is also shared by another informant who agreed that:

“Vote buying was a normal practice in the election while we are now learning how our national treasury was wasted by very few selfish greedy politicians because they are desperate to retain power at all cost” (Personal interview with an informant in category F3, 16th June 2017).

Other studies also confirmed the incidence of vote buying in the 2015 General Election including USAID/UKAID 2015, Nwagwu 2015, Ayanda & Odunayo 2015, Omilusi 2016 and Olorunmola 2016. This clearly confirms that vote buying took place when the views of the informants and the scholars are considered together.

In addition, vote buying is a cliental activity and therefore, the choice of Clientalism as one of the theories to explain this work is appropriate in this regard. This is because the candidates and the voters are engaged in a patron-client relationship or rather one of the aspects of Clientalism took place if votes are bought with cash or kind to favour a given candidate. The aim is for mutual benefit among the groups involved. It is a kind of corrupt practices perpetuated under cliental relationship.

The collection of money to vote for a candidate and the payment of money by candidates to get elected into public offices are perceived as immoral or corrupt practices to some extent but the actors themselves might see it as a rational decision based known to them for specific reason and if that is the case, then the theory of Rational Choice of Election is applicable here also practically. Thus, both the theories can explain what the informants and scholars mentioned above precisely.

6.5.2 Bribery

Another impact of political party financing is electoral corruption that took place in the 2015 General Election in form of bribery. Many of the informants presented an argument that, bribery took place at all levels including electoral officials, security agencies, traditional rulers, religious clerics, party stakeholders, power brokers and all

those that are either directly or indirectly related to the election. In their summarised views:

“Bribery existed in the entire process of election in the 2015 particularly the recent revelations of the INEC staff that are involved in bribery scandal by the ruling PDP which is still under investigation involving billions of naira and the \$2.1 billion arms scandal which was shared among top dignitaries including politicians, parties’ stakeholders, traditional rulers, religious clerics and electoral officials” (Personal interview with an informant in category D3, 22nd May 2017).

In addition to the above, another informant revealed that:

“Bribery allegations in the 2015 General Election made the Nigerian state a laughing stock among the comity of nations because of the insensitivity in the wastage of public funds towards bribing electoral officials, party stakeholders and other groups in a desperate bid to win the election at all cost” (Personal interview with an informant in category E3, 6th June 2017).

Furthermore, another informant stressed that:

“Many INEC staff were allegedly bribed by the PDP members to rig the 2015 Election in favour of the party. It clearly depicts how rotten our bureaucrats and politicians have turned into making our election a ridicule” (Personal interview with an informant in category D2, 27th June 2017).

Also, it has been added that:

“Bribery scandal became so pronounced in the recently concluded 2015 General Election despite the improvement in the electoral conduct, the recent disclosure of excessive spending and bribing of electoral officials and corruption allegations against public office

holders means our democracy is still not matured and our election needs a serious overhauling” (Personal interview with an informant in category D5, 14th May 2017).

The above position or information of the informants was supported directly by USAID/UKAID 2015, EFCC 2017 and INEC 2017 which asserted the view that bribery is one of the types of electoral corruption that took place in the 2015 General Election.

In the above data, one can see physically the influence of the theories used in the research. A good example is the clientalist nature that took place in terms of the bribery where various groups were paid off to compromise for the power brokers to have access into power through a mutual benefit of material gain. Bribery itself in the government cycle or electoral process is part of Clientalism and it has occurred here as revealed by the informants in their various submissions.

The second example is the Rational Choice Theory of Election in which the candidates and their support groups found it expedient to bribe their way into power thinking that even if it is a corrupt or illegal act, it will favour their emergence and hence, saw it as a rational choice. The groups that were bribed by politicians too saw it as a rational choice to collect easy money in millions that they might not get for many years in their daily business or income. They found the act as a means of enriching themselves quickly. It might look rational to them which it is, even if it is irrational by law.

6.5.3 Excessive Spending

In addition, another issue of political party financing that took place in the 2015 General Election is the issue of excessive money spending or spending above the set maximum campaign spending limit by the two major parties. The informants that were interviewed attested to that position in these words:

“The private financing continue to be the major source of campaign activities, there is and will never be any transparency or regulations that can be applicable or obtainable because we have all witnessed how politicians spent crazily in the 2015 General Election both the ruling PDP and the opposition APC yet, nobody question their source of campaign expenditure and nobody dare do that. Rules were violated, and regulations were ignored. The outcome is Nigerian election has been made more expensive in the future and our democracy has become the business where who has the highest capital will continue to emerge” (Personal interview with an informant in category A6 21st May 2017 and informant in category D4 18th June 2017).

In another view, an informant believed that, excessive spending is the only problem that one can question the credibility of the 2015 General Election. In his words:

“The 2015 General Election is a victory for democracy, victory for the voters, victory for the concern citizens in Nigeria because of the great improvement in the conduct in terms of the use of card reader, use of media freely for both the contestants, less intimidation, less violence and many other significant achievements. The only issue which can question the success and victory of the election is the unprecedented mobilisation of national resources by the ruling and opposition parties to arrest victory in the election. Here, it left much to be desired seriously and I think is the aspect that the present APC government should quickly look into against the 2019 election” (Personal interview with an informant in category B2 19th June 2017).

In another view, another informant mentioned that despite the fact that election was conducted in 2015 peacefully and successfully, there are still some lapses that made the election faced irregularities and must be addressed where he said:

“We are not saying that the 2015 General Election totally is hitch free and a complete success but at least it is a great improvement that succeeds particularly the way we conducted it peacefully. There are many challenges faced that we must address in our future elections for instance, the way politicians and their parties used money unregulated and beyond imagination made the election the most expensive and if care is not taken in future until such money was spent, election cannot be successful for them and it is not feasible to spend such crazy amount of money again, indeed, it is a dilemma for us” (Personal interview with an informant in category C1 11th June 2017).

From the above diverse views, one can see that even the informants themselves despite all their expressions of enthusiasm with the success and improvement of the election in the 2015, they expressed a cynical concern and fear in future election as a result of the excessive use of money in the process of political party financing which if it is not address might become a setback to the success recorded.

The above proposition indicates that Rational Choice of Election is obtainable because the excessive spending during the political party financing in the 2015 General Election is from the part of the candidates and their parties a rational or wise choice to do all that they can to win. It is good according to rationalist to study the environment and the competitor before making a vital decision. The parties and their candidates realised that, the Nigerian environment is all about politics of money and they therefore deployed enough resources to secure victory. The electorates on the other hand are operating in the environment of poverty, unemployment and lack of critical

infrastructure therefore, they have realised that some politicians failed in their performance and the only way to benefit from them is to get their share since they are now desperate to win at all cost.

On the other hand, excessive spending denotes Clientalism in its operation because there was an exchange of benefit among the patron-broker-client in terms of electoral victory. The patron (candidates and their parties) felt they must offer a negotiable benefit to the electorates to secure their support. The brokers (agents/godfathers) felt they must work in between their candidates and the electorates to secure a deal for electoral victory by connecting the two groups in a financial relationship. The voters on the other hand felt that, for the parties to secure their support and approval for electoral victory they need an instant benefit and not a deferred promise that might not be fulfilled after electoral victory at the end of it, money must exchange hands and since there are competitors from both side, the highest bidder got his way and it was because of that we witnessed excessive spending.

6.5.4 Socioeconomic Problems

One of the greatest impacts of political party financing in the 2015 General Election is creation of socioeconomic problems in the post-election period which should have been avoided should the money spent have been utilised in other vital national sectors. For instance, one of the informants stressed that:

“The \$2.1 billion Dasuki money that the PDP diverted for its campaign expenditure in the 2015 General Election might have been used for its statutory function, procure weapons and deal a Boko Haram a decisive blow prior to the election. Many lives and properties worth billions would have been save now. But, the Boko Haram remains relevant still

attacking and killing innocent souls as a result of that act of politicians. This explains why two years after assumption of office, the APC government is still confused on how to tackle the Boko haram menace because the damage was done since” (Personal interview with an informant in category E2 27th May 2017).

Again, another informant saw the socioeconomic impacts of the political party financing from the perspective of the APC campaign promise of fighting corruption in which he mentioned:

“The APC made it clear in one of its manifestos that it will fight corruption without fear or favour but, because of the excessive spending by godfathers from illegal sources to the government of President Muhammadu Buhari during campaign, his hands are now tight and a serious setback is now witnessed in the entire process with many corruption allegations involving his party members being swept under the carpet. The war against corruption is failing seriously” (Personal interview with an informant in category F216th June 2017).

The above view has been supported by Animashaun (2015) where he stated that, the too much hope on this government cannot be met because of the many socioeconomic obstacles and corrupt party members that the government must carry on especially those who spent much for the success of the party in the election.

Yet, another informant saw the impact of excessive spending or political party financing process in the 2015 General Election as the future economic trouble that the country and its citizens will face because the treasury was emptied as he said:

“The APC government will really suffer in its attempt to fulfill the change promise it made to the electorates because the public treasury was emptied completely by the PDP government before leaving office

in 2015 spending carelessly from the public purse to secure electoral victory at all cost and when they lost, they resorted to helping themselves with the public money where the last few days before hand over became a looting bazaar and believe me, this is a difficult situation that will impede APC from achieving its goal of ushering in a positive change that will affect the lives of the millions of people in the country”(Personal interview with an informant in category E129th June 2017).

In another similar view but different from the above, another informant revealed that:

“The issue is of course we know that people and well-meaning Nigerians worked hard to secure victory against the sixteen years of PDP misgovernance but, the reality on ground made the happiness to be reversed because the way they looted the public treasury dry and used foreign currencies crazily will affect our economy and strength of our currency couple with a sharp fall in the price of crude oil in the world market which is the sole means of foreign exchange for Nigeria, I pity the APC leadership honestly”(Personal interview with an informant in category F816th June 2017).

In this regard also, Animashaun’s (2015) view is evident because now the APC government is battling with many challenges making the Nigerian electorate still feeling unsecured not satisfied with the expected change they are anticipating. Here, Clientalism took place in the sense that, those who sponsored the APC party and its Presidential candidate into power used their resources to bargain for a safe landing because most of them are PDP decampees and former public servants being charged with different corrupt allegations.

For instance, one of the major financiers of the 2015 General Election for President Muhammadu Buhari is Senator Bukola Saraki who emerged presently as Senate President in the country. Few days after his inauguration, he was charged with corruption allegations of failure to declare his genuine assets as required by law when he was sworn in as the Governor of Kwara State. The Senate rallied behind him and declared a war against the executive to the extent that, they decided not to approve any appointment or budget or bill from the Presidency until the charges are dropped. The charges were later dropped becoming a slap in the face of the APC's war against corruption. The Clientalism here is the use of resources by some individuals to save their neck against corruption charges in the APC government.

6.6 Research Findings


The research discovered the following drawing from the various views, opinions and information of the informants, scholars, reports and other materials on the subject matter.

- a) The election in the 2015 is the most free, fair and credible in the history of elections in the Fourth Republic from 1999 to date;
- b) There were attempts to rig the elections in the 2015 by political actors most especially the ruling party then PDP but it was detected and halted;
- c) The credibility of the elections was as a result of the introduction of various measures such as smart card readers;
- d) The 2015 General Election recorded success as a result of improvement in the electoral processes and a credible leadership in the Commission;
- e) The 2015 General Election is the most expensive election in the history of Nigeria, Africa and even one of the most expensive world over and that

- questions the credibility that has been widely acclaimed by observers and many scholars because the spending affected the outcome of the election and beyond;
- f) The electorates became wiser and resilience in allowing money politics to influence their voting behaviour to a certain limit;
 - g) The regulations on political financing was faulty and leaves a loophole for corrupt practices by allowing for funding from unknown sources;
 - h) The maximum financial limit spending for various elective offices is not feasible and needs to be revisited as it is too low for most of the offices;
 - i) The provisions of maximum financial spending for political parties and candidates was vehemently violated by all parties and its contestants;
 - j) There is a weak legal enforcement regime for violators of the electoral rules and the electoral body is incapable of sanctioning the violators due to lack of cooperation from politicians;
 - k) Campaign funds were sourced from legal and dubious or illegal means including looting from public treasury and sponsorship from political godfathers;
 - l) There was an unprecedented campaign spending never witnessed in the history of the country running in trillions;
 - m) Corruption occurred massively in the electoral process in the 2015 involving politicians, government officials, government agencies, staff of electoral commission and many different groups and prominent Nigerians from all parts of the country;
 - n) The corruption cases run in billions and trillions of Naira accruing from the crazy sharing of the money looted or diverted from public funds;

- o) Investigations revealed that money meant for statutory functions in public services were used to fund the election of PDP in the 2015 General Election;
- p) The public funds that were looted and bribed various groups left the country after the 2015 General Election with an empty treasury leading to financial crisis in the country after the election and;
- q) The new leadership found it very difficult to fight corruption because of its long-standing influence on all aspects of Nigerians' life and reports indicated that it is still continuous, and it is also becoming difficult for the APC government to fulfill its campaign promises because of the romance with the corrupt politicians and the socioeconomic situation it met on ground.

The above findings and the overall discussions and analysis of the research are summarised or illustrated in a designed model by the researcher as presented below:






Figure 6.1 Model Explaining the Linkage between 2015 General Election, Political Party Financing and Theoretical Approach

Source: Developed by the Researcher 2017

The above model was designed by the researcher as an overall illustration and analytical interpretation of the basic components of the research work and their relationship. The centre angle (orange colour) indicates the case study of the research which is the 2015 General Election and the circle above it directly shows the investigated issue of the research which is political party financing (blue colour). Other components explained the activities that took place in the process of financing of the 2015 General Election and how they influence the main subjects which are the political party financing and the election.

From the right, the purple colour square angle indicates the outcome of the investigation of this research from the field on the factors which are sixteen in number that led to the success and improvement in the overall conduct of the 2015 General Election. Some of the factors were obtainable in the previous elections such as civil societies, international observers and money politics but, many of the factors such as card reader, improved electoral umpire, strong opposition, voters' rationality, massive decamping and other mentioned factors were absent during the previous elections. This made this research to conclude that there was an improvement and success to some extent in the 2015 General Election especially in comparison with the past ones in the current Republic. The green arrow that pointed towards the orange angle indicates the relationship or the effects of the factors on the election.

In the left-hand side, the ash colour square indicates the major sources of political party financing identified by this research from the field work as supported by many existing literatures also on the subject matter. The sources are six and the arrow from the box pointed towards the circle of political party financing showing the source of the

activities there in. in the left hand side below the square box is an octagon with a light pink colour showing how the sources of political party financing are spent during campaign expenditure in the 2015 General Election showing many illegalities and corrupt practices as discovered from the field. Thus, the small maroon arrow that pointed towards the angle of the case study from the octagon indicates how the election was sponsored and the influence of the sources and spending on the election especially raising an integrity question since it is recorded as a success by previous researches. With the recent discovery of huge illegality, can the credibility be unanimously accepted in this regard?

From below the entire boxes are two theories used in the research. The Rational Choice Theory of Election and Clientalism merged together to explain the context and relationship of the components. It can be seen that the two arrows from each of the theory pointed towards the two major boxes; the 2015 General Election and political party financing showing that they are directly related to them and are influenced by them at the same time.

In the two theories, it can be observed a two-edge arrow pointing towards the box of the success of election and the campaign spending and sources of political party financing indicating that they have explain, apply and relate to the issues discovered and the issues too are related to them and can influence them with a reciprocal relationship.

In essence, the research or model revealed that while the 2015 General Election is seen unanimously by many analysts and scholars as credible, it is agreed by this work that

there was a significant improvement in the conduct of the election but, it is overall integrity has been affected by illicit political party financing which has the impact of determining how the outcome was shaped as a result of money politics and excessive spending. In conclusion, the research is drawing the attention of researchers and policymakers not to relax and allow such illegalities to occur again because it has negative impact on the election's outcome and future implications for democracy.

6.7 Summary

The chapter analysed in detail the impact of political party financing in the process of electoral conduct in Nigeria in the 2015 General Election. The impacts were discussed and analysed in thematic forms where some impacts were identified such as electoral corruption, causes, its manifestations and how the political party financing affected the outcome of the election and the aftermath. Literature contribution was made in this chapter also from the informants' views and the theories adopted in the work were applied practically in the analysis and discussion. A model was designed as a part of contribution of this research in explaining the findings. The research findings were also presented in the chapter drawing from the discussions that were presented sequentially from the antecedent chapters to the present one. The next chapter will conclude the research work with recommendations and suggestions for further work in the area.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this chapter, the summary of the entire work is presented alone with conclusion and recommendations as well as all the sources consulted.

7.1 Summary

This research work investigated the impact of political party financing in Nigeria's Fourth Republic and how it affected the process of the 2015 General Election as the case study. The research work attempted in contribution to knowledge through the identified research gap. The major problem identified is how the political actors used public funds in sponsoring their campaign expenditure and it leads to spending of much money above the maximum limit which affects the electoral process and outcome all accruing from corrupt practices. The work saw the problem as a serious one because it affects election which is a major backbone of democratic rule, causes poor governance and corruption thereby depriving Nigerians of the opportunity to benefit from the abundant resources endowment that it possesses.

The major objectives that the research investigated include examination of the impact of political party financing on the integrity and credibility of the 2015 General Election in relation with what made the election different from the previous ones in the Fourth Republic, analysing the rules and regulations provided for political party financing and campaign spending in the Fourth Republic and whether the maximum limit set for campaign spending in the elective offices in Nigeria from Presidential to

Councillorship levels are adhered to or violated and the extent to which the electoral body monitor and sanction the violators and the role played by corruption in determining the 2015 General Election outcome.

The research used qualitative method of data collection specifically interview and focus group discussion with some selected informants identified because of their knowledge, experience and relationship in the area of study. The research is a case study which studied a specific event; the 2015 General Election. About 29 informants were identified in six categories and interviewed during the data collection which took place in Nigeria. The informants were identified and interviewed in various parts of the country, organisations and agencies that are associated with the topic of study.

The research used the data obtained from the field and existing literature in the area to reach its findings and conclusion. Recommendations were made or given based on the current situation that the research discovered. The study is a pioneer investigation in some of its discoveries as they are yet to be documented academically so far since the issues on the subject discussed are still ongoing as at the time of the work. It is not inconclusive other researchers in the field can build on the future revelations to add substance to the discoveries made in this work.

7.2 Conclusion

The study concludes that, the 2015 General Election is credible and an improvement positively in terms of the conduct and administration of the election as compared to the previous ones. All the reports, scholastic writings and informants contacted in the work attested to the fact that, the 2015 General Election is better, improved, credible,

free and fair comparatively with the previous four elections conducted in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011. The major factors that made the election credible are many including among others; the use of electronic card readers for accreditation and voting, improvement in the electoral body management and operation, merging of major opposition parties to form a strong opposition party that challenged the ruling party, campaign freely and media accessibility to all parties, social media explosion, misgovernance by the ruling PDP, rationality of the electorates, campaign on issues instead of ethnic, regional and religious sentiments and other factors already discussed in the work previously.

The research also concludes that, despite the claim for credibility in the 2015 General Election, there is no election in the history of the country that recorded the massive use of money spending in billions and trillions of Naira (billions of dollars) by both the ruling PDP then and opposition APC although; APC was discovered to have spent less than a quarter of what the PDP spent. Yet, the spending failed to secure victory for the PDP which is a good sign of ethical conduct from voters and the electoral body that Nigerian democracy is improving, and money politics is drastically losing its influence in determining the outcome of elections in future in Nigeria.

The study also concludes that, the existing rules and regulations on political financing and campaign spending provided in some sections of the Constitution and Electoral Act 2010 are articulated clearly but not adequate to cater for a transparent and accountable political funding. The provision for private and personal funding allows for a loophole in the activities of politicians towards campaign expenditure. There is no any means of monitoring the sources of finance for campaign and this is a gap that

allows for corrupt politicians and public office holders to loot from the public treasury and used godfathers to sponsor their campaigns in return for lucrative contracts and shoddy deals.

The research also concludes that, the campaign spending in the 2015 General Election is outrageous and beyond the maximum limit set by the Electoral Act. The funds were established to have been diverted from their statutory public functions and channeled into PDP campaign expenditure including the diversion of arms money \$2.1 billion and other oil revenues from the oil companies. The expenditure is to the tune of trillions of Naira spent by the ruling PDP then and APC. The process was corrupted entirely.

The research concludes that corruption occurred in the entire process of the conduct of the 2015 General Election affecting the election and its outcome but to a lesser extent because the culprits involved in the process lost the elections woefully. All categories and groups that are considered as power brokers in the country were bribed such as security service chiefs, party stakeholders, INEC officials, politicians particularly PDP members, traditional rulers, religious clerics, civil societies, voters and all those that are involved in the election either directly or indirectly bribing anybody that cares to accept all in order to win and in which they unfortunately lost.

The defeat of PDP set a new page in Nigerian history for the first time where an incumbent was defeated on the throne despite all the powers of incumbency but, the aftermath of the massive corruption that took place and looting from the PDP government throw the country in serious economic mess and abject deprivation. It

made the current government of Muhammadu Buhari to face the dilemma of failure to fulfill its campaign promises as it has no financial muscles to undertake them.

7.3 Recommendations

The research recommends that:

- (a) For future elections to be improved and more credible, the use of electronic card reader should be adopted constitutionally since it has succeeded in curbing election rigging drastically. The executive should send the bill to the National Assembly for passing into law. Not only election and accreditation, the collation also should be made electronically to avoid alteration of results;
- (b) There should be a strict law on campaign expenditure sources which should identify the candidates and follow their track records in offices, measure their income and determine the legality or illegality of the sources. All candidates with illegal sources should be automatically disqualified;
- (c) The maximum amount of campaign spending provided in the Electoral Acts should be revisited and reviewed upward in consideration with inflationary trend in the country and to avoid illegal spending and corruption in the process. It should be revisited in the following way;

Table 7.1

Recommendation for Maximum Spending Limit for Various Elective Offices in Future Elections in Nigeria

Position	Spending Limit
Presidential Candidate	N10 billion (\$31, 838, 709.1 million)
Governorship Candidate	N1 billion (\$3,183, 870.9 million)
Senatorial Candidate	N200 million (\$636, 774.2 thousand)

Member	Federal	House	of	N100 million (\$318, 387.1 thousand)
Representatives				
State House of Assembly Members			N10 million (\$31, 838.71 thousand)	
LG Chairman Candidate			N10 million (\$31, 838.71 thousand)	
LG Councillorship Election			N1 million (\$3, 183.871 thousand)	
Source: Researcher 2017				

- (d) A proposal should be made to monitor campaign spending in three stages, before the commencement of political activities intending contestants must declare their assets and their sources, during campaign the assets should be reviewed and after the elections;
- (e) The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) should be involved in the election process and make to work constitutionally with INEC in collaboration through monitoring and screening of all politicians with corruption records or corruption allegations in which anybody that is indicted should be disqualified or banned from active politics;
- (f) Political office holders should be made to compulsorily declared their assets on assumption of duty, a quarterly audit of their assets should be made and when leaving office or contesting for re-election again;
- (g) INEC should enforce auditing of political parties on quarterly basis since they have a constitutional backing for that. Any party that fails should be banned from participating in the next election as a punishment;
- (h) INEC should establish a unit or reinforce civil societies in civic voter awareness as it did in 2015 on the sensitivity of election and the need to avoid illegal practices during polls such as vote selling and rigging for politicians;

- (i) The welfare of electoral body staff should be maximised to deter them from collecting bribe from politicians during the conduct of election;
- (j) All those that are found currently involved in the corruption scandals during the 2015 General Election should be severely punished to discouraged others from the act after all the money they have received was recovered and
- (k)The government from its own part should endeavour to improve the general standard of living of the electorates so as to prevent vote buying and other election malpractices. Poverty, unemployment, education, health and other infrastructures should be attended to rapidly to improve living standard which will reduce the influence of money politics in the future.

7.4 Limitations of the Research and Suggestions for Further Work

The research has limitations in covering the areas that fall within the category of this subject matter because of many constraints such as time, resources and personal issues. Thus, it only succeeded in making contribution to knowledge based on the capacity of the researcher but, still there is need for further investigation into the area in future.

It is suggested that for researchers that wanted to dwell into this subject matter, should look into the aspects of electoral reforms and electoral conduct, role of anti-graft agencies in election conduct, corruption and political party financing in Nigeria in future election using comparison of the previous works etc. These are the areas that the researcher suggested other investigators should investigate.

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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: INFORMANTS' DESIGNATION AND DATE OF INTERVIEW

S/NO	INFORMANT'S DESIGNATION	CATEGORY	ORGANISATION	AREA OF EXPERTISE	INTERVIEW DATE
1.	Serving Senator	A1	National Assembly	Politician/ Law making	02 nd June 2017
2.	Serving Member House of Reps	A2	National Assembly	Politician/Law making	07 th May 2017
3.	Governorship Candidate	A3	Aspirant	Politician	07 th June 2017
4.	Senatorial Contestant	A4	Aspirant	Politician	03 rd June 2017
5.	Member State House of Assembly	A5	State House of Assembly	Politician/Academician	02 nd May 2017
6.	Chairman Local Government Council	A6	Local Government Area	Politician	21 st May 2017
7.	National Publicity Secretary	B1	Peoples Democratic Party	Party Stakeholder	30 th June 2017
8.	National Treasurer	B2	All Progressive Congress	Party Stakeholder	19 th June 2017
9.	National Secretary and Director IPAC	B3	Social Democratic Party	Party Stakeholder	13 th June 2017
10.	Acting National Secretary	B4	Democratic People Party	Party Stakeholder	23 rd May 2017

11.	Director	C1	INEC	Political Party Monitoring	11 th June 2017
12.	Director	C2	INEC	Operations and Logistics	3 rd May 2017
13.	Director	C3	INEC	Finance and Audit	24 th June 2017
14.	Zonal Coordinator Northeast	D1	EFCC	Coordination of Anti-Graft Activities	17 th May 2017
15.	Publicity Officer Southwest	D2	EFCC	Public Relation and Information	27 th June 2017
16.	Senior Investigation Officer Southsouth	D3	EFCC	Investigation of corruption allegations	22 nd May 2017
17.	Deputy Zonal Coordinator	D4	EFCC	Coordination of Anti-graft activities	18 th June 2017
18.	Director Operations Abuja	D5	EFCC	Operation Activities for Anti-graft	4 th May 2017
19.	Professor of Political Science	E1	Bayero University Kano	Elections, Corruption and Political Parties	29 th June 2017
20.	Professor of Political Science	E2	Usmanu Dan Fodio Univ.	Corruption, Political Parties and Election	27 th May 2017
21.	Professor of Political Sociology	E3	Ahmadu Bello University	Election, Corruption and Social interaction	6 th June 2017
22.	Member: Northeast	F1	Civil Society	Election Monitoring and Public Awareness	16 th June 2017

23.	Member: Northwest	F2	Civil Society	Election Observer and Social Activism	16 th June 2017
24.	Member: Northcentral	F3	Civil Society	Election Monitoring and Peace Campaign	16 th June 2017
25.	Member: Southeast	F4	Civil Society	Election Observer and Conflict Resolution	16 th June 2017
26.	Member: Southwest	F5	Civil Society	Human Right Activist and Election Monitors	16 th June 2017
27.	Member: Southsouth	F6	Civil Society	Election Monitors and Human Rights Watch	16 th June 2017
28.	Member: FCT Abuja	F7	Civil Society	Human Right Activist and Transparency	16 th June 2017
29.	Member: FCT Abuja	F8	Civil Society	Transparency Advocacy and Human Rights	16 th June 2017

APPENDIX B: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CATEGORY A (POLITICIANS)

Good afternoon sir, my name is Babayo Sule PhD student Political Science Universiti Utara Malaysia; I am here for data collection. I am seeking for maximum cooperation from you and I pledge that all information provided from you would be treated with utmost confidence and secrecy thank you sir. As you know sir, the title of the topic is “Impact of Political Party Financing on Integrity of the 2015 General Election”. I am seeking or soliciting for your cooperation in responding to the following questions as where applicable.

1. Sir, which political office did you contested for in the 2015 General Election?
2. Sir, under which political party platform did you contested?
3. Are you familiar with the rules and regulations on political party financing in Nigeria?
4. What are the major sources of your campaign financing?
5. Have you restricted your campaign expenditure within the stipulated maximum financial spending limit?
6. Has the INEC monitor your campaign activities properly?
7. Do you think the maximum campaign spending limit set by the law is feasible?
8. Have you engaged in influencing voters with any financial or material benefit to vote for you?
9. Do you think the 2015 General Election is fair and credible?
10. Do you think the political party financing has influenced the process and outcome of your election?
11. What are your general comments on the overall credibility, political party financing and the integrity of the 201 General Election?

Thank you, sir!

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CATEGORY B (PARTY STAKEHOLDERS)

Good afternoon sir, my name is Babayo Sule PhD student Political Science Universiti Utara Malaysia; I am here for data collection. I am seeking for maximum cooperation from you and I pledge that all information provided from you would be treated with utmost confidence and secrecy thank you sir. As you know sir, the title of the topic is “Impact of Political Party Financing on Integrity of the 2015 General Election”. I am seeking or soliciting for your cooperation in responding to the following questions as where applicable.

1. Sir, did your party participate at all levels and in all the elective offices in the 2015 General Election?
2. Sir, is your party aware of the political party financing regulations during the 2015 General Election?
3. How did you source for your campaign funds during the election?
4. Have you offered sponsorship to your candidates or they sponsored themselves?
5. Did you adhere to the regulations on political party financing in terms of maximum spending limit?
6. Did your party attempted to influence voters with money or other promises of benefits?
7. Do you see the 2015 General Election as free, fair and credible?
8. Do you think the process of political party financing has impacts on the outcome of the 2015 General Election?
9. What are your general comments on the overall credibility, political party financing and the integrity of the 2015 General Election?

Thank you, sir!

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CATEGORY C (INEC SENIOR OFFICIALS)

Good afternoon sir, my name is Babayo Sule PhD student Political Science Universiti Utara Malaysia; I am here for data collection. I am seeking for maximum cooperation from you and I pledge that all information provided from you would be treated with utmost confidence and secrecy thank you sir. As you know sir, the title of the topic is “Impact of Political Party Financing on Integrity of the 2015 General Election”. I am seeking or soliciting for your cooperation in responding to the following questions as where applicable.

1. Sir, has your Commission receive enough fund for the conduct of the 2015 General Election?
2. Sir, did your Commission inform the contesting political parties and their candidates on the provisions on political party financing and the sanctions for violators?
3. Is your Commission allowed by law to receive funding from abroad?
4. How did you get your source of election funding?
5. Did your Commission monitor parties and candidates in their campaign spending to ensure compliance with the law?
6. Have you come across electoral malpractices or irregularities that affected the 2015 General Election?
7. If the above question is yes, does it affect your staff, organisation or the electoral process?
8. What are the major challenges that you face during the 2015 General Election?
9. Did you see the 2015 General Election as an improvement on the previous ones?
10. Have you notice any case of violation of election rules and regulations in terms of party financing or illegal funding or other forbidden acts?

11. If yes for the above question, then how did you respond to the issue?
12. What are the impacts of excessive spending by parties in the 2015 General Election on the integrity of the election and its outcome?
13. What are your general recommendations on the overall conduct of the 2015 General Election?

Thank you, sir!



QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CATEGORY D (EFCC SENIOR OFFICIALS)

Good afternoon sir, my name is Babayo Sule PhD student Political Science Universiti Utara Malaysia; I am here for data collection. I am seeking for maximum cooperation from you and I pledge that all information provided from you would be treated with utmost confidence and secrecy thank you sir. As you know sir, the title of the topic is “Impact of Political Party Financing on Integrity of the 2015 General Election”. I am seeking or soliciting for your cooperation in responding to the following questions as where applicable.

1. Sir, is your Organisation involved in the electoral process?
2. If yes, at what level sir?
3. Is your organisation mandated to investigate corrupt practices involving election malpractice and illegal campaign spending?
4. Have you received any corrupt case that is directly associated with the 2015 General Election?
5. If yes for the above question, who are those involved and what is the amount implication?
6. If yes for question 4 above, what is the level of investigation so far?
7. Do you think EFCC should be involved in the conduct of General Election in future in Nigeria?
8. Do you perceive the 2015 General Election as an improvement on the previous ones based on your organisational investigation in terms of financial breach by parties and politicians?
9. What are the impacts of excessive spending by parties in the 2015 General Election on the integrity of the election and its outcome?

10. What are your general comments on the overall conduct of the 2015 General Election and recommendations for future policy making?

Thank you!



QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CATEGORY E (ACADEMICIANS)

Good afternoon sir, my name is Babayo Sule PhD student Political Science Universiti Utara Malaysia; I am here for data collection. I am seeking for maximum cooperation from you and I pledge that all information provided from you would be treated with utmost confidence and secrecy thank you sir. As you know sir, the title of the topic is “Impact of Political Party Financing on Integrity of the 2015 General Election”. I am seeking or soliciting for your cooperation in responding to the following questions as where applicable.

1. Sir, are you involved in the process of electoral conduct in the 2015 General Election?
2. Have you conduct an academic investigation on the issue of political party financing, election and corruption in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic?
3. Sir, do you think the political parties and their candidates have the appropriate knowledge of regulations in political party financing in Nigeria?
4. Do the political parties adhere to the maximum campaign spending limit as stipulated by law?
5. What are the major sources of campaign financing for parties and candidates during the 2015 General Election?
6. Isn’t allowed constitutionally for INEC, parties and candidates to receive external funding?
7. Do you think the INEC monitor properly activities of political party financing with regard to financial spending?
8. How credible is the 2015 General Election in your own view?
9. What are the impacts of excessive spending by parties in the 2015 General Election on the integrity of the election and its outcome?

10. What are your overall comments and recommendations on the conduct of the 2015

General Election especially in respect of political party financing?

Thank you!



QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CATEGORY F (FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION WITH SELECTED MEMBERS OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY)

Good afternoon respected gentlemen, my name is Babayo Sule PhD student Political Science Universiti Utara Malaysia; I am here for data collection. I am seeking for maximum cooperation from you and I pledge that all information provided from you would be treated with utmost confidence and secrecy thank you sir. As you know sir, the title of the topic is “Impact of Political Party Financing on Integrity of the 2015 General Election”. I am seeking or soliciting for your cooperation in responding to the following questions as where applicable.


1. Do you have the idea on the regulations of political party financing in Nigeria during the 2015 General Election?
2. If yes for the above, what are your views on the nature of rules and regulations on political party financing in Nigeria are they adequate?
3. Do you think the political parties and the candidates have the full knowledge of regulations on political party financing the 2015 General Election?
4. Do you believe that INEC create proper awareness on the regulations on political party financing to the parties, candidates and the general public?
5. Do you believe that the parties and the candidates adhere strictly to the provisions in the political party financing in the 2015 General Election?
6. Have you witness a case of violation of the regulations by parties, candidates or INEC itself?
7. Do you think the INEC succeeded in monitoring the campaign activities of parties and candidates in the 2015 General Election?
8. Have you witness cases of corrupt practices in the process of the conduct of the 2015 General Election from the parties, candidates, electorates or other public officers responsible for the conduct of the election?

9. What do you think are the impacts of political party financing in the 2015 General Election?
10. Does the political party financing in the 2015 General Election affects the integrity of the election in terms of credibility?
11. What are your comments and recommendations for future implications?

Thank you, gentlemen!




**APPENDIX C: MAPS SHOWING GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
OF THE 2015 GENERAL ELECTION (PRESIDENTIAL)**



State governor election results

■ APC
 ■ PDP
 ■ APGA
 ▨ No election
 ■ Inconclusive
 ■ Not confirmed




Source: Inec

BBC

(GOVERNORSHIP)

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (SENATE)


Senate



Source: INEC 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

House of Representatives



Source: INEC 2015

**APPENDIX D: EVIDENCES OF ILLEGAL SOURCES AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES IN THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL PARTY FINANCING OF
THE 2015 GENERAL ELECTION**



**\$2.1 billion
(N777, 133, 624,
337,580.00)
provided for
purchase of arms
to fight Boko
Haram through his
office diverted to
campaign financing
for PDP in 2015**



N23 Billion (\$63,
822,813.191million
bribe to INEC
officials to rig the
2015 Presidential
Elections for PDP.

